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Abstract 
This research makes a significant and important contribution to the literature on 
Canadian housing finance by identifying four regimes that represent a continuum toward 
a market-based mortgage system where Canadian households can readily access 
mortgage credit.  The history of housing finance in Canada, like many nations, has been 
plagued by a lack of an effective way to channel savings into mortgages, and this has 
influenced households in the process of making the rent versus buy decision to obtain 
housing services.  Innovation and advancements in Canada`s mortgage lending system 
and integration of mortgage funding with capital markets from 1900 to 2010, specifically 
mortgage backed securities enhanced with mortgage loan insurance, allow more 
households to shift from renting to homeownership.  A cross-country comparison of 
OECD nations illustrates that a domestic mortgage market system must be sufficiently 
liberal and flexible so that a representative household can evaluate homeownership as 
an investment decision.  In addition, a stylized Markowitz optimal portfolio selection 
model looks at homeownership as a critical asset allocation in the presence of bonds 
and equities in two Canadian markets: Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan 
Vancouver.  The conclusion is that when the long-term mortgage loan borrowing rate is 
used to construct the capital allocation line, the efficient frontier is a blend of bonds and 
equities, and housing only forms part of an optimal risky portfolio over long holding 
periods.  The economic model and empirical results show that single detached housing 
and apartment condominiums offer households different economic returns.  A household 
may respond to this reality through deferring maintenance and holding the housing asset 
for long periods to maximize the implied imputed return.  The instructive finding is that 
homeownership is a long-term investment that hedges rent risk, and if a household does 
not over-consume housing, there are significant gains from imputed rent.  The 
homeownership decision for most households is often based on maximum permissible 
mortgage credit granting rules rather than optimal portfolio selection.  The equilibrium 
approach verifies the probability distribution of positive economic returns in both 
Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver over long holding periods.   
Keywords:  Housing Finance; Mortgage Lending; Homeownership; Mortgage Backed 
Securities; Optimal Asset Allocation  
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Glossary 
Alt-A 
Mortgage 
Borrowers 
This class of mortgage borrowers includes new immigrants without a 
credit rating or self-employed individuals that cannot verify either 
employment or income and specific mortgage products exist for this 
borrower class. 
Collateral 
Mortgage 
Obligation 
This is a special purpose investment vehicle that as a legal entity owns 
mortgage assets within a pool.  The mortgage assets represent the 
collateral and the mortgage pool provides cash flows for a bond issue 
sold to investors whereby specified tranches, for example senior, 
mezzanine or equity, receive the distribution of cash flows subject to a 
contract which is referred to as the structure. 
Credit 
Default Swap 
This swap contract is an unfunded credit derivative that results in a 
buyer of the credit default swap making a series of payments to the 
seller of the credit default swap to obtain insurance like protection in the 
event of a credit default.  However, credit default swaps are not 
insurance since the buyer of the credit default swap does not need to 
own the underlying asset and the seller may not be a regulated entity 
and is not mandated to set aside a reserve fund from the premium 
payments to pay claims in the event of a credit default. 
Credit 
Derivative 
This form of derivative is a bilateral contract and is negotiated over the 
counter, and not on an exchange, and is similar to other derivatives in 
that the seller of protection in a credit derivative contract receives 
premiums from the buyer of the protection until maturity, or until default, 
against the credit risk of the reference entity such as a mortgage pool.  
A credit derivative can be unfunded like a credit default swap or funded 
like collateralized debt obligations. 
Credit 
Enhancement 
The purpose is to enhance the credit rating of an investment often 
fundamental to the securitization transaction in structured finance.  
Similarly, it can reduce credit risk and provide, for example, a lender or 
investor, with a guarantee of compensation if a borrower defaults by way 
of collateral, insurance, and or some form of counterparty agreement. 
Credit Risk  Credit risk in housing finance means the risk that the mortgage borrower 
will default on a mortgage loan and the mortgage lender is not able to 
cover its loss due to foreclosure. 
Mortgage 
Backed 
Securities 
Referred to as MBS, this asset backed security represents a claim on 
the principal and interest cash flows from a pool of mortgage loans 
originated from various financial institutions.  MBS is typically sold as 
bonds and because mortgage borrowers can prepay mortgages there is 
the potential for prepayment risk.  Credit risk also exists unless the 
mortgage assets are insured or guaranteed. 
 xiii 
Mortgage 
Loan 
Insurance 
On high loan-to-value mortgages, typically where the mortgage borrower 
does not have a 20% downpayment, there is often a legislative mandate 
to require mortgage loan insurance to be obtained from a mortgage loan 
insurance supplier.  Mortgage loan insurance is also integral to MBS.  
The premium is paid to the insurance company at the time of mortgage 
funding to insure or guarantee the mortgage lender against loss due to 
foreclosure. 
Subprime 
Mortgage 
Lending 
The common misperception is that subprime mortgage borrowers can 
be defined by a type of mortgage product such as mortgages with zero 
down payments, extended amortizations or interest only payments.  
Subprime mortgage borrowers are properly defined by their respective 
credit rating.  A subprime mortgage borrower is someone that obtains a 
mortgage loan even though they have an impaired credit rating, usually 
due to a recent bankruptcy or when payments on personal debt 
obligations including taxes have been missed and are in arrears. 
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Executive Summary  
The history of housing finance in Canada, like many nations, has been plagued 
by a lack of an effective way to channel savings into mortgages, and this has 
constrained households which are in the process of making the rent versus buy decision 
to obtain housing services as a homeowner.  Innovation and advancements in Canada`s 
housing finance system and integration of mortgage funding with capital markets, 
through the secondary mortgage market, and specifically mortgage backed securities 
enhanced with mortgage loan insurance, have allowed for an advanced mortgage 
market so that households can easily shift from renting to homeownership.  This 
research makes a significant and important contribution to the literature on Canadian 
housing finance by identifying four regimes that represent a continuum toward a 
mortgage system that is sufficiently advanced so that a Canadian household can readily 
access mortgage credit for either home purchase or a home equity line of credit.  Since 
1900, a market based mortgage system has emerged in Canada with secure mortgage 
funding sources and an institutional framework to support homeownership of different 
housing types. 
Investors benefit from financial innovation and often least understood is 
innovation related to the mortgage market as a necessary pre-condition for households 
to evaluate homeownership as an investment decision.  Homeownership requires a 
substantial investment that not only dominates total household wealth but is often 
supported by a large mortgage loan obligation.  In return, households will obtain 
consumption of housing services and also have the expectation to earn returns from 
potential capital gains and imputed rent.  To gain insight into housing finance in Canada 
this research also evaluates the features and indicators of a mortgage market among 
advanced economies to determine whether a flexible and liberal mortgage market exists 
in Canada.  Under such a system a representative household can use its wealth to 
become a homeowner and then manage the equity in a principal residence as a long-
lived security.  The household can then dynamically span its consumption needs through 
access to a mortgage loan which represents a second, long-lived security.   
The research proposes two indices based on a comprehensive set of features 
and indicators present in a domestic mortgage market.  The first index considers the 
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degree to which a domestic mortgage market is liberal and a second index considers the 
degree to which a domestic mortgage market is flexible.  The liberal index relates to the 
domestic homeownership rate, while the flexible index relates to the domestic level of 
mortgage debt per capita.  When the indices are combined on a matrix they serve to plot 
the relative position of a domestic mortgage market system to confirm whether it is 
dynamically complete, supporting homeownership as an investment.  The indices 
proposed in this research are then applied to a cross-country comparison.  The research 
represents a refinement and extension to the “synthetic index of mortgage market 
development” and “index of government participation in housing finance markets”, both 
set forth by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008, 2011) as well as other studies 
presented in the research.  The conclusion of the research is that the mortgage markets 
of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and Australia are sufficiently 
liberal and flexible so that a representative household can evaluate homeownership as 
an investment decision.  The findings support research whereby investment in 
homeownership forms part of the investor’s critical allocation decision within an optimal 
portfolio selection model. 
This research draws from existing studies on portfolio selection.  In these models 
housing is included among financial assets.  The main finding of the literature is that 
housing, due to its high cost and need for a large mortgage loan, crowds out investment 
in equities.  Most studies focus on the U.S. and the income tax deductibility of mortgage 
loan interest is a public subsidy that in and of itself, can influence homeownership 
preferences and mortgage credit demand.  The motivation for this research is to refine 
and extend the theoretical approach on how a representative household, that has 
qualified to become a homeowner but requires a mortgage loan, evaluates housing 
investment in the presence of equities and bonds.  The insight of this research 
contributes to finance theory and concludes that homeownership as a critical asset 
allocation is more complex than other asset classes.  Households must consider housing 
type, holding period, property maintenance, and the mortgage lending system as part of 
the optimal portfolio selection.  For the empirical research a Canadian market setting, 
Metropolitan Vancouver and Metropolitan Toronto where homeownership levels are 70 
per cent.  Canadian findings are an important addition to existing studies that focus on 
 xvi 
the U.S.  A Canadian approach avoids the influence of taxation deductibility of mortgage 
loan interest that shapes studies with a U.S. focus.   
In this research a stylized Markowitz optimal portfolio selection model is 
presented.  The guidance for expectation of returns and volatility of returns for equities 
and bonds are exogenous, based on long-term historic results, and three scenarios are 
presented for housing:  
1.  expectations of house price returns and imputed rents that follow 
historical returns;  
2.  an equilibrium approach where the change in house prices and 
imputed rents evolve together as a stochastic process; and  
3.  implied annual rates of housing returns necessary for housing to be 
an asset in an optimal portfolio selection above the global minimum 
variance portfolio.   
Empirically, interest rates, specifically the mortgage loan borrowing rate and the 
household lending rate, shape the efficient risk-return opportunities when the portfolio 
selection includes housing and financial assets.  When the long term mortgage loan 
borrowing rate is used to construct the capital allocation line (CAL), the efficient frontier 
is a blend of bonds and equities, and housing only forms part of an optimal risky portfolio 
in Metropolitan Vancouver for a single detached house under deferred property 
maintenance at a holding period of 25 years or more and an apartment condominium 
under deferred property maintenance at a holding period of 40 years.  In Metropolitan 
Toronto housing is never part of the optimal portfolio selection.  This would suggest that 
households would tend to avoid homeownership, yet homeownership rates are high in 
both markets.  An important insight is that due to the separation property, when the CAL 
is defined by the risk free rate to represent the available lending rate or a short-term 
mortgage loan borrowing rate, then the global minimum variance portfolio is the optimal 
risky portfolio.  While largely dominated by a holding of bonds and a modest holding of 
equities, the global minimum variance portfolio includes housing in the asset allocation 
for both market areas, but the initial net wealth requirements are very high, and greatly 
exceed that of maximum loan-to-value (LTV) mortgage lending ratios.  As such, the 
homeownership decision for most households is based on maximum permissible 
mortgage credit granting rules and not optimal portfolio selection and homeowners bear 
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unique investment risk.  The equilibrium approach verifies the high probability 
distribution of negative returns in both Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver 
over a holding period of less than 25 years under full property maintenance.  Without 
explicitly examining the benefits of renting, there is strong evidence to suggest that when 
a household requires consumption of housing services over the short or medium term 
the rental housing market should be regarded as the primary source of housing supply.  
The instructive finding from the results of implied annual housing returns suggests that 
an investor with a short term outlook on homeownership is expecting a high return and 
ownership control of a housing asset allows for high return property renovations, and this 
capacity is unique to housing as an asset.  Finally, homeownership is a long-term 
investment that hedges rent risk, and if a household does not over-consume housing, 
there are significant gains from imputed rent.  
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
The motivation for this research is to provide a richer understanding of the 
evolution in Canada`s housing finance system and the household decision to own 
housing services.  To address this in a thorough manner it is important to first identify the 
major turning points and advancements in the Canadian mortgage lending system and 
underlying institutional framework that link housing finance to homeownership.  For the 
purposes of this research housing finance is understood to encompass mortgage 
funding.  This also includes the sources of mortgage funds, the mortgage products and 
the mortgage funding channels that mortgage borrowers rely upon to secure finance to 
realize the goal of homeownership.  Housing finance includes the secondary market 
system in which many mortgage lenders operate to fund mortgage loans.  Housing 
finance gives a central role for government to provide the institutional framework and 
legal system to support mortgage lending.  Moreover, government can offer 
homeownership tax incentives and subsidies.  Government can even direct support and 
enhancements to offset the credit risk related to mortgage lending and securitization of 
mortgage pools.   
This research considers that a market based mortgage market lending system 
and secure funding sources are a necessary pre-condition for households to make the 
choice between owning and renting housing services.  An advanced mortgage lending 
system allows households to access home equity over time as needed to support 
household finance.  With such a comprehensive outlook on housing finance this 
research contributes to the literature on housing finance and mortgage market 
development in an international context.  It also adds significantly to the modest 
literature on Canadian housing finance.  This research does not address all aspects of 
the legal system and the institutional framework integral to a market based mortgage 
lending system, and this will be more fully addressed in future research.   
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In Chapter 2 the research highlights the specific regimes that define the evolution 
of housing finance in Canada.  It tracks the progress and advancements over the four 
regimes through a descriptive review.  Appendix A provides a timeline of key dates to 
assist the reader.  The researcher has found it necessary to highlight significant changes 
in the U.S. housing finance system as well.  The importance of drawing from the U.S. 
experience will become evident as it either directly or indirectly relates to the evolution of 
housing finance in Canada.  The concluding remarks will flow into the following chapters 
and allow some important conclusions to be drawn.  Chapter 3 intends to contribute to 
the international housing finance literature in a significant way.  It proposes a theoretical 
index and matrix to evaluate the degree to which a domestic mortgage lending system is 
sufficiently liberal and flexible to be defined as a dynamically complete, supporting 
homeownership as both an investment decision and to obtain housing services in a way 
that can smooth inter-temporal household consumption.  Chapter 4 refines and extends 
existing literature on portfolio theory to consider investment in homeownership in the 
presence of bonds and equities as an optimal portfolio selection. Under this approach a 
household that qualifies for homeownership through the mortgage lending system can 
choose among different housing types over different holding periods and express 
strategic considerations related to property maintenance. 
The motivation for this research is to better understand why some people choose 
to own while others choose to rent.  Unlike the past, home equity and the appreciation of 
housing as an asset have formed an integral part of retirement planning.  In today’s 
world consumers are taking a more active role in how best to consumer housing 
services.  Consumers are also taking a more active role in the mortgage lending system.  
With the advent of financial innovation and widespread use of computers a 
representative household can evaluate homeownership as part of the investor’s critical 
allocation decision.  Without fully realizing it, households are taking a portfolio 
optimization approach to homeownership.  Households are evaluating the rent versus 
buy decision alongside equities, bonds and a risk free asset, such as a mortgage loan, 
within a stylized Markowtiz optimal portfolio selection model.   
The mortgage lending system in Canada and the U.S. has undergone 
unprecedented change over the last few decades.  There is a new paradigm in housing 
finance.  Households are considering a range of goals as they decide on whether to own 
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or rent housing services.  This is only possible with a more transparent and inclusive 
mortgage lending system that is both liberal and flexible.  For the purposes of this 
research, a mortgage market that is both sufficiently liberal and flexible is defined to be 
dynamically complete.  The economic reasoning of this conclusion draws from the work 
of Duffie and Huang (1985), but extended to the housing market, whereby under a 
Radner (1972) style equilibrium a representative household can dynamically span the 
consumption space provided by homeownership in a principal residence through the 
mortgage market. Given that housing services obtained by renting or owning are 
substitutes, Hornstein (2009), in those nations with a dynamically complete mortgage 
market, the percentage of households that are homeowners should outweigh those that 
are renters.  There are specific economic benefits for households that view 
homeownership as an investment choice relying on mortgage funding as a household 
finance tool.  
Chapter 3 is critical to this research.  First, it presents a literature review with a 
Canadian focus on the investment qualities of homeownership including a description of 
the institutional framework of mortgage markets to support homeownership.  This flows 
into a discussion on the limitations of housing markets to fit the traditional principles of 
complete markets and the notion of a dynamically complete market is proposed.  A 
simple theoretical model is used to present comparative statics to highlight the important 
role of the mortgage market to support housing as an investment.  The researcher uses 
these findings to look at housing finance in an international context.  The ranking of 
domestic mortgage markets is based on a comprehensive set of inter-related features 
and indicators to create two indices.  The first index considers the degree to which a 
domestic mortgage market is liberal and a second index considers the degree to which a 
domestic mortgage market is flexible.  The liberal index relates to the domestic 
homeownership rate, while the flexible index relates to the domestic level of mortgage 
debt per capita.  When the indices are combined on a matrix they serve to plot the 
relative position of a domestic mortgage market system to confirm whether it is 
dynamically complete, supporting homeownership as an investment.  The proposed 
indices are applied to a cross-country comparison of Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations, similar to the work of the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008, 2011).  Chapter 4 can then consider a homeownership 
investment as part of a household`s optimal asset allocation. 
In Chapter 4 the researcher starts with the premise that the household decision 
to become a homeowner represents a significant share of a household`s net wealth and 
may mean that investments in financial assets are deferred since homeownership 
typically entails a large mortgage loan obligation.  The economic intuition is that while 
the household choice to become a homeowner supports the need for consumption of 
housing services, it is fundamentally an investment problem.  This contributes to the 
literature on portfolio selection, and this draws from the fundamentals of portfolio theory 
and asset selection beginning with Markowitz (1952), Samuelson (1969), and Merton 
(1971).  Extensions to the literature that include homeownership in the portfolio selection 
consider whether housing impacts equity market participation, and how portfolio 
selection may differ depending on an investor`s financial wealth, income or age and the 
cost of housing.  This research is useful and simple since it refines and extends existing 
research.  It proposes a stylized Markowitz optimal portfolio selection model in which a 
household`s portfolio selection that includes housing among financial assets account for 
different housing types; length of holding period; imputed rent; property maintenance 
and the mortgage lending system. 
This research does not address the challenges that many households face in 
obtaining acceptable housing services from both market and non-market sources and 
does not consider the supply and demand of housing.  This research also moves beyond 
studies that address a household`s portfolio selection as a simple utility maximizing 
consumption model without fully accounting for the complete range of benefits and costs 
associated with homeownership as an investment and the mortgage lending system in 
which households finance homeownership.  Advancements in mortgage markets allow 
home equity in a principal residence to be used as a household finance tool to smooth 
inter-temporal consumption.  Undoubtedly, home equity will continue to play an 
important role in financing retirement needs given stock market volatility.  This research 
is unique among the literature in that it considers different housing types, various holding 
periods and property maintenance.  The model presented allows a household to choose 
between an apartment condominium and a single detached home.  This model allows a 
household to consider finite holding periods.  As such, it adds to other models that either 
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assume an infinite horizon, Miao and Wang (2007), or an optimal stopping time, Cetin 
and Zapatero (2010).  Finally, households can also express strategic considerations 
related to property maintenance.   
For simplicity, the model and empirical analysis follows a Canadian market 
setting, unlike the U.S., where the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property 
taxes is a public subsidy that can influence demand for mortgage credit and therefore 
entice households to become homeowners.  Canada is similar to the U.S. and 
elsewhere in that capital gains and imputed rent related to homeownership of a principal 
residence over time are tax-exempt.  For the empirical work, the housing markets of 
Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver have been selected since 
homeownership levels approximate 70 per cent, and these housing markets report high 
levels of sales transactions, with relatively high house prices, but without much influence 
of subprime mortgage lending as has been the case in many U.S. housing markets.   
The stylized model assumes that a household, through the mortgage lending 
system, has qualified to become a homeowner and will make a portfolio selection that 
includes housing among financial assets such as equities and bonds at a specific point 
in time.  The expectation of returns and volatility of returns for equities and bonds are 
exogenous, based on long-term historic results.  There are three scenarios presented for 
housing:  
1.  expectations of house price returns and imputed rents that follow 
historical returns;  
2.  an equilibrium approach where the change in house prices and 
imputed rents evolve together as a stochastic process; and  
3.  implied annual rates of housing returns necessary for housing to be 
an asset in a portfolio selection above the global minimum variance 
portfolio.   
Chapter 4 begins with a literature review on housing as an investment; the role of 
the mortgage lending system in supporting homeownership; and aspects of portfolio 
theory that include housing in the selection.  The researcher then sets forth a simple 
economic model to evaluate a household`s portfolio selection that considers 
homeownership in the presence of equities and bonds.  The empirical findings focus on 
Canada’s two main housing markets: Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver.  
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The summary discusses the implications when a household places homeownership 
within an optimal portfolio and highlights key findings related to household preferences in 
favour of homeownership. 
 
 7 
Chapter 2.  
 
Toward a Market Based Mortgage Lending System 
There has been an evolution in housing finance in Canada which highlights the 
importance of the mortgage lending system to support households to make the rent 
versus buy decision to obtain housing services.  Financial innovation allows households 
to weigh the economic costs and benefits of buying or renting housing services.  This 
strengthens the rationale for a household to regard homeownership of a principal 
residence as an investor`s critical allocation decision, but this was not always the case.  
While homeownership rates for Canadians in urban markets have stabilized since the 
1980s at about 70 per cent, according to Statistics Canada, this is about twice that of the 
1920s when the rate was only 40 per cent.  Rural households in Canada have 
predominantly chosen homeownership since rural housing markets are more affordable; 
the home and employment are often inter-connected in rural areas; and also due to the 
lack of available rental housing options in rural housing markets. 
Housing finance in Canada, like many nations, has been plagued by a lack of an 
effective way to channel savings into mortgages.  The evidence presented in research 
by Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), Mayer and 
Pence (2007), Buckland and Dong (2008), Shiller (2008), Sherlund (2008), Mian and 
Sufi (2008), Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009), and Simpson and Buckland (2009) 
shows that without a market based mortgage lending system and without a secure 
mortgage funding source, households can be severely constrained from 
homeownership.  A market based mortgage system where mortgage funding is 
integrated with capital markets through the secondary mortgage market and mortgage 
backed securities (MBS), allows households to openly evaluate the rent versus buy 
decision for consumption of housing services.  At different times in Canada`s history, 
government participation, market practices and the mortgage lending framework have: 
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• mirrored changes in the U.S. mortgage system but with a lag; 
• purposefully not replicated the U.S. mortgage lending system; or  
• expressly followed the U.S. system, but often with the tendency for a larger 
role for public organizations and with generally less de-regulation than 
resulted in the U.S.  
As a descriptive review will confirm, even though housing finance in Canada has 
similarities to the U.S. system and comparisons can be made to other systems around 
the world, it is unique.  The process of change and advancement over the years can be 
defined as four distinct regimes.   
2.1. Regime 1 (1900 to 1953): 
A Constrained Mortgage Market System  
Canada, in the early 1900s, as described by Harris and Ragonetti (1998), had 
limited options for households to obtain mortgage credit, not dissimilar to many nations 
today where mortgage credit is just becoming available.  During the early part of the 
twentieth century, equitable mortgages were typical and variations of this form of 
mortgage credit still exist in Canada at modest levels and are also found in other 
nations.  In simple terms, under these informal and unregulated contracts, borrowers 
simply pledge property as security for mortgage debt and the mortgage lender is equally 
likely to be a private individual, commercial business or non-profit agency.  This form of 
mortgage lending, as well as vendor take-back mortgages whereby the seller of a home 
will hold and underwrite a first or second mortgage loan of the new home buyer, were 
commonly seen throughout Canada until the 1950s, as documented by Miron (1988).  
Due to constrained mortgage lending, many households often had to make outright cash 
purchases for new housing or obtain a line of credit from a local lumber store and 
construct homes in phases as household finances allowed, as confirmed by Paterson 
(1991).  This often forced households to defer homeownership for an extended period of 
time.  In Québec, La Confédération des caisses populaires Desjardins du Québec 
played an important role in mortgage lending in Québec since 1900, setting the 
foundation and framework for the credit union system to develop across Canada.   
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Poapst (1993) explains that institutional residential mortgage lending in Canada 
was generally financed by life insurance companies from the early 1900s even until the 
1960s, with the highest market share at 90 per cent between 1944 and 1954.  Trust and 
mortgage loan institutions focused on residential mortgage lending and term deposits.  
Banks did not participate in the residential mortgage lending system as bank charters 
limited their lending practices to the borrowing needs of the business community.  
During the first regime, Canadian households typically held 5-year term 
mortgages with loan payments usually made once or twice a year and sometimes 
quarterly.  Mortgage credit was largely constrained by the LTV ratio extended to 
mortgage borrowers, typically set at 50 per cent of assessed property value. Mortgage 
payments included two components: a small amount of repaid principal with the greater 
payment being accrued interest.  After 5 years, the principal outstanding became legally 
and fully due. Contracts did not offer borrowers a legal right to renew and rollover a 
mortgage, even though the lender would typically renew the mortgage if the borrower 
had made steady payments.  Depending on economic conditions, many households 
were subject to unpredictable mortgage credit granting and foreclosure was common as 
a mature system of mortgage lending did not generally exist.  Under this regime of 
housing finance, the risk of homeownership was high for both the lender and borrower, 
and the potential for capital appreciation associated with homeownership was relatively 
low.   
The 1944 revision to Canada’s National Housing Act (NHA) set mortgage loan 
rates at 4.5 per cent and allowed the amortization of mortgage loans up to 30 years.  It 
also introduced direct mortgage lending and formed the basis for a national housing 
agency, Central (later changed to Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 
to assist returning war veterans in obtaining adequate shelter.  The mortgage system 
was liberalized once again and by the 1950s the maximum LTV of mortgage loans was 
increased to 93.33 per cent.  Mortgage loan rates were capped by statute to keep costs 
down, and the interest rate ceiling on joint loans, whereby the mortgage loan was 
underwritten jointly by a financial institution and the federal government, was typically set 
at no more than 2 per cent above the yield on 12-year Canada Bonds. According to 
Steele (1993), this transformed the residential mortgage market, helping to assist 
middle-income households in obtaining mortgage financing.  Some constraints on low 
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income households were evident, as outlined by Steele (1993), due to the level-payment 
structure of NHA mortgages; high construction standards (at the time) that prescribed a 
minimum house price; unfavourable policies for lending on owner-occupied duplexes 
and triplexes; exclusion from “qualifying income” of anyone other than the household 
head; and lending exclusively on new buildings, ignoring the lower cost existing housing 
stock.  During the first regime, some provinces in Eastern Canada, notably Nova Scotia 
and Québec, directed homeownership strategies to low-income households.  Starting in 
1948, Québec`s Family Housing Act provided a 3 per cent interest rate subsidy to low-
income households with specific exclusions for homes at the upper price range in the 
market, in contrast to NHA rules.  During this time in Nova Scotia, low-income 
households could qualify for homeownership for unfinished homes and use sweat equity 
to finish the home as a replacement for a traditional down payment. 
Even as late as the 1950s, over 25 per cent of all Canadian households 
purchased a new or resale home without a mortgage, as Miron (1988) documents.  
Mortgage finance was important in larger urban markets, as illustrated in Table 1. At this 
time, Toronto had a much higher level of mortgage credit using first and second 
mortgages than Vancouver, suggesting a constraint on overall mortgage loan amounts, 
likely due to higher home prices.  Although homeownership levels without a mortgage 
were higher in Vancouver, this does not mean that mortgage credit was evenly 
distributed among all neighbourhoods.  The establishment of Vancity Credit Union in 
1946 had a goal to direct mortgage lending into lower income neighbourhoods, often 
restricted in obtaining mortgage credit.  Vancity would eventually become the nation`s 
largest credit union.  Since the 1950s, Canada`s credit union system has played a 
substantial role in providing mortgage credit to households in many previously under-
served jurisdictions.   
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Table 1. Historic Mortgage Finance in Toronto and Vancouver 
Toronto     1941   1951   
Homeowner without mortgage  25,381 (40.5%)  81,375 (42.3%) 
Homeowner with 1st mortgage  33,841 (54.0%)  90,845 (47.2%) 
Homeowner with 1st and 2nd mortgage   3,447 (5.5%)  20,250 (10.5%) 
Vancouver     1941   1951  
Homeowner without mortgage  21,006 (59.0%%) 63,165 (60.5%) 
Homeowner with 1st mortgage  14,383 (40.4%)  39,480 (37.9%) 
Homeowner with 1st and 2nd mortgage       214 (0.6%)    1,685 (1.6%) 
           
Source: 8th Census of Canada, 1941 and Ninth Census of Canada, 1951 
The first regime saw the beginnings of a shift to higher homeownership levels in 
urban areas.  The formalization of a mortgage lending system open to households with 
stable income and employment, often in defined geographic markets, was the start of 
the process.  However, direct government intervention and programs were still 
necessary to overcome many market limitations. Households lacked access to a secure 
mortgage funding source and the burdens and risks of homeownership were known to 
lenders and borrowers making rental housing a viable, low-risk option to obtain 
necessary housing services in urban markets. 
2.2. Regime 2 (1954 to 1968): 
A Secure Mortgage System with Some Constraints  
A revision to Canada’s NHA in 1954 replaced the joint (public – private) 
mortgage loans program with insured mortgage loans.  The Canadian introduction of 
mortgage loan insurance (MLI) in 1954, which followed MLI in the U.S. by 20 years 
(1934), provided an important safeguard for trust and loan companies to become 
mortgage lenders.  The 1954 Bank Act amendments permitted banks to participate in 
residential mortgage lending by way of NHA insured mortgages.  MLI was originally 
required by statute for any mortgage borrower that could not provide a 33 per cent 
downpayment, and later this was changed to 25 per cent and then finally to 20 per cent, 
which continues to remain in effect.  MLI was important for many prospective 
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homeowners looking to buy a home without adequate downpayment to qualify for a 
conventional mortgage. In effect, the provider of MLI safeguards the lender from 
borrower default and the risk of foreclosure, but the mortgage borrower pays the 
insurance premium which is typically included as part of the total mortgage loan, as 
Tracelet (2006) describes.  However, MLI did not compel financial institutions to 
originate mortgage lending and did not expand mortgage credit in any meaningful way, 
and bank lending was constrained by a ceiling on mortgage loan rates that could be 
charged to borrowers.   
Long term mortgage financing in Canada came about in the 1950s, and the 
renewable 10-year mortgage loan term was replaced with the longer 30 year loan term, 
eliminating the need to renew the loan before it was paid off. Prepayment was also 
permitted for the first time as the borrower was given a right to repay the loan in full on 
the third anniversary date of the loan, or thereafter.  National mortgage lending was 
further enhanced into remote communities with federal funds to pay lenders for the 
administrative cost and travel expenses to make mortgage loans in small and remote 
communities.  Up until 1967 and revisions to the Bank Act which took effect in 1969, life 
insurance companies, credit unions and trust and loan companies dominated the retail 
market for mortgage lending.  In 1967, the Caisse de dépôt placement du Québec was 
established, and it expanded mortgage lending in Québec.  However, there still was a 
need to modify the counter-cyclical behaviour in Canadian lending practices to better 
integrate mortgage funding with the capital market to increase the supply of mortgage 
funds eliminating sub-optimal financing constraints consumers often encountered in 
mortgage lending.  
In the second regime, demographic changes, specifically increasing household 
formation, placed demand on housing finance to support homeownership.  The housing 
market was changing as well with new condominium legislation that permitted 
developers in some provinces to sell townhomes and apartment units in multi-family 
buildings.  Although share ownership in cooperative buildings was common in some 
markets prior to this, the purchase of shares in a cooperative had many drawbacks, the 
most significant being limited financing opportunities, and generally ownership in the 
cooperative entity could not be mortgaged.  The introduction of legislation allowing for 
the development and sale of condominiums in 1966 in the provinces of B.C. and Alberta 
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was based on legislation from New South Wales in Australia.  The original Strata Titles 
Act set out the procedure for obtaining title to parts of a multi-storied building; rules for 
strata plans and for corporations formed by owners; and legal rights and obligations 
regarding common property. This was a transformation to the housing market and 
further revisions came into effect in B.C. in 1974 that provided for phased strata plans 
and strata plans on leased land.  The 1979 Condominium Act was passed in B.C. and 
has been generally mirrored in all Canadian jurisdictions. 
During the second regime, homeownership was made more accessible to low-
income households as downpayment and mortgage credit granting qualifications were 
relaxed, according to Steele (1993), and by 1965, 18 per cent of NHA borrowers fell in 
the bottom-third family income group, up from 6 per cent in 1954.  NHA MLI coverage 
was extended in the late 1960s to include condominiums and existing homes, increasing 
homeownership options for households that may otherwise have only qualified to rent 
multiple-family apartment units or hold an ownership interest in a co-operative housing 
project, financed with a personal loan, not a mortgage loan.   
2.3. Regime 3 (1969 to 2000): 
Toward a Market System with Mortgage Rate Volatility  
In 1969, when the constraints on mortgage lending were lifted, abolishing the 
interest rate ceiling (6 per cent NHA interest rate), banks could make uninsured 
mortgage loans and enter into the conventional mortgage market.  The dominant role of 
banks as the primary mortgage lenders in Canada was a result of expansion over the 
1970s and 1980s and also the acquisition by banks of mortgage trust companies 
(permitted by 1992 Bank Act revisions) that were experiencing financial difficulty 
particularly during the economic slowdown of 1992 to 1994, as Freedman (1998) 
documents.   
During the 1970s, CMHC was given the mandate to implement government 
policy to deliver large-scale subsidy to low-income households to become homeowners.  
To achieve 10,000 ownership units directed at low-income households, a $200 million 
“innovative low-cost housing programme” was announced in 1970.  Steele (1993) notes 
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that this program did not provide loans at below the CMHC lending rate; and in 1971 the 
$100 million Assisted Home Ownership Program (AHOP) was introduced along with 
extended mortgage loan amortizations.  The objective of AHOP was to make 
homeownership affordable by offering large initial monthly subsidies with a unique 
mortgage design where payments slowly increased over time.  According to Steele 
(1993), underlying the innovation were the assumptions that the rate of inflation would 
be stable; that the inflation premium on interest rates would not change upon rollover; 
that incomes would move in line with inflation making the payment-to-income ratio under 
AHOP affordable; and that house prices would steadily appreciate allowing for gains in 
home equity.  Funding supported approximately 161,000 homeownership units during 
the funding of AHOP, from 1970 - 1978.  By 1985, 11 per cent of all units had defaulted, 
and regionally Ontario realized 60 per cent of total AHOP defaults, with a default rate of 
20 per cent.  Of course, during this period, NHA defaults were also high due to house 
price volatility and a macro-economic shock to the economy related to excessive 
inflation over the 1970s.  In 1978, when AHOP was terminated, CMHC homeownership 
programs were largely confined to supporting mortgage product innovation initiated by 
financial institutions with NHA MLI and energy-savings programs such as the Canadian 
Home Insulation Program (1977 – 1986) and the Canadian Oil Substitution Program 
(1980 – 1985). 
The 1980 Bank Act revision responded to globalization by allowing foreign banks 
to incorporate subsidiaries in Canada and accept deposits.  Prior to this, foreign banks 
could only operate in wholesale banking.  This change created a broad-based, 
competitive market for mortgage lending in Canada.  However, mortgage loan costs 
could still vary and be subject to significant volatility that made mortgage credit risky for 
mortgage lenders, mortgage borrowers, and mortgage loan insurers.  The majority of 
mortgage funding during the 1970s in Canada had come from savings deposits which 
accounted for the largest funding source for mortgage lenders.  However, new financial 
products, primarily equity and bond mutual funds, offered investors the potential for 
diversified returns at higher levels than savings deposits, and therefore reduced a large 
share of savings deposits as a stable, low-cost residential mortgage funding supply.  
Homeownership and mortgage credit demand was increasing with incentives such as 
the Canada Home Buyer Plan, first introduced in 1992, to allow a first time home buyer 
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to direct savings within a registered retirement savings plan (RRSP) for the down 
payment of the purchase of a primary residence.  The First Home Loan Insurance 
Program, also introduced in 1992, reduced the minimum down payment on a 
household`s first time purchase of a principal residence (subject to certain conditions) 
from 10 per cent to 5 per cent. In 1998, the 5 per cent down payment threshold was 
expanded to include repeat home buyers as well. According to the Office of Consumer 
Affairs and CMHC, 70 per cent of first time home buyers between 1992 and 1997 would 
have been unable to purchase their home without the 5 per cent down payment option. 
The main challenge to mortgage funding in Canada during the 1980s and 1990s 
was due to mortgage loan rates that were both high and volatile exposing the mortgage 
system to significant interest rate risk, credit risk and prepayment risk.  Mortgage funding 
was also impacted by a decline in bank savings deposits due to competing investments.  
Mortgage loan defaults were often directly related to economic shocks impacting local 
economies as well as volatile and high mortgage loan rates that often made 
homeownership unaffordable due to high mortgage loan interest costs.  Mortgage 
contract features lacked flexibility to accommodate household mis-fortune due to loss of 
employment, strikes, or illness. There was a need to evolve the mortgage market further 
toward a fully market system with a consistent supply of low cost, stable mortgage 
funding sources. Integration of the capital market into mortgage lending was identified as 
the solution drawing from the U.S. experience.  Securitization became common in the 
mortgage market in the 1980s through MBS in the U.S. and this expanded globally ever 
since.  The reason this occurred in the U.S. highlights the institutional differences in 
housing finance and mortgage lending in the U.S. and Canada.  Understanding the U.S. 
housing finance system provides the reader with a context for the evolution of Canada’s 
housing finance system since the 1980s, paving the way for an era of low cost, stable 
mortgage funding in Canada in the fourth regime.  
2.3.1. The U.S. Influence on Canadian Housing Finance  
The following discussion highlights some key events in U.S. housing finance and 
mortgage market development, and while a full treatment of this topic is too large to 
address in this research, the timing of events and changes support the conclusion that 
the U.S. housing finance system has influenced developments in Canada’s system.   
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The current U.S. housing finance system and mortgage market are rooted in an 
institutional framework dating back to the 1930s, Green and Wachter (2005).  For many 
U.S. households the economic depression of the 1930s heightened existing constraints 
in the mortgage system as a large cross section of households were unable to initiate or 
renew a mortgage loan contract.  The financial and credit crisis of this era exacerbated 
the already high number of foreclosures due to increasing unemployment and failure of 
many financial institutions.  The estimate was that during the early 1930s about 40 per 
cent of U.S. households were renters and mortgage contracts were of a short term with 
LTVs generally not exceeding 50 per cent, Jameson (2002).  Since the government did 
not want to directly hold mortgages, a number of institutional changes took effect to 
remedy market imperfections starting with the 1933 Home Owner’s Act which supported 
the activities of Savings & Loans (S&Ls) to secure mortgage borrowers with a 25 to 30-
year mortgage at a fixed loan rate.  In 1934, with the passing of the National Housing Act 
in the U.S., the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) offered government-backed MLI 
as a credit enhancement for investors to purchase mortgages with confidence.  The 
Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, was established in 1938 
to support a secondary mortgage market for FHA mortgages.  The overall purpose of 
fixed long term mortgage contracts, combined with MLI, was to eliminate the 
destabilizing uncertainty of mortgage loan renewals rather than to directly promote 
homeownership.   
S&Ls traditionally participated in residential mortgage lending on a property held 
by a mortgage borrower located within 50 miles of the main office of each S&L.  
Between 1945 and 1966 the yield on a 3-month treasury bill did not exceed 4 per cent 
and S&Ls could readily raise mortgage credit directly from depositors and offer long term 
fixed rate mortgages at relatively low cost.  However, Regulation Q, imposed by the U.S. 
Congress on the S&Ls sector during the 1960s and 1970s, put a 5.5 per cent interest 
rate ceiling on interest paid to depositors.  With rising inflation rates in the 1970s which 
exceeded 13 per cent in 1979, this resulted in disintermediation for S&Ls.  The impact of 
Regulation Q on mortgage funding was immediate as depositors at S&Ls directed an 
increasing percentage of total deposits away from savings accounts to money market 
mutual funds, which reached 20 per cent of total deposits by the 1990s, Freedman 
(1998).  Regulation Q was phased out in the early 1980s so that S&Ls could compete for 
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deposit funds by offering interest rates in line with market rates.  By this time, however, 
an unsustainable gap due to maturity transformation highlighted the suboptimal practice 
between funding long term, fixed rate mortgage loans with short term deposits.  When 
mortgage loan rates exceeded 20 per cent in the early 1980s this resulted in an almost 
complete shift in mortgage terms to adjustable rates before a return to lower, more 
stable inflation in the 1990s and 2000s when U.S. mortgage borrowers once again 
preferred long term, fixed rate mortgages.  Deregulation of S&Ls was set out in the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act and the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982.  The economic value of thousands of S&Ls loan 
portfolios eroded following deregulation which allowed S&Ls to liberalize lending away 
from a business model based on residential mortgages to lending which included 
commercial property, credit cards, junk bonds, and other high risk lending ventures, 
Ferguson (2008).  S&Ls clearly did not have sophisticated underwriting expertise, risk 
based pricing and default servicing capabilities to ensure viable lending.  The S&Ls crisis 
lasted from 1986 to 1995.  It highlighted the obvious flaws in the maturity mismatch of 
residential mortgage lending and the unintended consequences of Regulation Q as well 
as deregulation within the S&L industry that fostered moral hazard in lending practices, 
resulting in a $153 billion bailout of impacted S&Ls by the U.S. Treasury, Jameson 
(2002).   
The growing loss of savings deposits as a mortgage funding source paved the 
way for MBS and the total percentage of U.S. residential mortgages securitized 
increased from almost nothing in the 1960s to 10 per cent by 1980, with an upward track 
to 50 per cent by 1990 and modest increase to 60 per cent through the 2000s, according 
to Freedman (1998) and the Mortgage Bankers Association.  The U.S. housing finance 
system which relied on MBS flowed naturally from the institutional framework imposed 
on the S&Ls and the mounting financial risks that resulted in poor economic 
performance for these financial institutions.  Mortgage lending shifted away from a 
funding model that relied on savings deposits at the same institution, towards one where 
the mortgage lender could focus solely on the origination of mortgage loans.  The market 
structure of mortgage lending in general was also changing as dedicated mortgage 
brokers were working directly with mortgage borrowers to originate mortgage loans, 
earning fees and commissions from the mortgage lender.  The financial institutions who 
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served households as mortgage lenders were also changing.  De-regulation allowed a 
growing number of non-depository financial institutions, referred to as mono-line 
dedicated residential mortgage lenders as well as mortgage investment companies 
(MICs) to enter the mortgage market.  The mono-line mortgage lenders relied on the 
MBS funding model for mortgage credit, and in many cases without access to any 
depositor savings accounts, had to partner with a wholesale funding source as an 
intermediate step in the securitization process.  
Government participation in U.S. housing finance has included a range of tax 
incentives and subsidies for homeowners such as mortgage interest deductibility and 
exclusion from capital gains taxation at the federal level as well as state and local 
property tax deductions.  While the U.S. MLI sector has a number of private sector 
companies, there has always been an important and direct role for government with 
significant activity recorded by government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), primarily 
Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae that began as one organization. However, in 1968, 
Congress directed Fannie Mae to support the conventional market and Ginnie Mae to 
support mortgage lending for the FHA, Department of Veterans Affairs Home Loan 
Program for Veterans, Office of Public and Indian Housing, and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Rural Development Housing and Community Facilities Programs.  Ginnie 
Mae does not purchase mortgages, nor does it buy, sell or issue MBS or debt securities. 
Private lending institutions approved by Ginnie Mae issue the MBS for which Ginnie Mae 
provides a guarantee. Moreover, Ginnie Mae only securitizes federally-insured or 
guaranteed loans.  The 1968 creation of a new private Fannie Mae allowed the U.S. 
Treasury to remove Fannie Mae`s debt from the government balance sheet and buy and 
sell non-government backed mortgages.  Freddie Mac was established in 1970 for the 
securitization of mortgages issued by S&Ls.  Since the 1980s, the provision of MLI in the 
U.S. has represented a multi-billion dollar industry for those collecting MLI premiums and 
securitization fees, supporting mortgage product innovation for trillions of dollars or 
mortgage funds.  The institutional framework to provide mortgage lenders and investors 
with a credit enhancement largely focused on MLI and the regulatory safeguard was to 
limit MLI to conventional, prime mortgages within specific property valuation ceilings.  
There was still a legacy of discriminatory U.S. mortgage lending practices, either based 
on geography or borrower class, Courchane, Surette, and Zorn (2004) and Benston 
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(1997).  The American Dream Downpayment Act, signed into law in 2003, had the 
objective to increase mortgage lending, facilitating a wave of subprime borrowers to 
become homeowners.  In support of this, structured credit derivatives, such as unfunded 
credit default swaps or funded credit debt obligations, supported mortgage product 
innovation and facilitated the sale of MBS to a broad spectrum of investor groups.   
The U.S. housing finance system in the 2000s was being funded by MBS at an 
increasing level, and the process of mortgage product innovation driven by deregulation 
included the introduction of subprime mortgage lending; interest only mortgages; and 
jumbo mortgages which are mortgage loans that exceed the maximum $417,000 GSE 
lending limit set in most U.S. markets.  Deregulation also resulted in innovation to 
important institutional processes.  For example, a privately run Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System was created in 1995 to speed up the registration of mortgages for 
about 60 million residential properties that could not be processed quick enough for MBS 
purposes within the county-operated deed system, Powell and Morgenson (2011).  Most 
importantly, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae took an expanded role in mortgage lending, 
holding about $5.5 trillion in 31 million residential mortgages and related loan guarantees 
by 2010, Timiraos (2010).  In September 2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been 
nationalized through a conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and by 
June 2010 the U.S. Treasury had extended a total of $145 billion to the two GSEs and 
the stocks were delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. The international financial 
crisis started in 2007 with complex links to the U.S. housing finance system by way of 
subprime mortgage lending, credit derivatives, MBS, and other aspects of financial 
deregulation.  Because of this, the role of the FHA and other public agencies in 
mortgage lending would begin to change and be subject to financial reforms under 
proposal by government officials and regulators since 2010.   
2.3.2. Differences in U.S. and Canadian Housing Finance 
The U.S. is unique in that many mortgage borrowers typically enter into 30-year, 
no prepayment penalty fixed rate mortgage contracts.  Even though long term fixed rate 
mortgages of the form in the U.S. have been offered in Canada, residential mortgages in 
Canada are typically rollover loans that amortize over 25 or more years.  The practice for 
Canadian mortgage lenders and borrowers has been to separate the mortgage loan 
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amortization period from the mortgage loan rate contract.  While a mortgage borrower 
will choose a 25 year amortization or longer, a fixed mortgage loan rate of 5 years would 
be considered a long term mortgage contract in Canada.  This is in keeping with deposit 
insurance offered to savings deposits at financial institutions served by the Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (created in 1968), which fully covers deposits up to 
$100,000 up to a 5-year term.  Typically, among Canadian mortgage borrowers, a 5-year 
fixed mortgage loan contract may prevail, for example, in the market during periods of 
volatile mortgage loan rates or among specific borrower classes such as first time home 
buyers who wish to avoid the risk of rising interest rates.  Equally common for a 
mortgage borrower, would be a short term, 1-year mortgage loan rate contract or even a 
variable rate that adjusts with changes usually tied to the prime bank lending rate.  For 
example, this may prevail in the market when the expectation is for declining interest 
rates.  Prepayment penalties in Canada are limited by the Interest Act to three months of 
interest on loans after the first five years of the term has elapsed, and may even be 
avoided through effective mortgage loan contract negotiations by a mortgage borrower 
or mortgage broker.  In contrast to the U.S., financial institutions in Canada have a more 
straight forward time matching the deposit book with the mortgage book.  The 
institutional framework in Canada of nationwide branching has allowed large financial 
institutions to diversify mortgage lending geographically and thus avoid the risk of undue 
mortgage loan concentration.  In the U.S. this risk is managed by financial institutions, 
either through MBS to diversify mortgage pools or by way of various risk management 
tools such as swaps and the existence of deep hedging markets for long-term interest 
rate risk. 
Although there are a number of similarities, housing finance in Canada evolved in 
a different fashion than in the U.S. for a number of reasons, such as: 
• historically, there was not a legislated interest rate ceiling on deposits in 
Canada, but rather a ceiling on a bank’s mortgage loan rate; 
• financial institutions in Canada were able to offer depositors market rates on 
savings accounts and term deposits to support mortgage lending; 
• there was not a large segment of borrower classes or regional housing 
markets in Canada under-served by the mortgage system as Canada had a 
blended system of national banks and localized lenders such as credit unions 
and caisses des dépôts; and 
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• unlike Canada which has a mortgage lending system based on full recourse 
should the mortgage borrower default, the U.S. mortgage lending system is 
essentially nonrecourse.  This creates a moral hazard, in the sense that 
should house prices decline or a mortgage borrower’s economic situation 
deteriorate, U.S. mortgage borrowers can almost freely engage in strategic 
mortgage default without penalty.  
The third regime was highlighted by direct government intervention to increase 
homeownership especially among lower-income households, and when the stability of 
these efforts eroded, supporting the increased market presence of mortgage lenders 
was seen as appropriate.  De-regulation of financial institutions generally followed the 
same timing of the U.S., although the services and operating environment of the 
financial services sector in Canada differed greatly from that of the U.S.  It became 
apparent that what was lacking in Canada related to secure, low cost mortgage funding 
sources to support mortgage product innovation, and this would come in the fourth 
regime. 
2.4. Regime 4 (2001 to 2010): 
An Advanced Mortgage System  
During the fourth regime the Canadian mortgage market exhibited the essential 
features of a market system with the presence of innovative mortgage products, 
increased numbers of mortgage lenders, and extended use of MLI and MBS.  The 
introduction of home equity lines of credit occurred in this regime, allowing households to 
refinance an existing principal residence and draw upon home equity to better manage 
household finance.  Similar to the U.S., this was often marketed to households as a low-
cost household finance tool to manage debt consolidation at more favourable credit 
terms than personal loans or high cost credit cards.  Financial institutions worked with 
dedicated mortgage professionals who advised households of the features and benefits 
of different mortgage products.  In addition, mortgage loan risks were reduced for 
lenders and borrowers alike with progressive default management tools, enhanced with 
MLI.  Most important to the system, was the presence of a broad range of mortgage 
lenders that relied on increasing use of MBS as a mortgage funding source that could 
ensure a consistent flow of low cost, stable mortgage credit to borrower classes with a 
prime credit rating. This was achieved by way of integration of the capital market into 
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mortgage funding, drawing from the U.S. experience and success in MBS portfolios for 
conventional mortgages, supported by credit enhancements, such as MLI.   
From 1961 to 1965 CMHC conducted 13 auctions of NHA mortgages to 
familiarize investment dealers with the instrument, but the experiment ended before the 
dealers took up a continual involvement in the secondary mortgage market, Poapst 
(1993).  In 1973, federal legislation was introduced to establish a joint public-private 
market maker for mortgage securities but this was not acceptable to private investors.  
From 1981 to 1985 the secondary mortgage market for NHA insured mortgages 
averaged 10 per cent of NHA loans held outside CMHC and this accounted for $1.8 
billion per year.  However, many of these transactions were among affiliated 
organizations that were part of the mortgage loans origination.  After 1990, mortgage 
lending in Canada was shifting toward a U.S. style of competition, with specialized 
residential mortgage lenders.  However, the lending environment for financial institutions 
involved in mortgage lending was impacted by minimum capital requirements based on 
the Basel I Accord in 1988 and Basel II Accord in 2004.  This set out capital adequacy of 
financial institutions, supervisory review and market discipline.  The Basel III Accord, 
introduced in 2010, with a goal of full implementation by the end of 2013.  Basel III sets 
out a new framework that requires banks and other deposit-taking institutions to maintain 
higher minimum levels of capital.  Among other things, Basel III should, over time, 
improve the quality of a financial institution’s capital, and imposes a new (non-risk-
based) leverage constraint as well as two new liquidity standards, the liquidity coverage 
ratio and the net stable funding ratio. 
While MBS gained market acceptance in Canada in 1987 with NHA MBS, only a 
fraction of mortgage lending credit was funded by NHA MBS during the first 15 years of 
the program.  It was not until 2001 that the Canada Mortgage Bond (CMB) program 
transformed the mortgage market in Canada.  Due to the monetary policy of central 
banks and macroeconomic factors, interest rates declined during the 2000s and NHA 
MBS and the CMB program have played a critical role in supplying mortgage credit to 
keep mortgage loan rates stable.  Figure 1 outlines long-term posted mortgage rates in 
Canada since 1950, and while these rates do not reflect discounting that is common 
during the mortgage contract negotiation, there has been a lowering and stabilizing trend 
in recent years.  Figure 1 also tracks some of the key turning points in modern Canadian 
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housing finance which still exist today as fundamental to a market based mortgage 
system.   
Figure 1. Mortgage Loan Interest Rates (Canada 5-Year Posted) 
and Key Turning Points in Housing Finance 
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In addition to obtaining MLI for high ratio LTV mortgage lending, mortgage 
lenders who participate in the NHA MBS and CMB program must obtain MLI for 
conventional, prime mortgage loans with less than 80 per cent LTV.  This is called 
portfolio insurance and is structured when mortgage loans are pooled into a portfolio and 
then insured. Portfolio insurance is motivated primarily by capital management and 
liquidity benefits with the end purpose being to create securitization-ready assets. With 
portfolio insurance it is the mortgage lender, and not the mortgage borrower, who pays 
the MLI premium.  From a mortgage lender’s perspective, MLI assists with capital 
management and liquidity because it minimizes mandatory risk-based capitalization 
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requirements.  It should be noted that under International Financial Reporting Standards, 
instituted in 2011, mortgage assets sold by financial institutions through NHA MBS and 
the CMB Program, will not generally achieve off-balance sheet treatment.  As such, 
mortgage lenders will be required to consolidate securitized mortgage on their balance 
sheets.   
NHA MLI offers a government guarantee to Approved Lenders for any mortgage 
loan for which a certificate of insurance is granted by the MLI provider, upon payment of 
a MLI premium.  MLI in Canada is provided to the market through the state provider of 
MLI, CMHC, and there are also private MLI companies.  NHA MLI allows Approved 
Lenders to keep mortgage assets on the balance sheet but with capital relief, 100 per 
cent for CMHC and 90 per cent for private MLI companies.  NHA MLI also includes a 
process for MBS securitization, and CMHC manages the activities of financial institutions 
in this regard by granting the status of Approved Issuer.  The status of Approved Issuer 
is granted by CMHC to a lending institution when certain operational guidelines related 
to profitability and minimum net worth are achieved.  An Approved Issuer is permitted to 
transform residential mortgage loans into an eligible NHA MBS pool which becomes a 
security, guaranteed by CMHC, and then can then be sold directly to investors.  
Approved Issuers are federally or provincially regulated mortgage lenders as well as 
aggregators and dealers that do not originate mortgages but operate as warehouse 
facilities or make whole loan purchases from other mortgage lenders such as mono-line 
financial institutions.  An Approved Issuer can directly sell a NHA MBS pool to investors 
after payment of a MBS guarantee fee to CMHC.  As all of the underlying mortgages in 
NHA MBS are insured, this eliminates the credit risk for investors.   
A refinement to the direct sale of a NHA MBS pool by an Approved Issuer to 
investors is the CMB program.  The CMB Program uses a special purpose trust, the 
Canada Housing Trust (CHT), to purchase eligible insured mortgages packaged into 
newly issued NHA MBS pools, and it is the CHT that will sell the NHA MBS pool to 
investors, rather than an Approved Issuer.  CMHC plays an integral role in the CMB 
program serving as the Guarantor and the Financial Service Advisor to the CHT.  This 
includes establishing requirements that the CHT must meet in order to obtain the 
guarantee from CMHC and advising on the market demand for CMB issuance and 
engagement of an underwriting syndicate to underwrite the CMB issue.  The CHT 
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accesses the secondary mortgage market by selling non-amortizing CMBs to investors 
and uses the proceeds to purchase NHA MBS pools from Approved Issuers.  In contrast 
to NHA MBS, and to provide investors with a bond-like investment, the CHT transforms 
the monthly cash flows from NHA MBS pools collected by MBS Sellers on behalf of the 
CHT into non-amortizing bond cash flows with fixed, semi-annual interest coupon bond 
payments over the CMB term and the repayment of principal at maturity.  A Central 
Paying Agency acts on behalf of the CHT to collect monthly payments from NHA MBS 
purchased by the CHT and oversee the administration of cash flows.  A key benefit of 
the CMB program is that mortgage assets can be replaced by the issuer in the case of 
prepayment, provided they are of the same risk and duration, fully utilizing the MBS fee, 
for example, paid on a 5-year mortgage pool.   
The CMB program has been an important advancement for Canadian mortgage 
lenders in achieving a market based mortgage system with stable mortgage credit.  To 
participate in the CMB program there is a basic requirement for an Approved Issuer to 
have a swap counterparty agreement in place to manage the payment obligations of the 
MBS pools as a safeguard to the CHT.  The role of the swap counterparty is to receive 
all the cash flow payments from the mortgage pools and while the interest belongs 
(becomes owned) by the swap counterparty, there is a requirement on the part of the 
swap counterparty to offset risk inherent in a NHA MBS pool.  This is to ensure the 
adequate cash flow to investors to support the coupon payments and hold and re-invest 
principal on behalf of the CHT in a separate account until the single bullet payment is 
due at maturity.  A main benefit of the CMB program is that there is no reinvestment and 
prepayment risk for CMB investors.   
While savings deposits remain the lowest cost source of mortgage funding, the 
CMB program was evaluated by KPMG (2008) and the conclusion was that the cost of 
funds obtained by banks through the CMB program was about 18 basis points less than 
the next lowest cost of long-term wholesale funding. The use of NHA MBS through the 
CMB program continued to rise since 2000, when less than $50 billion was reported 
outstanding, due largely to an increasing demand for mortgage credit.  In response to 
the financial credit crisis that began in 2007, the Government of Canada created an 
Insured Mortgage Purchase Program, from October 2008 until March 2010.  The 
purpose of the Program was to maintain the availability of Canadian lending credit, 
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whereby the Government through CMHC had the authority to purchase up to $125 billion 
in NHA MBS from Canadian financial institutions through a competitive reverse auction 
process managed by CMHC.  During the Program period $69.35 billion in NHA MBS 
was purchased.  Figure 2 tracks residential mortgage lending credit provided by the 
complete spectrum of Canadian financial institutions serving the homeowner mortgage 
market.  While chartered banks dominate the market, there are a range of other 
mortgage lenders.  The presence of a diversified group of mortgage lenders is an 
important and significant advancement in housing finance in Canada.  Canadian 
mortgage lenders which are deposit taking institutions rely on deposits for the lowest 
cost of mortgage funding.  However, as of 2010 the share of deposits as a source of 
mortgage funds represented about 60 per cent of Canadian mortgage funding, a decline 
from 72 per cent in 2006, according to CMHC`s Annual Reports.  As of 2010, CMHC 
securitization of various forms accounted for almost one-third of total mortgage funding, 
a two-fold increase in the use of CMHC securitization since 2006 levels.  Prior to NHA 
MBS and the CMB program, annual mortgage loans approvals in Canada averaged 
$400 million between 1949 and 1953 increasing to $18 billion annually between 1981 
and 1985.  For 2009, total mortgage approvals of $244 billion were reported, while the 
data on total credit showed annual mortgage growth of about $60 billion, (CAAMP, 
2011).  As of March 2011, total outstanding mortgage loans in Canada reached $1.042 
trillion, and the average annual growth rate of mortgage loans was about 9.7 per cent 
since 2001.   
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Figure 2. Total Outstanding Residential Mortgage Credit 
by Type of Financial Institution ($ Millions)  
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In addition to MBS, a covered bond (first issued by Royal Bank of Canada in 
October 2007) is a housing finance tool financial institutions can use to access the 
capital markets to support mortgage credit. Covered bonds, which are common in 
Europe, are secured debt instruments that give bondholders both a claim on the issuing 
bank and a priority claim on the bond’s dedicated and specified collateral while being 
retained on the issuers’ balance sheet.  Covered bonds require strict mortgage credit 
granting geared toward prime, conventional mortgage borrowers, with underwriting 
standards that often preclude high LTVs and place limits on debt service ratios.  Lenient 
personal bankruptcy rules, as exist in the U.S., are not conducive to covered 
bonds.  The proceeds from the sale of covered bonds are passed to the mortgage 
borrowers to purchase a home, and the interest and principal payments are passed to 
the investors holding the bonds.  The mortgage lender will add a margin to the cost of 
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mortgage funds to cover the administration of the bond as well as to price credit risk and 
allow for a profit.  Bonds are issued on an ongoing basis by the mortgage lender in 
individual series backed by a specific pool of mortgage loans, resulting in large and 
liquid tradable bond issues.  In 2009 Canadian financial institutions issued $1.43 billion 
in covered bonds.  During 2010, based on the strong performance of both mortgage 
collateral and the banking system in Canada, five of the six large national banks 
marketed 12 new issuances of covered bonds totalling $17.3 billion, and this accounted 
for 2.5 per cent of mortgage funding.  Further growth in use of covered bonds is likely.  
In addition, Canada will follow European countries with the introduction of legislation for 
covered bonds which, among other things, will detail priority rights to specific assets 
backing the covered bonds in the event of the issuer`s default.  It is likely that a fifth 
regime in Canadian housing finance will witness a reduction in government guarantees 
and MLI support for residential mortgages and covered bonds will be central to this. 
During the early part of the fourth regime Canada did mirror some of the 
mortgage innovations in the U.S., largely due to the presence of U.S. mortgage lenders 
operating in Canada.  It is well documented that the U.S. witnessed the mass marketing 
of subprime mortgage lending which reached 20 to 25 per cent of U.S. originations 
between 2004 and 2006, Green (2008) and Shiller (2008).  In addition to subprime 
mortgage lending and expanded use of credit derivatives, U.S. mortgage lenders 
expanded adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) with teaser rates for the first 2 years on a 
30 year fixed mortgage term; interest only mortgages; 50 year mortgage amortizations; 
and zero downpayment and negative equity mortgages.  However, because of NHA 
MBS requirements, innovation in Canada was largely directed to conventional borrowers 
with prime credit ratings and stable employment.  For much of the 2000s, NHA 
guidelines did allow for a maximum of 100 per cent LTV and therefore zero 
downpayments for new home purchases; interest only mortgages; Alt-A mortgages to 
self-employed households and new immigrants; home equity lines of credit and 40 year 
amortizations.  In terms of subprime mortgage lending, Canadian mortgage lending to 
this borrower class was more constrained than in the U.S. and at its height in 2007 
reached about 5 per cent of Canadian mortgage originations, as noted by Tal (2006).  
The reason is that in Canada subprime lending is typically equity lending to borrowers 
with a credit score below 600 and therefore ineligible for NHA MLI. 
 29 
During the fourth regime, two important factors supported the evolution in 
Canadian housing finance to a market based mortgage lending system with secure 
funding sources.  The first factor relates to the ability of mortgage lenders to support a 
Canadian household in the decision to become a homeowner and then access home 
equity in an ongoing manner by way of mortgage renegotiation.  Due to product 
innovation, primarily the home equity line of credit, mortgage funds had become integral 
to household finance.  The second factor relates to the resiliency of housing finance and 
the mortgage market to an economic shock impacting credit markets.  This tested both 
the availability of mortgage credit and the cost of those funds to borrowers.  The financial 
credit crisis hit Canada in August 2007, impacting the domestic asset backed 
commercial paper market first and then spreading throughout the credit markets.  During 
the peak of the financial crisis, in 2008 and 2009, commercial debt was being rationed 
and spreads on commercial loans widened.  At the height of the financial crisis, banks 
such as Credit Suisse (March 6, 2008 Credit Suisse Market Watch Weekly) quoted A 
rated 10-year commercial MBS at 1264 basis points (bps) over U.S. Treasuries, five to 
six times higher than the spread offered before and after the crisis.  In contrast, at the 
same time, commercial credit was being constrained and spreads widening, the 
residential mortgage market was quoting the lowest mortgage loan rates in Canadian 
housing finance history.  Just prior to the financial crisis of August 2007, the 5-year CMB 
spread over Government of Canada debt of the same maturity was as low as 7 bps, 
increasing to 70 bps in the Fall of 2008, and then declining back to 25 bps by year end 
2010.  As such, financial institutions and investors operating in Canada’s residential 
mortgage market looked to NHA MBS and the CMB program as a necessary funding 
source to ensure liquidity for clients and meet government regulations pertaining to 
minimum capital requirements.  The previously noted Insured Mortgage Purchase 
Program was also an important stabilizing factor to keep the cost of mortgage credit low.   
The financial credit crisis did constrain subprime mortgage borrower classes.  
Mortgage lenders and MLI providers took extra pre-cautions to confirm property values; 
household capacity to debt service mortgage loan obligations; and other market and 
borrower factors before granting or insuring mortgage credit, especially when approving 
home equity refinances or withdrawals and lines of credit.  It is true that smaller financial 
institutions which focused on residential mortgages may have ceased to operate due to 
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a range of factors such as insufficient capital reserves and deficiencies with warehouse 
facility funding sources that had to withdraw from mortgage lending due to the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis.  Overall, during the financial crisis, Canadian financial 
institutions, including the non-deposit taking financial institutions, continued to offer the 
broad market with high levels of mortgage funding.   
Figure 3 highlights the important and growing role of NHA MBS in Canadian 
residential mortgage lending since 2000.  Prior to 2000, mortgage lenders tended to 
issue private label MBS and rely upon deposits to fund mortgage credit.  Since 2000, 
growth in NHA MBS has been driven by expanded demand for mortgage credit largely 
fuelled by household finance management; competition among lenders and the 
increasing presence of non-deposit taking residential mortgage lenders and mortgage 
brokers, and very low cost mortgage funds.  What Figure 3 understates is the total of 
CMHC`s MLI in force which, according to the CMHC 2010 Annual Report, was recorded 
at $514,156 million and not only includes residential mortgage loans for homeowners, 
but also MLI to support the finance and refinance of multi-unit rental apartment building 
types (construction and take out financing). 
A market based mortgage system that is viable and resilient needs prudent 
policies and institutional safeguards for borrowers, lenders, investors, and others 
involved.  Following the challenges with the U.S. subprime housing market due to over-
valuations in residential real estate; lenient mortgage credit granting; and use of credit 
derivatives and enhancements, new regulation for Canadian mortgage lending took 
place during the fourth regime.  In an effort to ensure that households could manage 
mortgage debt and to provide an incentive for a household to accrue home equity and 
pay the mortgage loan obligation at a quicker pace, and thus reduce overall mortgage 
interest paid, the Department of Finance in Canada proposed changes to NHA high ratio 
LTV MLI commencing on October 15, 2008.  This eliminated zero down payments in 
favour of a minimum 5 per cent down payment and reducing extended amortizations to 
35 years when the borrower could not provide a down payment of more than 20 per 
cent.  There was also a change in mortgage lending rules, limiting each financial 
institution to no more than 3 per cent of annual mortgage originations to borrowers with 
credit scores below 600.  This is principally to accommodate new immigrants to Canada 
without a credit history in Canada.  In 2010, further refinements to high ratio LTV MLI  
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resulted in more stringent mortgage credit granting, by requiring mortgage borrowers to 
qualify on a 5-year fixed mortgage loan at the posted rate even if the mortgage contract 
negotiated was for a shorter term or at a discounted rate.  This also included a reduction 
of LTV on refinances to 90 per cent from 95 per cent and set a minimum downpayment 
of 20 per cent for all residential properties purchased for rental purposes.  In 2011, a 
third set of constraints was introduced, and resulted in a maximum 30 year amortization 
for NHA high ratio LTV MLI; maximum LTV on refinances at 85 per cent; and precluded 
from NHA MLI eligibility the non-amortizing part of a homeowner equity line of credit. 
Figure 3. Securitization in Canada as Measured 
by Annual NHA MBS Volumes ($ Millions) 
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2.5. A Summary of Canadian Housing Finance  
The first regime began the process of transformation of housing finance in 
Canada from an informal system of equitable mortgages, vendor mortgages, cash 
purchases and joint loans with the federal government.  By the fourth regime housing 
finance evolved to a market system with broad competition among mortgage lenders.  
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Fundamental to the fourth regime are a range of innovative mortgage products and 
securitization of mortgage pools with NHA MBS and the CMB program.  NHA MLI is the 
preferred credit enhancement for mortgage funding in Canada, while credit derivatives 
are popular in the U.S.  Canada experienced some U.S.-style mortgage lending 
practices, and the penetration of these practices into the housing finance system has 
influenced the marketing of mortgage loans to consumers.  However, the presence of 
legislation related to NHA MLI directs most of the activities of financial institutions 
involved in Canadian mortgage credit granting and precludes subprime lending.  
Moreover, regulatory oversight by the Department of Finance since 2008 has resulted in 
significant constraints that have not received opposition from financial institutions 
offering residential mortgages.  The limited Canadian experience with subprime lending 
has provided financial institutions and regulators with detailed information on mortgage 
loan performance for non-conventional mortgage products.  Should the parameters to 
NHA MLI and general mortgage lending practices change in the future, toward mortgage 
innovation geared at borrowers at the bottom end of the credit curve, the experience with 
Alt-A and subprime lending will be important information to better apply risk based 
pricing of mortgage loans necessary to make a broad, liberal lending platform resilient 
and viable. 
The evolution of housing finance should be of interest to many nations that 
continue to experience sub-optimal mortgage lending that constrains homeownership.  
There has been significant progress and advancements in Canada`s mortgage lending 
system since 1900.  The evolution is important to highlight as financial innovation in the 
mortgage market evolved from direct government lending to joint loans to NHA MLI 
mortgage loans to mortgage securitization enhanced by NHA MLI.  This allowed 
mortgage funding to flow more freely from the first regime which used set mortgage loan 
rates and the interest rate ceilings of the second and third regimes.  Finally, by the fourth 
regime mortgage lenders and borrowers could operate within an open system of 
negotiated market interest rates with flexible mortgage contracts allowing for easy 
renegotiation and refinance.  Appendix A provides a timeline of some key events in 
Canadian housing finance history. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
Financial Innovation and a 
Dynamically Complete Mortgage Market 
A representative household in any nation becomes a homeowner for many 
reasons such as more control over housing than provided by renting and consumption of 
housing services.  Equally important, is that homeownership allows a representative 
household to accumulate and store of wealth in a principal residence which represents 
an asset in the household`s investment portfolio.  Since there is an investment 
component related to homeownership, the decision to become a homeowner should 
naturally form part of an investor`s critical asset allocation.   
Homeownership, for a representative household, provides tangible benefits in 
meeting housing service consumption needs that would otherwise be obtained in the 
spot rental market where lease terms are usually negotiated on an annual basis.  Rental 
housing services can also lack consistent, quality choice of services, and present 
households with rental rate risk under certain future states of nature.  The economic 
intuition is that the benefits of homeownership can and should be measured.  From a 
financial perspective, homeownership is easily managed, highly leveraged, with 
predictable cash flow requirements, a combination unmatched by other real investment 
options, as Steele (1993) describes.  Capital gains on a principal residence in some 
nations like Canada and the U.S. are excluded from taxation, and neither are the implicit 
returns to home equity.  In the U.S. mortgage loan interest and state and local property 
taxes are deductible for personal taxation.   
Research by Goetzmann (1993), Reichenstein (1998), Flavin and Yamashita 
(2002), Yao and Zhang (2005), Sinai and Souleles (2005), Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 
(2005), Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007), and Waggle and Johnson (2009), 
considers the investment qualities of homeownership in the U.S.  However, there is still 
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a contribution to be made that considers the importance of a housing finance system to 
support homeownership as an investment decision.  Incomplete markets are also a valid 
consideration, as it is not always possible to find adequate choice for housing services 
from the rental housing stock, since some housing types are only available on a 
continuing basis through homeownership and investors can neither buy a fractional 
interest in homeownership or readily hedge downside risk (Steele, 1993).  Allen and 
Gale (1998, 1999), Allen (2001), and Pavlov and Wachter (2006), offer models that 
highlight underpricing of mortgage lending as leading to inflated house prices and 
constraints on mortgage lending curbing asset prices.  Housing markets where lenders 
have underpriced mortgage lending experience deeper market corrections when 
markets begin to slide.  The findings are also directed at a policy level, even though 
there are strong implications on the household decision to consider homeownership as 
an investment.  Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006) and Herring and Wachter (1999) 
explain that lenders, if left unchecked by regulators or financial markets, will eventually 
under-price the credit risk in mortgage loans.  Other models, Iacoviello (2005), illustrate 
that a general rise in consumer prices reduces the real value of a borrower’s outstanding 
mortgage debt obligation, positively influencing net worth.  Pavlov and Wachter (2009) 
include mortgage lending constraints, specifically what they define as aggressive 
mortgage lending instruments which came about due to financial deregulation and 
mortgage innovation, funded by securitization such as MBS often supported by credit 
enhancements.  Mortgages in the U.S. are nonrecourse, and the research differentiates 
between homogenous prime and heterogeneous subprime borrowers by including the 
borrower credit score in the model.  The general result is that house price appreciation 
churns homeownership investment returns.  Households find it attractive to switch from 
renting to owning when mortgage financing costs are low or when credit constraints are 
relaxed.  Nonrecourse mortgage lending in the U.S. can be advantageous for borrowers 
at the lower end of the credit curve.  In reality, nonrecourse lending can present a moral 
hazard for some borrowers who wish to exercise strategic default should house prices 
fall.   
Mortgage lending standards are identified as a significant factor in encouraging 
many households to become homeowners and can even influence the investment return 
of housing.  It is generally understood that mortgage lending standards evolve in a pro-
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cyclical fashion, resulting in powerful swings in house prices, Geanakoplos (2010).  
When mortgage lending standards are relaxed, often in good economic times, this drives 
up both credit and house price growth while a tightening of standards, often in poor 
economic times when credit is constrained, puts downward pressure on house prices.  
Research that has followed the U.S. housing boom of the early and mid-2000s, Green 
(2008) and Shiller (2008), shows that rapid growth in credit to prime and subprime 
borrowers was associated with a sharp deterioration in lending standards that in turn 
fuelled house price appreciation. 
In advanced economies over the last two decades, a representative household 
will choose between renting and owning housing services at any point in the life cycle by 
access to mortgage credit.  Homeownership has been acknowledged as having 
investment qualities similar to other financial assets as well as benefits derived from the 
imputed rent of owning housing services and hedging rent risk, Sinai and Souleles 
(2005).  Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) suggest that the correct calculation of the 
financial return associated with homeownership of a principal residence compares the 
imputed rent, defined as what it would cost a household to rent an equivalent property, 
with the lost income that a household would receive if the household had invested the 
capital in an alternative investment, defined as the opportunity cost of capital.  The 
conclusion of these authors is that government tax subsidies reduce the annual cost of 
homeownership.  Moreover, the expected appreciation rate a household associates with 
homeownership can be high in specific superstar U.S. cities, Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai 
(2004), where land is in short supply and economic growth is capitalized into land prices.  
The returns are further fuelled when real, long-term mortgage loan rates are low and 
alternative investments do not yield high returns.  In the context of portfolio theory, 
Sharpe (1974) and Black-Litterman (1991), when an investor buys an asset they are 
expressing an implied view regarding expected asset returns.   
There is broad understanding that an investment in homeownership results in an 
investor’s portfolio allocation being dominated by a single asset class, Cocco (2004). 
Over time, home equity is gained as the mortgage debt obligation is paid down by way of 
loan amortization or as net worth increases due to home price appreciation, 
Reichenstein (1998).  With increasing financial literacy among the public, especially first 
time home buyers, there is general recognition of the risk of a single claim on a real 
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estate asset especially in high house price markets, and many households as investors 
may even consider homeownership as an over allocation from an optimal portfolio 
perspective, Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007).  There is recent market evidence of 
the important role of accessing home equity and the mortgage lending system is 
considered a financial planning tool to manage household finances.  In turn, government 
participation in housing finance can be very significant and is often justified by the 
important role homeownership can have in supporting economic and financial stability at 
the household level, IMF (2011). 
3.1. The Institutional Framework of Property Markets  
It is not the intent to offer a review of property law as this is a complex topic with 
a long established history which has been reviewed in detail by legal scholars.  An 
appreciation of the features of the institutional framework for real property markets to 
support homeownership is important context.  This was highlighted and detailed by the 
IMF (2011) in the Global Financial Stability Report in which the legal prerequisites for a 
housing finance system were discussed in detail.  Although variations and unique 
domestic adaptations are common among OECD nations, the general institutional 
features can be summarized as follows: 
• Private property rights and entitlements where the state guarantees an 
indefeasible title to those included in the register, such as the Torrens title 
system, that records easements and the creation and discharge of mortgages, 
supported with land surveys, and where appropriate, with title insurance; 
• Enabling legislation for land development, new home construction and the 
purchase and ownership of title to parts of a multi-storied building to allow for 
the purchase and sale of different housing types; 
• A market based system that allows for the sale and purchase of real property 
which includes the full disclosure of property attributes, condition and 
encumbrances with public and private technological systems that record, 
track, store and retrieve accurate detailed attributes of the property as well as 
market prices, used in property appraisals, mortgage credit granting and MLI 
underwriting; 
• A regulatory framework that sets forth the rules of market conduct for real 
estate brokers and agents, mortgage brokers and agents, mortgage lenders, 
MLI providers and others involved in the sale, purchase and financing of real 
property; 
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• Mortgage loans that are secured by real property and the use of a mortgage 
note which evidences the existence of the loan and the encumbrance of that 
reality, by granting of a mortgage to secure the loan;  
• A legal process for residential real estate default management so that 
mortgage lenders have some level of recourse through the judicial system to 
enforce negotiated contracts with mortgage borrowers and exercise a claim 
against the real estate property and related collateral that is used as security 
to guarantee the loan, and this includes the presence of MLI as a risk 
management tool;  
• A housing finance system that ensures a stable, low-cost source of mortgage 
funding to households with the appropriate level of government participation 
and guarantees through a national housing agency; and 
• Government incentives and taxation rules to support homeownership. 
3.2. Complete Markets and Housing as an Investment  
The challenge in housing markets as to whether homeownership can be 
evaluated as an investment similar to financial assets must consider the topic of 
complete markets.  Research into complete markets traces back to Arrow & Debreu 
(1954), Debreu (1959) and Arrow (1968).  Generally, a complete market system is one in 
which there are traded claims to consumption in each future state.  This definition can be 
refined to specify the date and market state in which the good is consumed.  This allows 
economists to apply utility theory and state-preference theory to study investor behaviour 
under uncertainty.  A complete market is recognized to be one where all possible 
outcomes on possible future states can be constructed with existing assets.  A market is 
defined to be complete when the cash flows for a specific trading strategy over a 
specified period can be replicated by a synthetic trading strategy.  Complete markets 
also assume a Pareto-optimal allocation of economic resources among individuals such 
that no individual can be made better off without making some individuals worse off.  
With state-contingent goods claims and one round of trading, a complete market 
requires one market for each good to achieve Pareto optimality.  This equates to the 
number of states multiplied by the number of goods.  However, for elementary state-
contingent wealth claims and goods markets that open after the state is revealed, a 
complete market only requires the number of states plus the number of goods to be 
complete.  Arrow (1968) considered the separation of goods and wealth markets.  In the 
first regime, investors observe state-contingent prices of goods.  In the second regime, 
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investors must guess future goods prices correctly.  Complete markets take advantage 
of market efficiency and financial innovation to provide consumers and investors in 
allocating payoffs and planning for uncertain contingencies.  This provides justification in 
financial markets for innovation such as derivatives and options to accommodate state-
contingent wealth claims. 
As the theory of complete markets evolved, it was often concluded that in real 
world settings markets are not generally complete and rather it was more important to 
look at levels of completeness, Flood (1991).  The notion of a complete market does 
serve as a benchmark so that completeness, or maybe more appropriately, relative 
incompleteness, can be assessed to determine if a market system functions efficiently.  
Additionally, the state-preference context is important because it provides a theoretical 
basis for derivatives and the presence of futures and options which are regarded as 
fundamental to complete markets and to improve market efficiency.   
There have been efforts to make housing markets more complete, such as the 
Case Shiller (1987) index.  Criticism of this index relates to the limited set of twenty U.S. 
housing markets for which data is reported as well as the two month lag in data release.  
The housing market in the U.S. does allow for a short sale, however the definition of a 
short sale in housing differs substantially from the definition of a short sale of a financial 
asset.  A short sale in the U.S. housing market typically occurs when a lender who has 
taken control of a home due to mortgage borrower default and bankruptcy allows a new 
purchaser to buy the home for a value less than the outstanding mortgage amount.  As 
such, the sale price falls short of the mortgage loan balance.  A similar housing price 
index in Canada exists for a set of six Canadian centres called the Teranet–National 
Bank House Price Index.  This index was launched in 2008 to sell financial products 
connected to the housing market while giving investors access to the residential real 
estate market as an asset class.  However, even with the development and wide use of 
an index for housing prices, the market for housing is complex due to a number of 
factors such as the: 
• relative length of time and high cost to complete a real property transaction;  
• heterogeneous nature of the housing stock and varying degree of home 
quality which make it difficult to track and gauge home prices accurately when 
there are limited, actual comparable transactions;  
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• high per unit cost for a home, which cannot be broken down into fractional 
share ownership;  
• highly regulated process which can encumber the purchase and sale of real 
property;  
• lack of financial derivatives to adequately hedge background risk associated 
with homeownership; and  
• constraints in a mortgage lending system and specific mortgage products and 
credit granting regulations and guidelines that set parameters on the purchase 
and refinance of a principal residence.   
The last point is fundamental to homeownership in a principal residence being 
considered as an investment.  It highlights the importance of a liberal and flexible 
mortgage lending system that is necessary for a household to both buy a home and also 
after purchase, renegotiate and refinance a mortgage to smooth household consumption 
patterns over a household`s life cycle.  By providing the necessary financing for all home 
buyers to purchase and sell housing, the mortgage market supports a housing unit to 
function as a liquid, tradable security, by facilitating the clearing of housing markets and 
maintaining a housing price equilibrium.  The topic of housing price bubbles is beyond 
the scope of this research, and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) provide an 
excellent review of the fundamentals and misperceptions of house price bubbles that 
offers an important and useful context. 
In the case of housing finance and the mortgage market, research by Calza, 
Monacelli, and Straca (2007) provide evidence that there is significant divergence in the 
structure of mortgage markets across most industrialised countries and the correlation 
between consumption and house prices will increase with the degree of flexibility and 
development of mortgage markets.  This is important given that homeownership in a 
principal residence will tend to dominate total household wealth over a household`s life 
span, Campbell and Cocco (2005).   
In an Arrow-Debreu economy trading over time is not important since markets 
are complete at time zero, and for this reason among others housing markets are not 
generally regarded as complete in a traditional sense (Steele, 1993).  The reason is that 
for a complete market to exist there are potentially an infinite number of states of nature 
and infinite payoffs from the heterogeneous supply of housing.  As such, housing payoffs 
cannot be replicated by trading other securities.  When the mortgage market is 
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constrained, the housing market only offers households an investment choice related to 
one security.  The household either makes the decision in favour of homeownership and 
the required ownership holding is 100 per cent of the housing unit, or decides against 
homeownership with an ownership holding of 0 per cent of the housing unit.  There is no 
fractional holding allowed.  There is also no short selling.  The household simply makes 
a decision to own or not (and thus rent) one housing unit.  Housing markets are not 
complete in an Arrow-Debreu economy since an investor would need at least as many 
linearly independent securities in which to obtain the same utility (or total payoff) from 
one housing unit as states of nature.  Moreover, Yao and Zhang (2005) conclude that 
compared with other financial assets such as stocks and bonds, the housing investment 
is highly leveraged and relatively illiquid. 
3.3. A Dynamically Complete Housing Market  
There is agreement in the literature of dynamically complete markets that an 
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium to require an infinite-dimensional space may be misleading, 
Hakansson (1970), Merton (1974), Lucas (1978), Harrison and Kreps (1979), and Duffie 
and Huang (1985).  Hakansson (1970) found that the optimal investment strategies have 
the property that the optimal mix of risky (productive) investments is independent of the 
individual's wealth, noncapital income stream, and impatience to consume. The optimal 
asset allocation depends in each case only on the probability distribution of the returns, 
the interest rate, and the individual's one-period utility function of consumption. 
Hakansson identifies four models; with three of the models showing that a poor 
individual will always borrow, while under a fourth model a rich individual will always 
lend, and the borrowing and lending rates are important to the results.  The research 
offers an approach to address the limitation of traditional complete markets and can be 
extended to housing markets, since a housing unit and a mortgage loan represent two, 
long-lived securities that can be continuously traded over time.  Duffie and Huang (1985) 
illustrate that when an Arrow-Debreu economy is placed in a dynamic Radner (1972) 
setting agents can trade claims at any time.  This overcomes the constraints of an 
Arrow-Debreu economy.  Even if there are a finite number of securities the market can 
still be complete provided the “right” set of security markets exists.  A Radner equilibrium 
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provides the framework for a dynamically complete market demanding the presence of 
only two long-lived securities.   
Homeownership in a principal residence can be regarded as a long-lived security 
where returns follow a stochastic process, such as a geometric Brownian motion, up 
until some end period allowing a homeowner to accumulate and store wealth over this 
time.  For example, until retirement or some other future household event that triggers 
the sale of the principal residence.  The mortgage loan, which represents a second long-
lived security, has a value secured against the home equity, and allows a household to 
withdraw home equity to smooth consumption needs over time, given different states of 
nature.  The extent to which a domestic mortgage market is liberal influences 
homeownership levels and the opportunities a representative household has to qualify 
for homeownership.  Similarly, we need to accept that the consumption payoffs and price 
processes for housing, as a long-lived security, can be constructed in the presence of a 
second long-lived security, the mortgage loan, in such a way that investors may be 
allocated trading strategies allowing them to consume their original Arrow-Debreu 
allocations within a Radner style equilibrium.  Therefore, a flexible mortgage market 
allows a household to continuously trade its position in home equity and to dynamically 
span its consumption space, and transfer purchasing power over time, a necessary 
condition for a Radner equilibrium.  This addresses the relative illiquidity of housing as 
an investment identified by Yao and Zhang (2005). 
The economic theory proposed extends the work of Duffie and Huang (1985).  
Homeownership in a principal residence experiences gains and losses with the home 
itself functioning as a security to build and store wealth, Flavin and Yamashita (2002).  
The mortgage market provides the basis for the mortgage loan to be a second security 
that allows a household to dynamically span an infinite-dimensional commodity space 
and transfer purchasing power across time by continually trading home equity.  To 
restate, a liberal mortgage market facilitates the transition of a household from renting to 
homeownership, while a flexible mortgage market provides households with easy 
mortgage renegotiation and refinance to access home equity to smooth consumption 
needs in a tax exempt tradable security.  
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Duffie and Huang`s elaboration on a Radner equilibrium provides sufficient and 
necessary economic reasoning of a dynamically complete market in the presence of only 
two long-lived securities.  The structure of the mortgage market, which supports the real 
property market discussed in section 3.1, is understood to be the necessary pre-
condition for homeownership to be considered as an investment similar to other financial 
assets in jurisdictions where private property rights prevail.  Given that housing services 
obtained by renting or owning are substitutes, homeownership has an embedded 
investment in the property market; and the presence of government subsidies and tax 
incentives directed to homeowners.  Therefore, in those nations with a dynamically 
complete mortgage market, homeownership tenure should outweigh rental tenure.  The 
IMF (2011) has concluded this result, but only for an index that considers government 
participation in housing finance and not the complete features of the mortgage market, 
and neither has the IMF considered housing as an investment. 
3.4. The Mortgage Market and the Household Choice to 
Own Housing Services  
Some researchers have concluded that as each new representative household is 
formed the default tenure is, in fact, rental (Steele, 1993). It will follow that a 
representative household has a prime credit rating and homogenous beliefs about the 
evolution of housing prices and rents, and is assumed to undertake a two-stage decision 
process.  The first is to continuously decide over time whether to rent or buy market 
housing services.  The second relates to how best to finance this decision.  The decision 
making process is complicated because stage one and two are not always independent.  
In the case of a conditional positive decision in favour of homeownership the financing 
decision may precede the decision to buy a principal residence as a search among 
mortgage lenders as part of mortgage pre-qualification.  It could also occur 
simultaneously during the negotiation over the purchase price and conditions of sale 
between the home buyer and seller.  Equally likely is for the financing to take place 
following purchase, and typically as part of a buyer’s subject or conditional offer to buy.   
To span a household`s consumption space through homeownership in a principal 
residence the mortgage market needs to be sufficiently flexible so that a household can 
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continuously renegotiate and refinance a principal residence to access home equity by 
varying the mortgage loan to property value (LTV).  Homeownership, in effect, becomes 
a form of household finance so that a household can accommodate an infinite-
dimensional commodity space.  The domestic housing market becomes complete 
through a dynamically complete domestic mortgage market.  A representative household 
can buy, sell and refinance a homeownership interest (home equity) over time.  The 
permitted LTV ratio and amortization period have a strategic use.  The principal 
residence which stores home equity, combined with the mortgage loan, become two 
securities that allow a household to effectively consider homeownership as an 
investment decision.  The mortgage market also supports the sale of the principal 
residence thus returning the household to rental tenure, with a zero share of net worth in 
a principal residence. 
Therefore, in the process of becoming a homeowner, a representative household 
must generally rely on an underlying housing finance system that supports mortgage 
lending.  The presence of a mortgage market is not a necessary condition for all 
households to become home owners since households may possess adequate net 
worth or receive a substantial endowment that allows for an outright cash purchase. 
Under this situation all that is required is an institutional and legislative framework that 
supports the property rights necessary for a household to become a homeowner.  
However, given the high price of housing in prosperous urban markets and the point in 
the life cycle at which most households want to become homeowners, it is generally 
understood that a representative household actively participates in the mortgage market 
when the positive decision is made to buy a principal residence.  As well, through 
continuous trading of a mortgage loan on a specific principal residence, which can 
include the refinance, prepayment or closing of the mortgage contract, a household can 
vary its ownership interest.  More importantly, in order for a Radner-style equilibrium to 
exist, a household must have the ability to build and store wealth in a principal residence 
by way of homeownership, and given different states of nature, dynamically trade home 
equity to transfer consumption across time.  This is done through the mortgage market 
and the mortgage loan as a debt instrument, against the home equity accrued in a 
principal residence.   
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There is an interplay between the mortgage lending system and household 
access to homeownership that can best be described with an economic model whereby 
a representative household lives in a two good world, and can either consume housing 
defined as X with an allocation of their income, α, which must carry the cost to service a 
mortgage contract and maintain the property including: utilities, strata fees, property 
taxes, and basic property maintenance, but not necessarily the full depreciation expense 
of the structure itself.  All other consumer goods and services, including non-housing 
investments such as stocks and bonds, are defined as Y, with an allocation of household 
income, β, required to cover necessary household expenditures.  The percentage of 
consumption on both housing and related costs, and other consumer goods and 
services is assumed to be α +  β = 1.  This model is consistent with mortgage lending in 
that a representative household is qualified on the percentage of income used to debt 
service a mortgage and support the basic living costs associated with homeownership, 
and it should be noted that this allocation of income for housing even applies to a 
representative household that chooses to rent, so it is generally consistent with how 
housing markets function to provide housing services to households.  However, in the 
case of rental housing a representative household is likely to be more diligent in 
consuming more exact levels of housing services to minimize overall expenditures.   
A representative household will seek to maximize utility and the investment 
quality of housing services using leverage to compete in the open market for housing 
that offers the greatest return on investment.  We describe a simple Cobb-Douglas utility 
function as follows: 
U(X, Y) = XαYβ (1) 
We can now solve for the utility maximizing values of X and Y for any prices (PX, PY) and 
household income (I) which is set forth as  
I = PXX + PYY
F
 (2) 
Within this model it is assumed that a representative household operates in a 
sufficiently liberal mortgage market to meet the necessary downpayment condition and 
mortgage credit granting associated with homeownership. Governments typically 
 45 
participate to support households at varying levels in this regard, IMF (2011).  In simple 
terms, a representative household is in a position to equally decide between renting and 
owning housing services.  Given this, the parameter I is monthly household income and F allows for households to access housing finance by a specific mortgage contract that 
has been negotiated with regards to a specific borrower class.  It is understood that F ≥ 1, but if a household does not require leverage or mortgage debt of any kind F = 1.  
Therefore, as leverage increases, F increases monotonically above 1 within lending 
guidelines set forth by financial institutions that grant household mortgage credit, 
supported by credit enhancements such as MLI or even credit derivatives.  
Since house purchases typically involve household borrowing, house prices are 
likely to be strongly driven by credit conditions and household leverage, IMF (2011).  
Research by Stein (1995) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), concludes that households 
can borrow only a fixed multiple of their down payment. This assumption of a fixed 
leverage ratio implies an accelerator mechanism to the household income available for 
debt service of the mortgage loan, where a positive or negative shock to income or net 
worth is amplified by an expansion, or contraction, in borrowing capacity, in turn 
influencing house prices. The parameter F represents the home buyer purchasing 
power, which is an income multiplier or accelerator embedded within the mortgage 
contract, geared by the interest rate and amortization period such that 
F = �1
r
−  1
r(1+r)T�1+m  (3) 
where r is the negotiated mortgage interest rate supported by a secure mortgage 
funding source, and T is the amortization period, which is the number of months that the 
mortgage term can last for under existing mortgage products available in the market.  
The m term is central to this model as it is the parameter that drives a household`s ability 
to leverage homeownership and dynamically change a household`s consumption 
patterns toward more non-housing goods and services or investments over time, as 
desired.   
The m term is a parameter that either constrains mortgage credit or supports a 
dynamically complete market and, as a power weighting, it highlights the importance of 
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the domestic mortgage lending system in which households can access mortgage credit 
and the terms of the credit contract.  When a domestic mortgage market does not exist 
or is significantly constrained, then -1 ≤ m < 0 and the value for F becomes constrained 
and when there is no domestic mortgage market m = −1 and F becomes 1.  Where the 
domestic housing finance system does offer mortgage lending 0 < 𝑚 < 1, and although m = 0 in most markets the more flexible and liberal the system the value of the m term 
increases monotonically above 0 to some amount that reflects the guidelines of 
mortgage credit granting that is generally offered in the market and negotiated between 
mortgage lenders and mortgage borrowers.  For example, allowable mortgage debt 
levels relate to acceptance of non-traditional sources of income such as “offsets” related 
to rental income gained through accessory units in the principal residence; margin 
accounts that support investments in financial assets; and financing innovations such as 
the leasing of automobiles and other consumer durables.  Limitations on the m term 
generally flow from regulations and guidelines imposed by government agencies on MLI 
providers as well as investment underwriting inherent as part of MBS and credit 
derivatives.  As a power function it captures the extent to which a domestic mortgage 
market supports household finance leverage.  Since mortgage loan contracts for a 
principal residence are negotiated on an individual basis the influence of the m term can 
vary in importance depending on market conditions largely due to competitive forces or 
government participation in mortgage lending, as noted by the IMF (2011). 
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of changes in the  m term on the output of F.  It 
confirms that as a domestic mortgage market becomes sufficiently liberal and flexible, 
and the m term increases above 1, the F term experiences an increasing shift.  This 
allows a representative household to leverage its income and make the shift from renting 
to homeownership, depending on local area house prices.  Not surprisingly, some 
researchers have studied whether the mortgage market contributes to ever-rising house 
prices, especially in housing markets where there is a short supply of developable 
residential land, Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2004).  
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Figure 4. Illustrating the Impact of the Mortgage Market on Household 
Homeownership Purchasing Power 
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Note.  Mortgage Contract: $100,000 household income; 5 per cent mortgage loan rate; 30 per 
cent debt service ratio; using 25, 30 and 35 year amortizations.  
Figure 4 also outlines the effect of different amortization periods.  This offers 
households more leverage by extending out mortgage payments, and this increases the 
debt servicing capacity of household income.  Most developed mortgage markets allow 
for mortgage amortization of 25 years and many up to 35 years, and some domestic 
systems allow for even extended amortizations beyond this.  Unlike most nations, the 
U.S. mortgage market is dominated by 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with the interest 
rates also fixed for 30 years, without prepayment penalty and without lender recourse to 
the mortgage borrower in the case of default.  The ease in which mortgage loan terms 
can be renegotiated and refinanced underscores the importance of a flexible mortgage 
market, with the mortgage loan acting as an essential security in which a dynamically 
complete mortgage market allows a representative household to continuously trade in 
the underlying housing asset, X.   
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The economic model where households can access mortgage lending to support 
homeownership of housing services, in the presence of non-housing goods and services 
to consume as well as financial assets to invest in, can be solved as a constrained 
maximization problem by way of the Langrangian multiplier method.  Setting up the 
Lagrangian expression 
)( PyYPxXIFYX −−+= λζ βα  (4) 
yields the first-order conditions 
01 =−=
∂
∂ − PxYX
X
λαζ βα
 (5) 
01 =−=
∂
∂ − PyYX
Y
λβζ βα
 (6) 
0=−−=
∂
∂ PyYPxXIF
λ
ζ
 (7) 
Taking the ratio of the first two terms shows that  
Py
Px
X
Y
=
β
α
 (8) 
or  
PxXPxXPyY
α
α
α
β −
==
1
 (9) 
where the final equation follows because α +  β = 1.  Substitution of the first-order 
condition in equation 9 into the budget constraint gives  
PxXPxXPxXPxXPyYPxXIF
αα
α
α
α 1)11(1 =−+=−+=+=
 (10) 
solving for X yields  
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Px
IFX α=*
 (11) 
assuming that households are permitted to consume only one principal residence due to 
specific taxation benefits that relate directly to homeownership of a principal residence, 
and therefore x∗ = 1, then we can drop the X term and re-arrange equation 11 to obtain 
the following  
IFPx α=  (12) 
The domestic mortgage lending system allows a representative household to 
access homeownership by paying the purchase price of housing through an initial 
downpayment and ongoing payments to fulfill the mortgage loan obligation based on a 
mortgage amortization payment schedule, subject to specific mortgage loan contract 
features.  The key parameter is α, which is the proportion of income that a household 
can invest in housing and must include a set aside for necessary maintenance, utilities 
and property taxes; I, which is a household`s income; and F, which is a parameter that 
provides the household financing or purchasing power by way of the mortgage market.  
The F term is driven by the m parameter which is exogenously supplied to the model. 
From Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2005) and re-defining the parameters to be 
consistent with the notation above, house prices follow a stochastic process 
𝑑𝑃𝑥 = 𝑃𝑥𝜇𝑃𝑥𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑥𝑑𝑍𝑃𝑥 (13) 
Extending this we define home equity, H, as the result of three terms: (1) the house price 
change over time, dPx; (2) the payment of the principal component, P∗, of the mortgage 
loan obligation accrued during the amortization of the mortgage loan from the 
summation of each mortgage principal payment; and (3) the original equity investment in 
the home which we can define as the inverted LTV, with the notation of LTV′.  
Homeownership provides a store of wealth which can vary over time, formally defined as 
home equity, H, which can be defined as  
𝐻 = ∑ 𝑃∗𝑡 +  𝐿𝑇𝑉′ (14) 
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When home equity is greater than the permitted LTV for a refinance and the 
mortgage system does allow for mortgage refinance and home equity withdrawal, the 
homeowner has the ability to access the store of wealth in the home on a continual basis 
by refinancing the mortgage loan to access home equity.  Equally important is the home 
owner ability to renegotiate the amortization period of the mortgage loan contract to 
manage cash flows by lowering expenditures to debt service the mortgage loan.  A 
household may choose these options to consume more non-housing goods or services, 
invest in other financial assets, or reinvest in the principal residence by way of property 
upgrades and improvements.  In simple terms, through the ongoing renewal, rollover 
and renegotiation of the mortgage contract the representative household as a 
homeowner may decide simply to reduce the α term in equation 12.  The effect of a 
flexible mortgage market is that a household has the option to increase the β term which 
allows consumption to be shifted toward non-housing consumer goods and services or 
investments in financial assets.  A flexible mortgage market also allows a household to 
accommodate unexpected price increases for non-housing goods and services.  This 
can be shown by rearranging equation 10 as follows 
𝐼𝐹 = 𝑃𝑦𝛼 𝑌
𝛽
+ 𝑃𝑦𝑌 (15) 
𝐼𝐹 = 𝑃𝑦𝛼 𝑌
1−𝛼
+ 𝑃𝑦𝑌 (16) 
𝐼𝐹 = 𝑃𝑦𝑌 � 𝛼1−𝛼 + 1� (17) 
𝑃𝑦𝑌 = 𝐼𝐹� 𝛼
1−𝛼
+ 1� (18) 
 Therefore, as equation 18 shows, when there is a decrease in parameter α, 
households can make the choice to buy more Y, or accommodate higher prices for Y, by 
allocating more of the benefit in the decrease of α to PY.  The relative importance of both 
the initial amounts and changes to the IF terms can allow households to allocate more 
wealth to non-housing consumption.  It is obvious to show that if both or either 
parameter in the numerator,  IF, increase due to increasing incomes over time or 
changes to make mortgage credit granting more liberal and flexible, this elevates the 
magnitude of the allocation to non-housing consumer goods and services and financial 
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investments.  This can happen if the household so chooses to shift consumption away 
from housing. 
The instructive point is that a liberal and flexible mortgage market, defined as a 
dynamically complete mortgage market, is integral to housing as an investment.  The 
housing market relies upon the ability of homeowners to access mortgage credit to not 
only smooth consumption within an infinite-dimensional commodity space, but also 
support market clearing prices for homeownership housing units.  This becomes more 
important given relatively high house price levels and low savings rates documented in 
the economy, especially among younger households.  This is a typical scenario for a 
representative household who wishes to become a homeowner in an urban market 
where high house prices prevail.  As such, the tenure choice in any housing market 
where there is competing demand for housing services, between rental and 
homeownership, hinges on the mortgage market and underlying institutional framework 
that directly and indirectly relates to trading the underlying value of the security, which is 
homeownership in a principal residence.  Even among advanced economies, there are 
situations when constraints or imperfections in the mortgage market and an incomplete 
housing finance system can impede a household to become a homeowner, Chiuri and 
Jappelli (2000).  This has implications for a household that wants the ongoing ability to 
consider an investment in a principal residence as a homeowner as a part of optimal 
asset allocation.   
3.5. Relating Mortgage Market Development to 
Homeownership as an Investment 
A housing finance system which promotes a liberal and flexible mortgage market 
supports the positive decision of a representative household to become a home buyer, 
and then as a homeowner manage its home equity as a household finance tool to span 
consumption needs over time.  The evolution toward a liberal and flexible mortgage 
market relates to structural changes in domestic housing finance typically linked to de-
regulation and competition among mortgage lenders; mortgage product innovation; 
advanced secondary mortgage markets to keep the cost of mortgage credit low and 
stable; and the presence of credit enhancements including MLI and government 
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participation in mortgage funding.  There are socio-economic factors to consider such 
as: 
• high urban house prices and the need to gain access to increasing levels of 
housing services;  
• low savings rates and modest changes in annual income growth;  
• changes in employment contracts with increasing levels of self-employment;  
• aging baby boomers who will retire with positive levels of home equity, and the 
desire of many of these households to age in place as homeowners; and 
• increasing levels of international immigration, with new immigrants lacking a 
domestic credit history. 
Much of the research has a U.S. focus, and the IMF and International Union for 
Housing Finance have undertaken cross-country research on developments and 
advancements in mortgage markets.  For comparative purposes researchers will cluster 
advanced OECD nations together.  For example, research of a group of OECD nations 
by Calza, Monacelli, and Straca (2007) provide evidence that: 
• there is significant divergence in the structure of mortgage markets across the 
main industrialised countries;  
• the correlation between consumption and house prices increases with the 
degree of flexibility and development of mortgage markets; and  
• the transmission of monetary policy shocks on consumption and house prices 
is stronger in countries with more flexible and developed mortgage markets.  
These authors describe households as a mix of patient and impatient consumers, 
illustrating how the role of housing as collateral in the lending process may affect 
consumption.  Impatient consumers do not smooth consumption based on permanent 
income, but prefer current consumption and their access to credit is constrained by the 
value of the housing asset.  This supports the conclusion that a liberal and flexible 
mortgage market supports a dynamically complete housing finance system, and allows 
for a wide range of borrower classes to gain mortgage credit benefitting from high ratio 
LTV; extended amortization of mortgage contract terms; and renegotiation and refinance 
of mortgage contracts on an ongoing basis to access home equity in a principal 
residence.  The instructive point is that given the presence of a liberal and flexible 
mortgage market, homeownership should be considered as an investment to achieve 
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both an optimal asset allocation and to manage household consumption over time, 
irrespective of whether consumers are patient or impatient. 
3.6. Measuring the Relative Advancement of the 
Mortgage Market  
Housing finance and the underlying mortgage market among OECD nations is 
relatively established, although important changes will continue to occur either as a 
matter of government policy or market innovation.  There may be institutional changes in 
property law that encourage higher homeownership levels as well, but generally 
advancements in the mortgage market support homeownership and household finance, 
IMF (2008, 2011).  These may include government participation in the mortgage market 
to encourage homeownership; innovation in mortgage products that allow mortgage 
borrowers to refinance for the purposes of home equity withdrawal; and an expanded 
role of secondary mortgage market in providing mortgage funding.  For example, the 
most significant recent changes in housing finance in the U.S. have been based on 
mortgage product innovation directed to subprime mortgage borrowers and the home 
equity line of credit.  As well, the mortgage origination to securitization funding model 
has been streamlined by de-regulation in financial markets and supported by credit 
enhancements such as MLI and credit derivatives, either funded collateralized debt 
obligations or unfunded credit default swaps.   
The legislative and institutional framework that supports homeownership differs 
across nations.  A cross-country survey of nations highlights the key elements of the 
housing finance system that support homeownership at a general level, recognizing that 
there are unique complexities in every jurisdiction.  Often there is not further insight 
gained from understanding unique features which may exist due to a different 
interpretation of domestic laws, contracts and rules that govern property rights or 
implementation of mortgage lending.  This is an important subject and there are many 
useful reference sources such as the International Union for Housing Finance which was 
established in 1914 to disseminate research on national housing finance systems.   
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A study by Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) considered the impact of financial market 
imperfections on household intentions and ability to become homeowners.  The authors 
concluded that a cross-country variability in the volume of mortgage lending are traced 
to supply factors such as interest rate spreads and credit rationing which includes the 
institutions that govern housing finance as well as demand factors which include 
homebuyer earnings and savings, government incentives for homeownership and other 
factors, such as demographics and labour force characteristics.  An important additional 
factor is the efficiency of the judicial system related to mortgage defaults and the costs 
and duration of mortgage foreclosure proceedings, for which data is not readily 
available, nor reliable.   
In looking at the U.S. mortgage market, Green and Wachter (2005) draw from 
previous studies by Diamond (2004), Dubel (2004), Renaud (2004), Lea (2003), and 
Mercer (2003) and offer an international context for housing finance that provides a 
cross-country comparison of mortgage market advancement based on:  
• Maximum mortgage LTV ratio; 
• Mortgage debt to GDP; 
• Mortgage terms and duration;  
• Repayment for fee free redemption; and 
• Levels of mortgage securitization. 
The IMF (2008) undertook a study of mortgage market indicators derived from 
OECD nations.  The methodology is based on an index to evaluate mortgage market 
development as a function of five indicators: 
• Mortgage equity withdrawal; 
• Refinancing (fee-free repayment); 
• Maximum mortgage LTV ratio; 
• Mortgage amortization length; and  
• Development of secondary mortgage markets as measured by mortgage 
credit funded by MBS and covered bonds. 
The IMF study presents an Index of Mortgage Market Development.  The Index 
ranges between 0 and 1, and an index rating closer to 1 indicates that mortgage 
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borrowers have easier access to mortgage credit and the mortgage market is advanced, 
while an index rating closer to 0 indicates a constrained mortgage market.  The 
conclusion of the IMF study is that due to considerable institutional differences among 
the housing finance systems in advanced economies there are large inequalities in the 
stock of household mortgage debt.  According to the IMF findings, using data from 2005, 
the U.S., Denmark, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands appear to have the most 
advanced mortgage markets based on the features and indicators chosen.  In these 
countries, typical LTV ratios are about 80 percent; the standard term of a mortgage is 30 
years; mortgage products that allow for home equity withdrawal are widely marketed; 
and standard loans include an option to prepay the mortgage without (or with only 
partially) compensating the lender for capital or market value losses.  Moreover, in these 
countries, the secondary mortgage market is mature playing a relatively important role 
as a funding source for mortgage credit.   
U.S. mortgage lenders and financial institutions were highlighted due to a 
complex array of tools to facilitate residential mortgage securitization and wide use of 
credit derivatives. For instance, securitization accounted for about 60 per cent of 
mortgages in the U.S. at year-end 2004, compared with about 15 per cent in the 
advanced economies of the European Union. Canada was ranked in the middle of the 
OECD nations examined in terms of mortgage market advancement due to relatively low 
levels of mortgage debt outstanding (as a per cent of GDP), although Canadian 
households have experienced increasing usage of mortgage credit since 2005.  The fact 
that countries in continental Europe rank at the lower end of the IMF study may suggest 
that mortgage markets in these countries offer limited access to mortgage credit among 
different borrower classes and lack mortgage product innovation.  As well, minimum 
capital reserve requirements have an impact on mortgage credit offered by many 
financial institutions.  It is hard to draw strong conclusions from the IMF Index due to the 
limited number of features and indicators and the changes in mortgage markets that 
have occurred more recently.  While the methodology proposed by the IMF is important, 
an expanded list of features and indicators and more recent data would make the Index 
more robust, considering the financial crisis that started in August 2007. 
Following on its previous work, the IMF in its 2011 Global Financial Stability 
Report set forth an index to measure the role of government participation in domestic 
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housing finance and the extent to which this relates to the level of homeownership in a 
specific nation.  A broad cross-section of advanced economies as well as emerging and 
newly industrialized economies comprised the IMF sample set.   
The IMF study found that government participation in the housing market takes 
many forms. It included social housing policies to benefit low-income and first-time home 
buyers; tax incentives; state-owned financial institutions that originate mortgage loans; 
and state-sponsored, or state-owned, housing finance agencies that generally provide 
liquidity facilities for the mortgage markets.  The index is based on eight features present 
within a domestic housing finance system which collectively measure government 
participation.  These include: 
1.  Subsidies to first-time home buyers or repeat home buyers; 
2.  Upfront subsidies to home buyers through savings account 
contributions or through preferential fees on mortgage loans; 
3.  Subsidies to select groups, such as low and middle income 
households; 
4.  Government permission for early withdrawal of provident funds 
(savings account geared to fund retirement or health care costs) for 
house purchases; 
5.  Housing finance funds, where the government housing agency 
provides mortgage loan guarantees or other credit enhancements 
such as MLI, or even direct mortgage lending;  
6.  Government permits both, or either, the tax deductibility of mortgage 
loan interest and state and local government property taxes;  
7.  Government excludes home price appreciation from capital gains 
taxation upon house sale; and  
8.  State-owned institution(s) represents the majority market participation 
in mortgage lending, accounting for more than 50 per cent of the 
mortgage market share. 
An index between 0 and 1 is based on weightings taken from the features noted 
above and defined as an Index of Government Participation.  Two indices were derived: 
(1) an Index of Government Participation with a higher weight to subcategory number 
eight which measures the mortgage market share of the state-owned institution, and (2) 
an Alternative Index of Government Participation, which gives equal weights to the eight 
subcategories. 
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The results of the first index were graphed by the IMF in its report since it was 
determined that when the state-owned housing finance agency accounted for more than 
50 per cent of the mortgage market share this was a significant indicator of government 
participation in housing finance.  The Index of Government Participation for each nation 
was plotted on the y-axis and the corresponding homeownership rate on the x-axis.  The 
highest level of government participation, as measured by the IMF index, was recorded 
by Singapore, U.S., Netherlands, Russia, Canada, Japan, Chile, France, Australia, 
Poland and Slovakia, with the U.K. reporting the lowest level of government 
participation.  The highest level of homeownership, as measured by official government 
sources referenced by the IMF, was Singapore, Slovakia, Hungary, Spain, Slovenia, 
Italy, Belgium, U.S., and Australia.  The U.K.  and Canada ranked in the middle, with 
Germany reporting the lowest level of homeownership.  The IMF analysis and findings 
are important to highlight.  For example, the IMF concluded that some of the features to 
encourage homeownership may conflict with mortgage borrower and homeowner 
safeguards.  For instance, special laws can provide triggers for the termination of 
mortgage loans on terms more favourable for mortgage borrowers than would otherwise 
apply under a more general framework.   
There was modest statistical correlation between the government participation 
features and homeownership with a R2 of 0.04. The challenge with the Index and its 
relationship with homeownership is that government participation in housing markets 
may equally relate to homeownership tenure as well as rental tenure.  The rationale for 
government participation in housing finance is often to promote homeownership.  
However, the two factors are not always correlated.  Many countries in Western Europe, 
as well as Australia, have achieved high homeownership rates without extensive 
government participation.  Some countries have lower rates of homeownership partly 
because of strong public support for rental housing. For example, Germany provides 
incentives for rental investment but not for homeownership.  Overall, government 
participation in housing finance would be expected to relate to housing as an investment 
supporting both a liberal and flexible mortgage market that is dynamically complete.  As 
such, this research draws from the IMF report, both for the methodology and specifically 
the output of the Index which provides a key input variable, as outlined in Table 2.   
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3.7. Refinements and Extensions to the IMF Models  
This section presents refinements to the IMF 2008 and 2011 indices and other 
research, primarily Green and Wachter (2005).  The refinements include a more 
comprehensive set of features and indicators to evaluate the mortgage market, than 
identified by the IMF (2008) and other cited studies.  The IMF 2011 Index of Government 
Participation, when the state-owned housing finance agency accounts for more than 50 
per cent of the mortgage market share, is extended and included as an indicator.   
The intuition for using two indices to evaluate whether a domestic mortgage 
market system is liberal and flexible is an important refinement and extension to the 
existing body of research.  Combined, the indices have direct relevance to measure the 
extent to which a dynamically complete mortgage market exists in any nation.  The 
objective will be to validate the role of the mortgage market in supporting a household 
decision in favour of homeownership.  Additionally, the principal residence must 
represent a security that can store wealth and through a second security, the mortgage 
loan, a household can access home equity to span consumption requirements.  Within a 
general market equilibrium a representative household and mortgage lender can have 
rational expectations about housing prices offered in the market.  A liberal and flexible 
mortgage market allows a representative household to be a price taker, and complete on 
the purchase of a home with a mortgage lender who provides the necessary mortgage 
loan, as required.  This would be consistent with the economic reasoning of Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), whereby the aggregation of households as representative households 
leaves equilibrium prices unchanged.  If markets are complete and households behave 
as competitive price takers, in a stochastic process this must be interpreted to mean that 
each household takes as given the stochastic process of the price and has rational 
expectations about it, then the equilibrium condition is efficient. The scope of a mortgage 
market that is liberal and flexible, generally relate to the following:  
• An adequate supply of low cost (relative to risk free securities) to meet 
demand for mortgage credit to meet mortgage credit nationally and this 
requires the presence of the secondary market to integrate housing finance 
with capital markets, principally by way of MBS or covered bonds; 
• Mortgage loan rates that are stable and nationally available at either fixed or 
variable terms to assist households in managing mortgage credit risks over 
the long term; 
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• Credit enhancements that are nationally available to reduce the risk of 
residential mortgage lending and allow mortgage lenders to meet minimum 
capital reserve requirements; and reduce MBS investor risk; 
• Mortgage credit granting guidelines that allows a household to leverage 
monthly income over an extended amortization period at debt service ratios 
that are comparable to renting housing services; 
• A regulatory framework for housing finance and enforcement of mortgage loan 
contracts (including default and foreclosure) that also sets forth the rules of 
market conduct for real estate agents, mortgage brokers, mortgage lenders, 
MLI providers among others; 
• Mortgage loan to property value amounts, LTV, that allow high ratio mortgage 
lending so that a household can access homeownership with moderate wealth 
levels and maintain this over time if needed;  
• Mortgage contracts that allow households to easily renew, refinance or 
transfer a mortgage loan contract, with prepayment, transfer and cancellation 
clauses, either fee-free or without punitive penalties; 
• Mortgage products that support household finance by allowing equity 
withdrawals; and 
• Mortgage lending open to a wide range of borrower classes reflecting 
demographics such as new immigrant households; those with impaired credit 
ratings; or even to accommodate the increase in self-employment. 
A liberal and flexible mortgage market allows a household to obtain a mortgage 
loan to become a homeowner and then continuously trade home equity through a 
mortgage loan which is secured against a principal residence.  Continuous trading 
means that the household can renegotiate and renew a mortgage loan with ease; initiate 
home equity withdrawals and refinancing; and even prepay, cancel or transfer a 
mortgage loan.  The features and indicators used to create each index can be 
categorized as follows: 
• Liberal, in that a household from different borrower classes can become a 
homeowner through a high ratio LTV mortgage loan.  A liberal system 
supports financial institutions to fund mortgage credit through savings deposits 
and the secondary market with mortgage credit enhancements to reduce the 
overall risk;  
• Flexible, to facilitate a household`s need to continuously trade a mortgage 
loan to span consumption needs and these features relate to mortgage terms, 
amortization, loan type and duration, and contract provisions that allow for a 
household to modify a mortgage loan contract based on household finance 
needs; and  
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• Flexible and liberal, so that a household can access adequate mortgage 
funding, based on household size, and this may require government 
participation in the housing finance system. 
Figure 5 references and classifies the features and indicators of a liberal and 
flexible mortgage market.  This is a much expanded and comprehensive set of features 
and indicators than presented in earlier studies.  It is important to highlight that the 
features and indicators exclude the institutional framework that must be present in any 
mortgage market system as a necessary pre-condition for mortgage contracts.  It is 
assumed that the institutional system of real property markets is a compulsory 
foundation that must be in place before a domestic mortgage market can be considered 
advanced.  
The features and indicators outlined in Figure 5 can then be plotted on a two by 
two matrix.  On the Y-Axis the features related to a liberal mortgage market will be 
plotted.  On the X-Axis the features related to a flexible mortgage market.  The use of 
two indices and a matrix is analytically appealing, and when each domestic system is 
plotted within a quadrant it will be evident whether the mortgage market is constrained or 
dynamically complete, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 5. The Key Features, Indicators and Outcomes Used to Evaluate 
Mortgage Market Development  
Features that are Flexible Features that are Liberal 
Home Equity Withdrawal :  
Ongoing access to mortgage  
refinancing (fee free) or allowing for  
withdrawal of home equity, 
linking homeownership to household  
finance. 
Renegotiation or Prepayment :  
Rollover renewals, renegotiations and  
prepayment of mortgages. 
Loan Type and Duration:  
Availability of either fixed or  
adjustable variable  rate (and  
blended) mortgage loan products so  
that mortgage borrowers can manage  
perceived interest rate risk.  
Amortization :  
Availability of extended 
amortization mortgage loan periods  
(including interest only mortgages)  
that can be renegotiated so that a  
household can smooth consumption  
through household finance over the  
holding period of homeownership, as  
required.  
Loan to Value (LTV) :  
Availability of mortgage products that  
permit high ratio LTVs. 
Secondary Mortgage Market :  
Integration of the capital markets with  
mortgage funding so that  
there is significant advancement of the  
secondary mortgage market to allow a  
wide range of mortgage lenders to  
participate in the mortgage market  
securing funds by way of MBS, covered  
bonds, and other structured  
investment vehicles. 
Mortgage Credit Enhancements :  
Availability of credit enhancements to  
support mortgage lending and mortgage  
credit primarily through direct lending or  
MBS supported by MLI and credit  
derivatives. 
Borrower Classes :  
Innovative mortgage  
products that offer mortgage loans to  
non-conventional borrowers, including  
new immigrants and self-employed (Alt-A)  
and borrower classes with impaired credit  
(Subprime). 
Combined Indicators and Outcomes of a Flexible and Liberal System 
Government Participation Index: 
 the IMF 2011 index captures this outcome. 
Mortgage Debt to GDP:  
availability of mortgage funds allows households to become homeowners and  
access home equity in a dynamically complete mortgage market 
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Figure 6. Evaluating a Mortgage Market as Fully Constrained, Partially 
Constrained or Dynamically Complete  
Liberal 
 
Partially Constrained Mortgage 
Market: 
There is adequate mortgage financing 
available to a wide range of borrower 
classes due to a well-developed 
secondary mortgage market and high 
ratio LTVs are supported by credit 
enhancements.  Accessing home equity 
can be difficult, there is little flexibility in 
choosing among loan types the 
renegotiation of mortgages are limited 
and extended amortization periods are 
not widely available. 
Dynamically Complete Mortgage 
Market: 
Households have ease of access to 
mortgage credit to support home 
purchase with high LTVs, and can 
withdraw home equity to manage 
household finances continuously.  
Mortgage market is open to a wide range 
of borrower classes.  Markets will likely 
exhibit high government participation and 
high usage of mortgage debt to manage 
household consumption needs over time. 
  
Fully Constrained Mortgage Market: 
Households experience severe 
limitations in accessing mortgage funds 
for home purchase and are limited in 
drawing upon home equity to manage 
household finances on a continuous 
basis.  Mortgage market is generally 
accessible only to conventional, prime 
borrower classes.  Low government 
participation to support homeownership 
and mortgage funds are constrained by 
conservative LTVs and limited 
amortization periods. 
Partially Constrained Mortgage Market: 
Homeowner households can use home 
equity refinancing to manage changes in 
household consumption requirements on 
a continuous basis.  Mortgage credit may 
be constrained through conservative 
LTVs due to underdeveloped secondary 
mortgage market and certain borrower 
classes are restricted from accessing 
mortgage funds due to limited presence of 
credit enhancements. 
  
 Flexible 
 
The two by two matrix provides important structure to the analysis, but the 
challenge is to weight the indicators and features.  It is understood that housing finance 
has changed substantially since the excessively high mortgage loan rates reported in the 
early 1980s, Girouard and Blondal (2001).  Traditionally, up until the mid-1980s in most 
advanced nations, the mortgage lending system was highly regulated with specialized 
mortgage lenders and limited market competition, such as the Savings and Loans 
(S&Ls) in the U.S. and Building Societies in the U.K.  Regulations set interest rate 
ceilings and quantitative limits on mortgage credit and repayment periods. These 
regulations sometimes resulted in credit rationing in the mortgage markets among 
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OECD nations, making it difficult for households to access mortgage credit.  
Deregulation of mortgage markets, which began in the early 1980s in many OECD 
nations, introduced competitive pressures among mortgage lenders and broadened 
household access to mortgage credit. The process of deregulation, however, took 
different forms in various countries, Diamond and Lea (1992).  A significant difference 
among various domestic housing finance systems relates to the specific features of 
mortgage loan products, mortgage funding sources, management of mortgage risk and 
credit granting rules among various borrower classes.  The study proposes a weighting 
for each feature, indicator and outcome outlined in Figure 5.  A summary of the 
weightings is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Setting Weights to the Parameters Used to Measure Mortgage Market 
Development  (weighting for each parameter is set from 0 to 1) 
 
Flexible: 
    None  Partial/Limited         No limits 
Home Equity Withdrawal     0          0.5              1.0 
(Withdrawal amount/LTV limits) 
    None       Partial             Yes 
Renegotiation or Prepayment     0          0.5              1.0 
 
    No Choice Fixed or Variable  Fixed, Variable or Blended 
Loan Type and Duration     0.0          0.5              1.0 
 
        up to 15 years      15 to 25 25 to 30            30 to 35       35 or more 
Amortization  0.0          0.25     0.5               0.75            1.0 
 
 
Liberal: 
         up to 50%      50 to 65% 65 to 80%          80 to 90%      90% higher 
Loan to Value  0          0.25     0.50               0.75            1.0 
(purchase / refinance) 
 
   None up to 15% 15 to 30%          30 to 45%     45% or more 
Secondary Mortgage Market,    0    0.25       0.5               0.75            1.0 
Covered Bonds or MBS as a % 
of residential loans outstanding 
 
   None  Mortgage Loan Insurance (MLI) MLI and Credit Derivatives  
Mortgage Credit     0        0.5              1.0 
Enhancements   
 
               Prime Only          Prime and Alt-A  Prime, Alt-A and Subprime 
Borrower Classes     0        0.5              1.0 
 
Combined Indicators/Outcomes from a Flexible and Liberal System: 
This index is based on a IMF (2011) study and ranks each nation between 0 to 1, and measures whether the state-
owned housing finance agency accounts for more than 50 per cent of the domestic mortgage market share  
 
        Up to 20%          20 to 40%           40 to 60%           60 to 80%        80% or more 
Mortgage Debt to GDP 0  0.25  0.50  0.75              1.0 
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The IMF, in its 2008 report, selected 18 nations in a cross-country comparison, while in its 
2011 report selected 33 nations, 19 emerging and newly industrialized economies and 14 advanced 
economies.  For Green and Wachter (2005) 13 nations were selected.  
A cross country comparison of 12 of the largest, most advanced mortgage 
markets, is undertaken in this research based on the overall value or size of the 
domestic mortgage credit market with a legal and institutional framework that supports 
private market property rights and mortgage lending contracts.  The focus is on 
advanced economies where there is an adequate legal system and institutional 
framework that supports real property markets; housing finance; and secondary market 
activity.  This is not the case for many emerging and newly industrialized economies that 
lack a fully transparent regulatory framework for housing finance and enforcement of 
mortgage loan contracts (including default and foreclosure).  The selected nations also 
sets forth rules of market conduct for real estate agents, mortgage brokers, mortgage 
lenders, MLI providers and others.   
The index uses a simple methodology similar to the IMF, and based on Table 2 
there are four separate and unique features assigned to either the liberal (L) or flexible 
(F) index.  In addition to these, there are two combined (C) indicators and outcomes that 
are common to both the liberal and flexible index.  This includes both the IMF Index of 
Government Participation and the domestic mortgage debt to GDP.  Mathematically, the 
liberal and flexible mortgage market index can be expressed as the following function, so 
that  
𝐹 = ∑ 𝐹𝑖+ 𝐶𝑖=1…𝑛
𝑛
 (19) 
and 
𝐿 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖+ 𝐶𝑖=1…𝑛
𝑛
 (20) 
where 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑛𝑖=1…𝑛  (21) 
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To obtain the final ranking for either the liberal index, defined above as L, or the 
flexible index, defined above as F, there is an equal weight given to the four features 
unique to the flexible and liberal features for a maximum index of 0.8.  In addition, there 
is a further allocation of up to 0.2 from what are defined as combined (C) indicators and 
outcomes, and therefore the final maximum index is 1.0, so that  
0 ≤ (𝐹, 𝐿,𝐶) ≤ 1 (22) 
The index for either the liberal or flexible features, among a cross comparison of 
nations, are summarized in Table 3.  The first column is the cumulative total of the 
flexible features and the second column is the cumulative total of the liberal features and 
the third column totals the combined indicators and outcomes which are equally 
important to support either a liberal or flexible mortgage market system.  The fourth 
column summarizes the final total for the flexible index and the fifth column summarizes 
the liberal index.   
The findings in Table 3 draw from data taken from a range of sources including 
regularly published private and government organizations that track the mortgage 
market.  The data availability and sources for the features and indicators to rank the 
degree to which a domestic system is flexible and liberal are based on the most recent 
published sources and most recent mortgage products and credit granting rules that 
could be obtained.  The analysis is based on the mortgage lending system that was 
present in the market during 2010 and 2011, although it is understood that mortgage 
contracts are often negotiated on a case by case basis.  Where required, contact was 
made with leading domestic financial institutions to gain information on specific 
mortgage products and relevant features to mortgage credit granting rules and 
guidelines.  Therefore, the indices are based on what are deemed to be common 
practices generally available to households.  In terms of the secondary mortgage market 
and mortgage debt to GDP, depending on data availability, the study relied on published 
data between the years 2005 and 2010 to obtain an average for comparability over a five 
year period.  This was considered necessary due to the impact of the financial credit 
crisis which may have affected mortgage credit flows and the cost of mortgage credit 
differently in different nations, likely as a result of government intervention in housing 
finance and mortgage lending.   
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Table 3. Mortgage Market Development: A Cross Country Comparison 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Country Flexible  Liberal  Combined Flexible  Liberal 
  Features Features Features  Index  Index 
      (1)      (2)      (3)  (1) + (3) (2) + (3) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Australia 0.40  0.45  0.106  0.506  0.556 
 
Canada 0.50  0.50  0.094  0.594  0.594 
 
Denmark 0.65  0.45  0.100  0.750  0.550 
 
France 0.15  0.40  0.056  0.206  0.456 
 
Germany 0.20  0.25  0.069  0.269  0.319 
 
Ireland 0.45  0.55  0.125  0.575  0.675 
 
Italy  0.15  0.30  0.025  0.175  0.325 
 
Japan 0.40  0.40  0.063  0.463  0.463 
 
Netherlands 0.75  0.35  0.150  0.900  0.500 
 
Spain  0.05  0.50  0.117  0.131  0.581 
 
United  0.60  0.60  0.113  0.713  0.713 
  Kingdom 
 
United 0.80  0.75  0.131  0.931  0.881 
  States 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Maximum 0.80  0.80  0.200  1.000  1.000 
  Index 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources for the data include the European Mortgage Federation for the European nations; Bond Market 
Association and Federal Reserve for the U.S.; Bank of Australia and the Australian Bureau of Statistics; 
Bank of Japan and the Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Statistics Canada and 
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and International Monetary Fund to obtain other data and for general data verification. 
Figure 7 plots the liberal index and the flexible index on a matrix for each nation 
with the data summarized from Table 3. The classification of each quadrant is taken 
from Figure 6 which describes whether a mortgage market is constrained or dynamically 
complete.  The intuition is that the y-axis plots the liberal index and is a measure of the 
extent to which a domestic system supports homeownership.  Equally important, the x-
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axis plots the flexible index and measures the ease to which a household can access 
mortgage funding over time.  
The hurdle rate to move from the fully constrained quadrant to the partially 
constrained quadrant is determined to be an index rating of 0.5 for either the flexible or 
liberal index.  This may be considered an arbitrary reference point, but it follows the 
economic reasoning of studies such as the IMF in the sense that some kind of simple 
threshold or benchmark is required for comparative analysis.  The notion is that the 
index for both the flexible and liberal features is linear and at some point the mortgage 
market system becomes less constrained and more open and accessible as various 
features as well as outcomes and indicators support the mortgage borrower to consider 
homeownership as an investment and dynamically trade home equity over time to 
manage inter-temporal household consumption.  To move into the quadrant for a 
dynamically complete market it is necessary for both liberal and flexible indices to 
exceed an index rating of 0.5.  What has not been discussed is the appropriate 
homeownership rate for any nation, or just what would be the correct level of mortgage 
credit available in a nation to support homeownership targets as these do not explicitly 
exist.  The overall objective offers a different focus, and supports the notion that if a 
household wishes to consume housing services through homeownership rather than the 
rental housing market, a liberal and flexible mortgage market system needs to be in 
place to support a dynamically complete market. 
As Figure 7 illustrates, seven of the nations’ plot in the dynamically complete 
quadrant, including the U.S., U.K., Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and 
Australia.  Five nations are partially or fully constrained with Italy, Germany, France and 
Japan the most constrained.  These fully constrained mortgage systems are not flexible 
since households cannot easily renegotiate, transfer or terminate mortgage contracts.  
Moreover, home equity withdrawal is generally not permitted.  These systems are not 
liberal due to constraints in raising mortgage funds in the secondary mortgage market 
and a lack of credit enhancements reduces the borrower classes that are eligible to 
qualify for mortgages.  Spain is partially constrained, with a liberal system that has little 
flexibility in terms of mortgage loan types and duration as well as limitations in terms of 
renegotiation and home equity withdrawal.   
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Figure 7. A Two-by-Two Matrix to Plot the Domestic Indices of a 
Flexible and Liberal Mortgage Market  
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In continental Europe, de-regulation in housing finance has been slow and 
mortgage market innovation modest, with a larger role for public institutions which is 
similar to Canada but unlike the U.S.  While Japan has experienced much de-regulation 
starting in the 1980s with the government no longer providing direct mortgage loans to 
borrowers, the government still plays a significant role in the mortgage market 
development which shows modest levels of innovation.  The Canadian, U.S. and 
Australian systems display sufficient differences, while at the same time these systems 
have been successful in achieving high levels of homeownership.  Simply due to the 
availability of mortgage credit and mortgage product innovation, the U.S. system is a 
benchmark model for any nation.  In the U.S. there is a private mortgage lending system 
with strong mortgage product innovation and a very prominent role for credit derivatives 
as well as an important and direct role for government support to provide credit 
enhancements and secondary mortgage securitization.  U.S. mortgage product 
innovation is unparalleled among nations and automated underwriting systems facilitate 
mortgage credit granting.  Canada has maintained strong legislative and regulatory 
oversight on mortgage market systems with a direct role for government in credit 
enhancements and secondary mortgage securitization with less advancement in 
mortgage product innovation.  The evolution of the Canadian housing finance system is 
interesting because many nations are grappling with housing finance challenges that 
Canada has faced during various periods in the past.  Canada`s advancements map in a 
similar path to the U.S. often mirroring the U.S. housing finance system but with a lag, 
and most likely, any future change will be evaluated against the performance of the U.S. 
system following the financial crisis that began in 2007, King (2012).  Australia has less 
government participation in the mortgage system especially when it comes to 
guarantees provided to mortgage lenders and investors in MBS, although private sector 
MLI is available.   
In terms of which national systems are most flexible, nations either scored as 
strongly flexible or not, largely due to the regulation of home equity withdrawals, 
extended amortizations and ease of mortgage renegotiation, transfer or termination.  
The U.S., Netherlands, Denmark and U.K are the most flexible systems for home equity 
withdrawal and mortgage renegotiation.  Canada and Australia rank as not quite as 
flexible as these nations, but more flexible than the majority of nations in the cross-
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country comparison.  Mortgage amortization periods in the U.S. can be extended to long 
periods and generally most nations allow for 25 to 30 year amortizations, and in Japan 
households can access 35 year fixed rate mortgages, which is similar to the U.S.  
However, Italy, France and Spain require shorter amortization periods.  In Canada, 
residential mortgage loan terms are equally balanced as fixed or either variable or 
adjustable, and households equally choose between term duration based on socio-
economic factors or even marketing by mortgage lenders to gain market share among 
competitors.  In the U.S., fixed rate mortgages are common with between 70 to 90 per 
cent of mortgage holders choosing this term, similar to Japan.  France`s mortgage 
market is the third largest in Europe after the U.K. and Germany, with 80 per cent of all 
households holding a mortgage.  In France, 80 per cent of all mortgage loan terms are 
fixed rate.  In the U.K and Australia the dominant mortgage term is for an adjustable or 
variable rate mortgage.  Australia has an overall mortgage market similar to Canada in 
many respects; however, adjustable or variable mortgage loan terms dominate the 
system accounting for about 85 per cent of outstanding mortgage loans.  This means 
that mortgage loan rates tend to move in line with changes in the monetary policy rate 
and mortgage borrowers bear significant interest rate risk, which is a risk that cannot be 
easily hedged and this may deter some households away from homeownership.  In 
Canada and the U.S., the pass-through of monetary policy to mortgage loan rates is less 
immediate and clear, and mortgage loan rates are a function of competitive market 
forces with the secondary mortgage market playing a key factor in the pricing of 
mortgage funds.   
In terms of which national systems are most liberal, the U.S. has a very 
innovative system where high ratio LTVs allow for a minimal down payment and the 
secondary mortgage market provides adequate mortgage credit, even to non-
conventional borrower classes with the presence of a range of credit enhancements.  A 
liberal mortgage market system allows for high ratio LTVs that typically exceed 80 per 
cent in most advanced OECD nations, except for Germany.  The U.K., Ireland and Spain 
all score high on the liberal index comparatively to the U.S., largely due to mortgage 
credit being available to many non-conventional borrower classes.  While the U.K. lacks 
the advanced secondary mortgage market that exists in Netherlands, Denmark and 
Ireland, there are also limitations on credit enhancements and credit derivatives that are 
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available for mortgage lenders and investors in the U.S. The secondary mortgage 
market is important to a liberal system, and in Europe retail deposits are still the 
predominant source of mortgage funding.  Covered bonds vary regionally in terms of 
importance in Europe and account for 20 per cent of total outstanding mortgage debt 
funding.  Generally, Europe lacks integration of the secondary market with the mortgage 
market and some jurisdictions have a legal framework that supports private property 
rights but has not been “modernized”, when compared to the U.S. or Canada, and this 
potentially constrains mortgage credit.  Canada is more in line with Australia and on par 
with Spain although the mortgage systems are fundamentally different.  Spain is much 
more liberal in terms of high ratio LTVs which are supported by advancements in the 
secondary mortgage market.  Canada and Australia have generally more conservative 
mortgage credit granting rules and the advanced secondary mortgage markets allow for 
high ratio LTVs.  In Japan the overall system is constrained by the role of the Japan 
Housing Finance Agency which has a main purpose to take a lead role in purchasing 
MBS and therefore assumes the credit risk for most mortgage lending.   
Households that are defined by mortgage lenders as non-conventional or 
subprime vary in significance and importance depending on the nation.  But given 
changes in demographics (increasing levels of immigration) and labour conditions 
(toward more self-employment) this is important to account for. In terms of mortgage 
credit for non-conventional borrowers, the U.S. and U.K. are most liberal, while Australia 
and Canada also have mortgage products directed to non-traditional borrower classes, 
primarily new immigrants and self-employed households that either cannot document 
income or lack a credit score.  European financial institutions supported subprime 
lending through the purchase of U.S. mortgage pools and collateral debt obligations, but 
this directly supported U.S. subprime mortgage lending and not European subprime 
borrowers to any extent.  Credit enhancements can play a fundamental role in the 
secondary mortgage market, managing risk for investors.  Most nations have access to 
credit enhancements and these are either MLI or government mortgage loan 
guarantees, with only the U.S. extensively using credit derivatives.  
Overall, the features, outcomes and indicators provide useful and important 
results in which to evaluate the advancement of a domestic mortgage market.  The 
liberal and flexible indices are not intended to conclude whether one system is better 
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than another.  It represents an important refinement and extension to the methodology 
and research of the IMF (2008, 2011) to measure the degree to which a mortgage 
system supports homeownership as an investment.  Finally, domestic tax policies, such 
as tax free capital gains in homeownership or mortgage interest deductibility as well as 
direct and indirect government homeownership policies, can influence household 
behaviour and have been addressed through the use of the IMF 2011 index.   
3.8. The Mortgage Market and Household Behaviour  
In presenting the summary statistics for the IMF 2008 Index of Mortgage Market 
Development, the IMF concluded that the correlation between the IMF Index and the 
residential mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio was significant, with a R2 of 0.80.  In the IMF 
2011 study, the Index of Government Participation was related to the domestic level of 
homeownership, and the R2 was reported to be 0.04.  Other studies that have looked at 
the features and indicators of the mortgage market generally discuss the cause and 
effect of advancements in housing finance and mortgage market with outcomes such as 
household choice to become homeowners, Chiuri and Jappelli (2003).  Similarly, Green 
and Wachter (2005) offer a descriptive analysis of mortgage outcomes in nations with 
low levels of mortgage funding securitization and outcomes in nations with low mortgage 
debt outstanding.  
In keeping with the literature, it is useful to relate the mortgage market indices to 
household behaviour.  The focus is household behaviour associated with 
homeownership as an investment decision.  As such, the first objective is to consider the 
relationship or causality that a liberal mortgage system has on homeownership levels, 
since the first action a household will take in choosing housing as an investment is to 
become a homeowner.  The second objective decision is to consider the relationship or 
causality that a flexible mortgage system has on accessing mortgage funding.  It is 
understood that a representative household that considers housing as an investment 
must have the capacity to dynamically span the consumption space provided by 
homeownership in a principal residence and this is done through a flexible mortgage 
market.  It would therefore be expected that a representative household in any nation 
with a flexible mortgage market would experience commensurate levels of mortgage 
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debt to support homeownership and household finance to smooth inter-temporal 
consumption. 
The expectation that a liberal mortgage market should promote homeownership 
and the correlation of the two factors is important.  Similarly, a flexible mortgage market 
through ease of home equity refinance, different loan types and duration, and extended 
amortization periods should have a correlation with mortgage debt based on household 
size.  This is evident among households that consider the investment qualities of 
housing since mortgage funding is often a low cost option to fund household 
consumption, when compared to credit card debt; unsecured personal loans; and even 
other lending sources such as automobile loans.   
In summary, the Index of Liberal Mortgage Features in a nation is positively 
correlated with its domestic homeownership rate; while the Index of Flexible Mortgage 
Features is positively correlated with mortgage debt levels based on the size of the 
household.  Figure 7 confirms that the U.S., U.K., Canada, Denmark, Ireland, 
Netherlands and Australia have dynamically complete mortgage markets consistent with 
Figures 5 and 6, but does not suggest that any of these systems are either too liberal or 
too flexible.  Further research into understanding the indices of a domestic mortgage 
market and household behaviour would yield interesting results as to what is an 
appropriate mortgage market system to achieve intended objectives for government, 
financial institutions and households related to homeownership targets or mortgage 
credit availability.  Appendix B summarizes the applications of the indices of mortgage 
market development.  It identifies the expected household behaviour related to both a 
liberal and a flexible mortgage market.  This includes the relationship of a liberal 
mortgage market with homeownership and the relationship of a flexible mortgage market 
with household mortgage debt levels. 
3.9. Policy Implications of Mortgage Market Development  
The usefulness of the indices for mortgage market development is important for 
government agencies and regulatory authorities that either supply or guarantee 
mortgage funding to mortgage lenders and the ultimate mortgage borrowers.  For 
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example, it may be insightful for policy makers to consider whether there is an optimal 
level of mortgage market development.  The normative analysis is complex but can be 
structured within an economic model.   
The question is whether achieving the maximum index of one is the objective for 
any domestic mortgage market and whether the current domestic market structure, legal 
system, institutional framework and housing finance could ensure the viability of this.  It 
may not be possible or desirable for either the liberal or flexible index to attain the 
maximum index level of 1.  This raises criticism of what is the ultimate objective for 
financial markets and government in providing households with a liberal and flexible 
mortgage market.  An economic model that considers the mortgage market within a 
broader social planning function is proposed.  As such the construction of the economic 
model begins with 
M = f(F, L) (23) 
and the implicit function that flows from this that 
f (f, l) =  0 (24) 
which has a total differentiation of 
0 = ffdf +  fl dl.   (25) 
and this shows that 
  dl
df
=  −  ff
fl
. (26) 
Therefore, the derivative dl
df
 can be found as the negative of the ratio of the partial 
derivatives of the implicit function, providing that fl  ≠ 0. 
The housing finance policy makers working in conjunction with mortgage lenders 
and financial institutions as well as government agencies that are involved in mortgage 
credit granting, mortgage funding and direct mortgage guarantees can set the necessary 
parameters for mortgage credit.  The economic model can be structured as a 
household`s objective function.  If we suppose that mortgage market development is a 
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function of the variables that can be defined as flexible and liberal to achieve the 
household objective function, defined as α, which is a parameter that expresses the 
household objective function as  
α = E[u(Wh)] (27) 
which says that a household desires to maximize expected utility of wealth from 
ownership of a housing unit, h. However, it is equally useful and possible that the α term 
be defined by households and policy makers as another objective function rather than 
expected utility of wealth and it is straight forward to revise the objective function.  
Therefore the model which relates the mortgage market development, m, to the flexible 
and liberal features which are present in the domestic system and the household 
objective, such as to maximize utility of wealth, from homeownership can be expressed 
as  
M = f(x1, … xn,α)        (28) 
where the set of x`s include the features, indicators and outcomes of a domestic 
mortgage lending system. Finding an optimal value for mortgage market development 
would consist of solving n first-order equations of the form 
∂m
∂xi� = 0    (i = 1, … . n),       (29) 
and the solution to this process would yield optimal values for these x`s (x1∗ , x2∗ , … . , xn∗ ) 
that would implicitly depend on the parameter α.  The requirement would be that the 
second-order conditions are met, and therefore the implicit function theorem would apply 
and the next step would be to solve each xi∗ explicitly as a function of the parameter n 
described as 
x1∗ = x1∗ (α)  x2∗ = x2∗  (α)  
⋮  
xn∗ = xn∗  (α) . (30) 
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By substituting these functions onto the objective function we can obtain an 
expression in which an optimal value of m (m∗) depends on the parameter α both 
directly and indirectly through the effect of α on the x`s and therefore we have 
m∗ = f[x1∗(α), x2∗(α), … . xn∗ (α),α] (31) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to α yields the following 
dm∗
dα
=  ∂f
∂x1
. dx1
da
+  ∂f
∂x2
 . dx2
dα
… +  ∂f
∂xn
 . dxn
dα
+  ∂f
∂α
 (32) 
Referring back to the first-order conditions, all these terms except the last are equal to 
zero if the x’s are at their optimal values, and therefore we derive the envelope result 
consistent with the earlier result. 
dm∗
dα
= ∂f
∂α
 .  (33) 
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Chapter 4.  
 
Homeownership as a 
Critical Asset Allocation Decision 
The household decision to become a homeowner is important since it represents 
a significant share of a household`s net wealth and may mean that investments in 
financial assets are deferred since homeownership typically entails a large mortgage 
loan obligation.  The economic intuition is that while the household choice to become a 
homeowner supports the need for consumption of housing services, it is fundamentally 
an investment problem.  The research contributes to the literature on portfolio selection, 
and there is an extensive literature on portfolio theory and asset selection beginning with 
Markowitz (1952), Samuelson (1969), and Merton (1971).  Extensions to the literature 
that include homeownership in the portfolio selection will be discussed, and they 
consider whether housing impacts equity market participation, and how portfolio 
selection may differ depending on an investor`s financial wealth, income or age and the 
cost of housing.  The motivation is to refine and extend existing research and propose a 
stylized Markowitz optimal portfolio selection model in which a household`s portfolio 
selection that includes housing among financial assets account for different housing 
types; length of holding period; imputed rent; property maintenance and the mortgage 
lending system. 
The researcher does not address the challenges that many households face in 
obtaining acceptable housing services from both market and non-market sources and 
does not consider the supply and demand of housing.  The research moves beyond 
studies that address a household`s portfolio selection as a simple utility maximizing 
consumption model without fully accounting for the complete range of benefits and costs 
associated with homeownership as an investment and the mortgage lending system in 
which households finance homeownership.  Advancements in mortgage markets allow 
home equity in a principal residence to be used as a household finance tool to smooth 
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inter-temporal consumption.  Undoubtedly, home equity will continue to play an 
important role in financing retirement needs given stock market volatility.  The research 
also moves beyond current research that only considers single detached housing and 
does not account for different housing types, various holding periods and property 
maintenance.  The model presented allows a household to choose between an 
apartment condominium or a single detached home.  The household will consider finite 
holding periods and this also differs from other models that either assume an infinite 
horizon, Miao and Wang (2007), or an optimal stopping time, Cetin and Zapatero (2010).  
Households can also express strategic considerations related to property maintenance.   
For simplicity, the model and empirical analysis follows a Canadian market 
setting, unlike the U.S., where the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property 
taxes is a public subsidy that can influence demand for mortgage credit and therefore 
entice households to become homeowners.  Canada is similar to the U.S. and 
elsewhere in that capital gains and imputed rent related to homeownership of a principal 
residence over time are tax-exempt.  For the empirical work, the housing markets of 
Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver have been selected since 
homeownership levels approximate 70 per cent, and these housing markets report high 
levels of sales transactions, with relatively high house prices, but without much influence 
of subprime mortgage lending as has been the case in many U.S. housing markets.  The 
stylized model assumes that a household, through the mortgage lending system, has 
qualified to become a homeowner and will make a portfolio selection that includes 
housing among financial assets such as equities and bonds at a specific point in time.  
The expectation of returns and volatility of returns for equities and bonds are exogenous, 
based on long-term historic results.  There are three scenarios presented for housing:  
1.  expectations of house price returns and imputed rents that follow 
historical returns;  
2.  an equilibrium approach where the change in house prices and 
imputed rents evolve together as a stochastic process; and  
3.  implied annual rates of housing returns necessary for housing to be 
an asset in a portfolio selection above the global minimum variance 
portfolio.   
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4.1. Literature on Housing as an Investment and 
Critical Asset Allocation 
Gau and Goldberg (1983) provide the inspiration to consider homeownership an 
investment comparable to finance assets.  These authors cite the institutional framework 
and urban land patterns that shape housing development and homeownership strategies 
in Canada that differ to that of the U.S.  The performance of homeownership as an 
investment continues to shape Canadian housing finance. 
Traditional economic models with a housing perspective have focused on why a 
household may buy or rent housing services.  An economic value is assigned by 
consumers on housing attributes.  This theoretical approach traces back to Lancaster 
(1966) and an approach to consumer theory where the attributes of goods are in fact the 
primary units of consumption.  Based on this economic reasoning, Nicholson’s work, 
Microeconomic Theory (2005), profiles linear attributes as a standard utility model that 
works well to bundle consumption attributes together, and the bundles for durables 
would include housing while the bundles for non-durables would include food, clothing, 
recreation and the like. 
Hedonic studies reference Lancaster as the basis for defining housing as a 
bundle of housing services rather than just a building.  Arguea and Hsiao (2000) derive 
shadow prices for various attributes and this provides a framework to understand the 
determinants of demand for housing but does not address the rent versus buy decision.  
Graphical representations of the Lancasterian approach, as outlined by Nicholson 
(2005), can be adapted to illustrate that when a household with a specific budget 
constraint is faced with a rent versus buy decision and a third choice of non-durable 
consumption, a utility maximizing household would never consume positive amounts of 
both rental and homeownership housing.  This approach allows for consumption 
patterns to change over time with respect to tenure.  As such, goods that were 
previously consumed may cease to be bought, such as rental housing, and goods that 
were previously ignored due to constraints, such as homeownership in a principal 
residence, may experience a substantial shift in consumption.  However, the linear 
assumptions inherent in the theoretical model require preference ordering (mapping) of 
all possible collection of goods and are often chosen by way of convenience to obtain 
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certain outcomes rather than confirmed in a real world setting.  In the case of non-
durable consumption, many attributes are non-additive and conflicting, and utility 
maximization subject to a budget constraint is not a robust linear programming problem.  
Rosen (1974) focuses more on how consumers and suppliers interact within a 
framework of bids and offers for characteristics, and this naturally leads to a non-linear 
hedonic price structure.  It is not uncommon for hedonic studies to be plagued by highly 
unstable shadow prices, as concluded by Pendleton and Shonkwiler (2001).  Another 
shortcoming is that housing consumption models ignore mortgage lending constraints 
which are not a unique property attribute, and generally these models fail in their 
usefulness to consider homeownership as an investment decision for households.   
Basic theoretical models of housing choice adopt a Cobb Douglas utility function 
due to its analytical tractability.  Davis, Lehnert and Martin (2008), Hornstein (2009), and 
Piazessi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007) conclude that households reduce expenditures on 
housing when house prices increase relative to non-durable consumption and suggest a 
value higher than one for the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between housing 
and non-durable consumption.  This is important research but the framework does not 
consider housing as part of an optimal asset allocation, where house prices can change 
over time and households can choose among different housing types and mortgage 
lending constraints can influence the homeownership decision. 
While economic models can show the elasticity of housing services over time, 
housing tenure choice is more complicated and theoretical models have been adopted to 
handle different situations.  Hornstein (2009) considers long run growth rates in house 
prices based on the balanced growth path of the housing market using the Campbell and 
Hercowitz (2006) representation of collateral constraints, finding that changes in 
collateral constraints hardly affect the balanced growth path of house prices.  Household 
tenure and housing consumption choices typically fall within a life-cycle framework as 
proposed by Gervais (2002), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde and 
Kreuger (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2005) and Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf 
(2008) among others.  These models cannot overcome many of the complex realities of 
housing markets and strategic considerations a homeowner may exhibit with respect to 
homeownership investment such as holding periods and the choice to buy different 
housing types.  Households also need to account for the actual impacts of transaction 
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costs, imputed rent and property maintenance and this can influence investment 
preferences.  Structural parameters and their weighting can ultimately bias outcomes 
and housing is a unique asset class compared to other investment alternatives.  
Moreover, Green (2008) concludes that the mixing of subprime borrowers and 
speculators confound housing consumption models derived for prime, conforming 
borrowers, since the evidence shows that subprime borrowers and speculators are 
heterogeneous and quickly abandon housing markets in a nonrecourse market setting if 
real estate markets fall or mortgage lending costs increase above the rate of house price 
appreciation.  In a finance context, mortgage underwriting structured to benefit prime 
borrowers with expeditious mortgage credit at low cost, resemble low cost call options 
when extended to subprime borrowers, investors and speculators.  Pavlov and Wachter 
(2006) consider a lending environment where lenders misprice and under-price the put 
option, and in the context of a mortgage loan to securitization model, this leads to 
ruthless borrower default without recourse by lenders or investors of mortgage backed 
securities. 
Given that mortgage credit is a significant factor in the household decision to 
become a homeowner, well cited research by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) concludes that 
information imperfections in credit markets can result in different credit granting 
outcomes for different consumers, and this would apply to mortgage lending.  Pavlov 
and Wachter (2004, 2005, 2009a, 2009b), Abraham and Pavoni (2008) and Green, 
Sanders and Wachter (2008) and Green (2008) show that strict mortgage loan 
underwriting in the U.S., in the form of employment and income verification and 
conservative debt service ratios along with risk based mortgage loan pricing, affects real 
estate markets immediately and can substantially alter home buyer demand for 
mortgage credit.  This disproportionately impacts the rent versus buy decision for those 
at the bottom end of the credit curve such as minorities and low income households, 
new immigrants, and even self-employed borrowers.  Using data from 1990 and 1991, 
Avery, Beeson and Sniderman (1999) conclude that denial rates were 30 per cent higher 
in low income and minority U.S. neighbourhoods than wealthy neighbourhoods, 
consistent with arguments that U.S. mortgage lenders had historically constrained 
mortgage lending by redlining certain high risk housing markets, Ferguson (2008).  The 
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results give evidence that U.S. mortgage loan applications for low income and minority 
households were low prior to the 1990s, given the high likelihood of a denial. 
Pavlov & Wachter (2004, 2006) and Herring & Wachter (1999) conclude that if 
lenders are left unchecked by regulators, financial markets may fail to properly price the 
credit risk in mortgage lending.  In turn, housing markets where lenders underprice 
mortgage lending experience deeper market corrections when markets begin to slide.  
Allen and Gale (1998, 1999) and Allen (2001), offer models that highlight the 
underpricing of mortgage lending as leading to inflated house prices, while constraints 
on mortgage credit granting can equally curb house price growth.  The findings have a 
policy level focus, even though there are strong indirect implications on the decision of a 
household to consider homeownership as an investment.  Iacoviello (2005) illustrates 
that a general rise in consumer prices reduces the real value of a borrower’s outstanding 
mortgage debt obligations, positively influencing their net wealth.   
On a macroeconomic level, higher levels of household wealth and income play a 
key role to support homeownership and household behaviour is influenced both by the 
consumer need for housing services and the investment potential embedded in 
homeownership.  Li, Lui and Yao (2008) conclude that as wealth increases 
homeownership will approximate 70 per cent for young age cohorts and 90 per cent for 
older age cohorts over a 40 year employment horizon and a 75 year life cycle.  The 
authors extend the basic Cobb Douglas utility function and propose constant elasticity of 
substitution preferences over housing and non-housing consumption.  The optimization 
problem uses a calibrated housing model implementing a two stage method of simulated 
moments, drawing from a comprehensive data set across three age groups.  The model 
is based on strong empirical guidance regarding input parameters that are either 
classified as economic such as housing stock, housing prices, income wealth, 
transaction costs, and mortgage collateral constraints, or those classified as 
demographic including mobility and mortality.  This accounts for many shortcomings in 
other works and is an important contribution in the theory of housing tenure.  The results 
focus on policy issues and conclude that when income declines this triggers both lower 
house prices and lower house values, resulting in lower homeownership rates and lower 
non-housing consumption which is consistent with the economic reasoning that 
households regard homeownership as an investment.  However, the complex model 
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relies on a comprehensive data set that limits its broad application, and proves of little 
value in considering utility maximization decisions for a household to consider alternative 
investments such as stocks and bonds.   
The literature on housing finance and homeownership generally conclude that 
households become homeowners based on net wealth, labour income and access to 
mortgage credit because they have access to an advanced domestic mortgage market 
and an institutional framework that supports real property markets, IMF (2008, 2011) and 
King (2012b).  In a U.S. setting, homeownership has been acknowledged as having 
investment qualities similar to other financial assets, providing asset appreciation and 
dividends, which are defined as the imputed rent gained when a household owns its 
housing services, as well as the direct benefit of hedging rent risk, Flavin and Yamashita 
(2002), Yao and Zhang (2005), Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), and Sinai and 
Souleles (2005).  This is also the conclusion of Steele (1993) for a Canadian setting, but 
without an economic model.  At the time an investment in homeownership is made this 
often results in an investor’s asset allocation being dominated by a single asset class, 
specifically the housing unit.  This changes over time as the mortgage debt obligation is 
paid down by way of loan amortization and net wealth increases due to home price 
appreciation, Reichenstein (1998).  Homeowners, especially first time buyers, do 
recognize the risk of a single claim on a real estate asset especially in high house price 
markets, and may even consider this overexposure from an optimal portfolio 
perspective, Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007).  For homeowners, a flexible mortgage 
market is an important innovation that supports homeownership as an investment and 
the consequence has been that home equity is being increasingly used as a finance tool 
to smooth inter-temporal household consumption, Campbell (2006) and King (2012b).  In 
turn, some governments have responded to a household`s liquidity constraint and store 
of wealth in homeownership by allowing certain segments of the population, such as 
seniors, the option to defer property taxes, to be settled upon transfer of the property or 
probate of the estate. 
Relating net wealth, mortgage debt levels and consumption of housing services 
within an economic model is complex.  The research suggests that the level of real 
estate ownership needed for the consumption of housing services may differ from the 
optimal level of housing assets held within a portfolio and that rental housing is by no 
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means a perfect substitute for homeownership, Flavin and Yamashita (2002).  To 
address this point, Sinai and Souleles (2005) present a simple tenure choice model with 
endogenous house prices, illustrating how the demand for owning trades off the rent and 
asset price risks.  The conclusion is that homeownership will dominate the tenure 
decision for households with a long term horizon in markets with high levels of net rent 
risk and volatility since renters must purchase housing services on the spot market. 
More recent models, Pavlov and Wachter (2009b), include mortgage lending 
constraints and can differentiate between homogenous prime and heterogeneous 
subprime borrowers by including the credit score in the model.  Consumers find it 
attractive to switch from renting to owning when mortgage financing costs are low or 
when credit constraints are relaxed.  The end result is house price appreciation which 
churns homeownership investment returns.  The more wealth a renter household has 
relative to income the more likely the household will become a homeowner as 
requirements for mortgage credit, primarily LTV, can be met.  This does address the 
complexity of placing subprime borrowers, investors, and speculators in the same 
mortgage credit granting regime as prime borrowers.  This suggests a research 
opportunity to consider an economic model that examines the impact of mortgage 
borrower misrepresentation and fraud on housing markets, quantifying the potential for 
financial gain achieved from overly liberal and flexible underwriting standards, especially 
in a mortgage market without lender recourse as in the U.S.  Mortgage lending 
constraints address much more than credit score and include sources of home purchase 
down payment, amortization periods, LTV ratios, acceptable sources of documented 
income and, most importantly, mortgage debt service ratios.  Combined, the features of 
a liberal and flexible mortgage market support home buyer purchasing power, 
Himmelberg, Mayer and SinaI (2005).  When credit granting allows borrowers to qualify 
with high debt service ratios at low mortgage loan rates, this in effect extends purchasing 
power, potentially fuelling house price appreciation generating high internal rates of 
return for home buyers.  This may skew the household portfolio choice away from 
equities, biasing homeownership as a preferred asset allocation. 
Research into mortgage credit granting in Canada by Buckland and Dong (2008) 
and Simpson and Buckland (2009) and in the U.S. by Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), 
Mayer and Pence (2007), Shiller (2008), Sherlund (2008), Mian and Sufi (2008), and 
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Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009), show that liberal and flexible mortgage lending 
increases mortgage loan originations among all mortgage borrower groups.  The 
research of Linneman and Wachter (1989) is an initial reference on the impact of 
housing finance constraints.  There is evidence that mortgage credit easing prior to the 
1990s occurred as U.S. lenders increased credit flows to risky borrowers in urban 
markets, supported by investor demand for mortgage backed securities, Harrison, 
Noordewier and Yavas (2004) and Shiller (2008).  Abraham and Pavoni (2008) confirm 
broader mortgage lending, easing in smaller U.S. markets and among smaller U.S. 
financial institutions after 1990 due to mortgage securitization often enhanced by 
mortgage loan insurance, government guarantees, and credit derivatives.  Moreover, the 
presence of U.S. mortgage lenders operating in Canada impacted mortgage credit 
granting throughout North America with more liberal and flexible mortgage credit, King 
(2012a).  There are also political influences that need to be recognized.  For example, 
the American Dream Downpayment Act, signed into law in 2003, had the objective to 
increase mortgage lending, facilitating a wave of U.S. subprime borrowers to become 
homeowners.  Policy makers, influenced by the welfare benefits of homeownership, 
supported deregulation in mortgage lending, without underwriting rigour in mortgage 
credit granting in an effort to extend homeownership in the U.S. to subprime borrowers, 
Shiller (2008).  Clearly, since 1990, the mortgage lending system in North America has 
allowed for a larger share of households to consider housing as an investment, that were 
traditionally constrained from homeownership.  Housing finance continues to move 
beyond the simple economics of housing services consumption in which households are 
indifferent to tenure.   
Basic life cycle theory related to housing begins with the notion that for each new 
household the default tenure is, in fact, rental (Steele, 1993). The underlying investment 
risk related to homeownership is valid for a household to consider.  Households become 
homeowners for a range of reasons such as more control over housing than provided by 
renting and to accumulate and store wealth as an asset in the household`s investment 
portfolio.  Homeownership is an investment that provides tangible benefits in terms of 
meeting housing service consumption needs, alternatively obtained in the spot rental 
market with lease terms negotiated usually on an annual basis.  Incomplete markets are 
a valid consideration since some neighbourhoods lack rental housing choice, and the 
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rental housing that is available may lack consistent, quality choice of services and some 
housing units may only be available on a continuing basis through homeownership 
(Steele, 1993).  Households that rent may also be subject to rental rate risk under 
certain states of nature.  For example, when vacancy rates are low and rent increases 
are high and persistent.  From a financial perspective, homeownership is easily 
managed, highly leveraged, with predictable cash flow requirements, which is a 
combination unmatched by other real investment options, as Steele (1993) describes.  
Capital gains and the imputed rent from a principal residence are not taxed in the U.S. 
and Canada.  Mortgage interest and property taxes are tax deductible in the U.S. and 
the public subsidy makes homeownership attractive to many households with high 
incomes, Cocco (2004).   
There is portfolio theory research that considers a household`s mixed asset 
allocation, and this includes financial assets along with housing in the portfolio selection. 
Grossman and Laroque (1990) offer equilibrium implications from a representative agent 
who derives utility from ownership of a good that is relatively illiquid since its sale 
involves a high transaction cost such as housing, and the model also allows for 
depreciation of the durable good.  Goetzman (1993) sets forth a simple mean variance 
framework to show evidence that there are gains in creating large portfolios of residential 
properties. Pools of equity claims on thousands of houses are much less risky than a 
single equity claim on a home.  However, most households are required to make an all 
or nothing decision when it comes to homeownership since a household can only buy 
one principal residence and not just part of a home, and neither a fraction of a diversified 
pool of residential real estate assets.  The investment likely consumes most, if not all, of 
household wealth to just meet the down payment requirements and since a large 
mortgage loan is also required, diversification of a household`s portfolio is likely delayed 
until home equity is accumulated.  Government sources, such as Statistics Canada 
through the Census, report that most households in Canada make the move to 
homeownership between the age of 25 and 39, and financial net wealth for most 
homeowners is concentrated in a principal residence.  According to Statistics Canada, a 
typical Canadian will remain a homeowner for at least 30 years, although households 
may trade among residential real estate assets over the life cycle. 
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It is typical for portfolio optimization to exclude the ownership of a personal 
residence consumed for its housing services from the calculation of an investor’s asset 
and liability mix.  Reichenstein (1998) provides one of the first studies that analyses how 
a household should account for homeownership in an asset and liability mix, and how 
the portfolio can be used for retirement purposes.  The notion is that a principal 
residence can be sold should the household wish to downsize and even change tenure, 
with the mortgage loan being treated as a short bond position.  The economic insight is 
that if the household is willing to borrow or downsize against its homeownership in a 
principal residence, then it is appropriate for the real estate asset to be included in the 
portfolio selection.  The scenarios examine the portfolio mix with after tax dollars based 
on a financial assets only view; home equity view; an expanded view to allow a 
household to downsize; and an estate planning view, allowing for the presence of 
defined benefit pension payments.  In the case of the financial assets only view, the 
corporate bond is included as part of the portfolio but the mortgage loan is excluded.  
For the home equity view, the fixed rate mortgage is equivalent to a short position in 
corporate bonds. The expanded view allows a household to downsize during retirement, 
using the proceeds to buy a smaller home and include the remaining net wealth gained 
from the sale of the larger pre-retirement home as a position in real estate.  The estate 
planning view includes proceeds from death benefits such as a life insurance policy.  
Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007) confirm that when the investment in 
homeownership is exogenously determined by market conditions, new home buyers in 
effect constrain their ability to adjust their asset allocation between residential real estate 
and other assets.  The authors conclude that homeownership results in a shift of asset 
allocation away from equities, but this constraint is less binding as the household ages 
and financial wealth is accumulated.  The emphasis is on the household utility 
maximization objective in terms of obtaining housing services, rather than accumulating 
wealth.  This work follows Yao and Zhang (2005) who present a theoretical model based 
on a household’s life cycle with empirical results based on income data.  The conclusion 
is that a household`s decision to continuously rent or buy housing services is 
suboptimal, suggesting welfare losses that drastically alter the investor’s portfolio 
choices.  When indifferent between renting and owning housing services, the 
homeowner substitutes home equity for risky stocks in household net wealth, yet 
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increases the equity proportion in a liquid financial portfolio to take advantage of the 
diversification benefit afforded by the low correlation between stock returns and housing 
returns.  The findings also point to U.S. tax law related to mortgage interest deductibility 
as a significant factor and the presence of different housing types is not considered. 
Equilibrium in the housing market implies that the expected annual cost of 
owning a house, also known in the literature as the imputed rent, will not exceed the 
annual cost of renting, Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005).  Therefore, while the 
house price-to-rent ratio may differ among cities, it is the change in the rent level that 
influences house price changes thus maintaining equilibrium between the ownership and 
rental of housing services.  Equally important, is the limitation of much of the research 
that focuses on single detached housing type.  This ignores the presence of multi-family 
condominium housing in more recent years within many housing markets, allowing 
housing services to be purchased at more exact levels of consumption by matching 
physical house size with household need, King (2012a).   
Given the high price of housing and typical requirement for a household to 
finance a home purchase with a large mortgage loan debt obligation, the importance of 
risk aversion needs to be considered.  Flavin and Yamashita (2002) found that for 
investors with relatively high levels of risk aversion, higher home values relative to net 
wealth lead to lower optimal allocations to stock, while the principal residence’s share in 
the portfolio had almost no impact on investors with low levels of risk aversion.   
Waggle and Johnson (2009) address the impacts of different levels of home 
value to net wealth and mortgage loan financing.  The intuition is that it is appropriate to 
treat the single family home as an asset and the mortgage loan as a separate liability.  
Households are assumed to make their home investment decisions first, and then they 
examine the implications of homeownership on asset allocation decisions.  
Homeownership represents both a consumption requirement and an investment 
decision. The authors consider the investment benefits of the home, based on the total 
returns, which includes the capital gain from price change over time and a rental 
dividend.  The focus is on the risk associated with an investment in a single family home. 
The model utilizes a mean variance utility function to consider the impact of 
homeownership and mortgage loan financing on the optimal asset allocation decisions of 
 90 
households and contrasts this with a scenario that does not include the home in the 
portfolio. Optimal portfolio weights are dependent upon both the degree of risk aversion 
of the household and the relative importance of the home in the overall net wealth 
picture.  The evidence suggests that the higher the home-to-net wealth ratio, the higher 
the portfolio allocation to stock holdings.  Moreover, for most households that invest in a 
broad portfolio of assets, including the home in the optimization decision impacts the 
asset allocation to risky stock than suggested by traditional portfolio selection that 
ignores housing.  Overall, the size of investment in a home is largely driven both by the 
potential housing returns and also to support a household`s specific consumption 
requirements for housing services, and 100 per cent mortgage loan financing is not 
optimal for all households.  This finding differs completely from that of Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) who conclude that optimal allocations to stock should decrease with 
higher home-to-net wealth ratios and mortgage loan financing ratios should increase. 
In terms of portfolio theory it is useful to consider the household problem at a 
specific point in time irrespective of wealth and income, and this follows Hakansson 
(1970) who found that the optimal investment strategies result in an optimal mix of risky 
(productive) investments that is independent of the individual's wealth, noncapital 
income stream, and impatience to consume. Rather, the optimal asset allocation is case 
by case, and depends only on the probability distribution of the returns, the interest rate, 
and the individual's one-period utility function of consumption.  Hakansson identifies four 
models; with three of the models showing that a poor individual will always borrow, while 
under a fourth model a rich individual will always lend, and the borrowing and lending 
rates are important to the results.  As such, given the separation property, the model 
illustrates that optimal portfolio selection for an investor is determined by the borrowing 
and lending rate that define the slope of the CAL and this establishes the tangency point 
for the optimal portfolio selection of risky assets. 
The Black Litterman (1991) model provides a structured theoretical approach to 
portfolio selection, and it serves a number of purposes.  First, the model allows 
households to express expectations of returns, allowing for various constraints to 
influence the optimization problem.  Moreover, it outlines the notion of equilibrium 
returns and when extended to housing markets, this allows for the rate of change in 
renting and owning housing services to follow the same stochastic process.  Building on 
 91 
this, the model can take an investor`s actual portfolio which can, for example, include 
homeownership in an optimal asset allocation, and derive the implied views which are 
the set of returns implied to form this portfolio selection.  The intuition of the Black 
Litterman model sheds light on understanding investor preference in portfolio selection, 
and explains how investor expectations and implied views influence portfolio selection. 
The economic reasoning of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), when applied to housing 
markets, confirms that if the risks of house prices and mortgage lending are complete, in 
the presence of necessary credit enhancements and regulatory safeguards, a 
representative household can be viewed as a price taker expressing rational 
expectations about prices being offered in the market.  As long as the household owns 
the principal residence, the allocation of initial wealth to the homeownership investment 
is a function of exogenous market conditions.  If markets are complete and households 
behave as competitive price takers, in a stochastic dynamic context this must be 
interpreted to mean that each market participant takes as given the stochastic process of 
the price and has rational expectations about it, then the equilibrium condition is efficient.  
This focuses the study on a household objective function, which is optimal asset 
allocation, and not the determination of the demand for housing or valuation of housing 
assets.  The mean variance model of asset choice is worthwhile for its ease of use for 
empirical research, and its use is extensive since its development by Markowitz (1952).  
Under this model, as detailed by Huang and Litzenberger (1988), a preference for 
expected return and an aversion to variance is implied by monotonicity and strict 
concavity of an individual`s utility function.  As the research shows, the mean variance 
model of asset choice is popular because of its analytical tractability and its rich 
empirical implications.  By drawing from traditional portfolio theory, the mean variance 
model recognizes that investors are searching for the optimal asset allocation.   
The research cited above supports the economic reasoning that consumption of 
housing services by way of homeownership includes an embedded investment.  Due to 
the high price of housing and fluctuations in house prices and mortgage loan interest 
rates as well as property maintenance and taxes required to live in a owned principal 
residence, homeowners, especially first time home buyers, need to recognize the risk of 
a single claim on a real estate asset.  Homeownership may even be viewed as 
overexposure from an optimal portfolio perspective at the time the household is 
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considering to shift from renting housing services.  The holding period is important since 
this relates to the imputed rent associated with homeownership, while spreading out 
transaction costs to a future date.  These factors do not exist to the same extent for the 
consumption of housing services in the rental housing market as renters are not 
exposed to significant transaction costs when they decide to move.  Moreover, renter 
households do not need to bear the liability of a mortgage loan and neither do they attain 
a return on investment from the gain or loss in value of the home they rent, except where 
rent controls may support the payment of “key money,” although this is likely limited to 
rent controlled markets.  As well, property maintenance and depreciation are factors 
relevant to homeownership being evaluated as an investment, since equities and bonds 
do not physically wear out.  As Blazenko and Pavlov (2004) note, property maintenance 
represents a risk with the cost being the responsibility of the landlord, which can be 
managed strategically.  This is in keeping with Grossman and Laroque (1990) who set 
forth an economic model for optimal portfolio choice where the value of a durable good 
depreciates at a constant rate. 
The researcher would like to acknowledge Grossman and Laroque (1990), 
Goetzmann (1993), Reichenstein (1998), Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Yao and Zhang 
(2005), Sinai and Souleles (2005), Himmelberg, Mayer and SinaI (2005), Blazenko and 
Pavlov (2005), Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007), and Waggle and Johnson (2009).  
The analysis will determine optimal portfolio selection where homeownership is part of 
the critical asset allocation along with financial assets.  The household will consider 
different housing types and by including various constraints and strategic considerations 
related to holding periods, property maintenance, and mortgage lending, specific 
aspects of the investment problem are brought into focus.  The literature on portfolio 
theory, specifically Markowtiz (1952), Hakansson (1970), Huang and Litzenberger 
(1988), Black and Litterman (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), offers a useful 
theoretical framework to address portfolio selection where expectations of house price 
returns and imputed rents can follow historical returns or the change in house prices and 
imputed rents can evolve together as a stochastic process.  The separation property 
illustrates that optimal portfolio selection for an investor is determined by the interest rate 
and the CAL, and given a household`s level of risk aversion, this establishes the efficient 
set of assets.  There are also important results obtained from implied annual rates of 
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housing returns necessary for housing to be part of the optimal portfolio selection above 
the global minimum variance portfolio.   
4.2. The Economic Model 
The following presents a stylized Markowitz optimal portfolio selection model that 
allows a household to evaluate homeownership as a critical asset allocation decision in 
the presence of alternative financial assets.  This model allows households to consider 
different housing types as shaping portfolio selection for the first time.  While previous 
studies consider single detached housing as an asset class in the portfolio selection, this 
study divides housing into two asset classes: single detached homes and apartment 
condominiums as alternative choices.  This is an important contribution to theoretical 
models since housing is heterogeneous and households may wish to match housing 
service requirements to the consumption of housing services, and limiting the model to 
only single detached homes suggests that a household may significantly over-consume 
housing services.  With the increasing development of multi-family condominium housing 
in more recent years, housing services can be purchased at more exact levels of 
consumption need and at lower price levels.  Moreover, housing returns are different for 
single detached homes than apartment condominiums, since property value changes 
over time are strongly tied to the elasticity or inelasticity of the land supply, Himmelberg, 
Mayer, and Sinai (2005).  It follows that the land component of a single detached home 
value is more significant than for an apartment condominium, and the degree to which 
this manifests itself will be a reflection of the local housing market. 
The empirical work follows a Canadian market setting, Metropolitan Toronto and 
Metropolitan Vancouver, and this avoids the influence of the income tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest and property tax of a principal residence, which is not permissible 
under Canadian tax law.  This public subsidy in mortgage lending can affect housing 
returns and demand for mortgage credit and ultimately bias homeownership 
preferences.  A Canadian setting is similar to other taxation regimes like the U.S., where 
capital gains on housing price appreciation and imputed rent are not subject to taxation.  
The model accounts for the reality that an investment in residential property traditionally 
differs from financial assets due to liquidity, difficulty in converting home equity into cash 
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as well as property depreciation, since stocks and bonds do not physically wear out.  
The model allows a household to express preferences over different holding periods and 
apply strategic considerations to spread out transaction costs or even defer property 
maintenance expenses.  The Canadian mortgage market is like the U.S., and is both 
liberal supporting homeownership, and flexible allowing easy conversion of home equity 
into cash, if the household needs to smooth household consumption needs, and is 
therefore dynamically complete King (2012b). 
The economic model proposed considers that there is a representative 
household that has reached the threshold to become a homeowner and has qualified 
under the domestic mortgage lending system as an eligible home buyer.  The time 
horizon for a representative household to consider homeownership occurs at t = 0 and 
extends up to a pre-defined holding period T, and this is a positive integer.   
The economic model presented does not include a bequest motive.  This has 
been considered, but the exclusion of a bequest motive does not change the important 
conclusions and findings in any significant way.  The rent versus own decision is 
important and this research confirms that portfolio theory can be expanded in a 
meaningful way to consider housing along with equities and bonds.  The care and effort 
to extend and refine portfolio theory to include housing along with equities and bonds 
has been considerable.  Future research can address the bequest motive in the 
homeownership and maintenance decisions. 
Yao and Zhang (2005) set forth a basic survival function and this is appropriate 
where λj is the probability that the household is alive at time j for j = 0, … . . , T, conditional 
on being alive at time j = 1.  It is enough to assume that λj > 0 for all j and that λT = 0.  
The probability that an individual investor lives up to period t(t ≤ T) is given by the 
following survival function: 
F(t) = ∏ λjtj=0  (34) 
where 0 < 𝐹(t) < 1 for all 0 ≤ t < 𝑇, and F(T) = 0. 
Given the above, the model considers a representative household who may hold 
a portfolio of assets which can be represented as some amount of initial wealth at t = 0 
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which is comprised of financial assets and housing assets such that the wealth Wt for a 
household is given by: 
Wt = Xtℓ +  Hi,t Pt (35) 
where Xt equals a ( 1 x n) vector of amounts which, as is common, are expressed in 
terms of nondurable consumption good used as the numeraire held of the n risky assets, 
ℓ equals a ( n x 1) vector of ones.  The second term places homeownership of a 
principal residence in the portfolio composition with Hi,t to represent the type of housing 
unit, i, which can either be a single detached home or an apartment condominium.  The 
focus is on household preferences today and therefore only current income, and not 
expectations of future income, is relevant to mortgage credit granting to determine 
household preferences that includes homeownership in the portfolio selection.  This 
approach accommodates lower income households, typically one- and two-person 
households, who will exhibit preferences for an apartment condominium that is smaller 
and lower priced.  Moreover, the results address the permitted LTV ratio and required 
initial net wealth for the down payment to support homeownership in relation to the 
market price for housing.  In either case the presence of a mortgage loan over a 25 year 
amortization will be compulsory.  The housing unit offers a certain level of services and 
attributes at time, t, and  Pt is the market value of the respective housing unit at time t.  
The last element of Xt represents the mortgage loan.  This is a refinement to Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) and Waggle and Johnson (2009). 
The optimization problem requires that household wealth, which is in nominal 
levels, be transformed into shares of wealth, which is consistent with Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) and this is simply done by dividing equation 35 by Wt and therefore 
equation 35 can be restated as  
1 = xtℓ +  Hi,t  (36) 
 where 
hi,t  ≡  Pt Hi,tWt   (37) 
and 
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xt  ≡  XtWt  (38) 
Black and Litterman (1991) note that if a mean variance model only considers 
expected returns the results can be potentially flawed since small changes in 
expectations can lead to portfolio allocation of weights to one asset.  The Black and 
Litterman model does not preclude the presence of real constraints in financing 
homeownership in a principal residence and therefore mortgage lending constraints are 
incorporated in the model.  Therefore, when a home is purchased the homeowner`s 
interest in the property is equivalent to a portfolio comprised of the real property and a 
mortgage loan, consistent with Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007).  Households are 
subject to real mortgage lending constraints such that the minimum amount of wealth for 
a representative household to make the shift from renting to owning a principal 
residence, or to withdraw home equity after initial homeownership to re-balance the 
portfolio allocation, is adhered to.  Therefore, at any point in time a household`s wealth 
relates to the LTV of the property in the following way 
Wt  ≥ PtHt (1 − LTV(CE))  (39) 
where LTV is the maximum mortgage loan to house value, which takes a value 0 ≤LTV ≤ 1, which is typically set forth by mortgage lenders, financial intermediaries that 
structure mortgage backed securities or collateral debt obligations, or even mortgage 
loan insurance companies and government agencies that qualify households for a 
mortgage loan guarantee.  It follows that the approved LTV amount is often conditional 
on some form of borrower credit enhancement, CE, such as mortgage loan insurance or 
government guarantee and this applies to both high ratio mortgage lending as well as 
low ratio mortgage portfolios such as government guaranteed mortgage backed 
securities.  Therefore, to make a homeownership investment in a principal residence the 
household needs to direct a portion of its wealth, δt, as a down payment to cover the 
LTV requirements where  
δt =  PtHt (1 − LTV) (40) 
This does not preclude house price changes over time where an economic shock 
places a homeowner into a negative LTV state.  A mortgage loan can exceed the market 
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value of a home due to unexpected, negative fluctuations in house values. As a 
refinement to Flavin and Yamashita (2002), the corner constraints on the vector of 
financial assets at the time of home purchase or home equity refinance are given by: 
−1 ≤  X
PH
≤ −MaxLTV (41) 
which is the constraint on mortgage borrowing which is conditional on the maximum LTV 
permitted by the domestic mortgage lending system for a specific housing type 
maintained at a certain level of quality and attributes at time, t, which represents either 
the date of home purchase or home equity refinance.  The weight of the mortgage loan Xn,j is constrained so that PtHt is the portfolio weight of the house or the home-to-net 
wealth ratio.  The mortgage loan liability cannot exceed the value of the house, and the 
portfolio weight of the mortgage loan cannot be positive.  Also, the portfolio weights for 
stocks (XS), bond (XB), and the house (XH), must all be non-negative, so  XS, XB ,  XH ≥0.  
Reichenstein (1998) and Campbell (2006) include the mortgage loan in the 
portfolio as a negative bond, whereas Waggle and Johnson (2009) treat the house as an 
investment that is separate from the mortgage loan.  Interest rates are relevant to the 
outcome and Cocco (2004) assumes a risk free rate derived from short term government 
bonds at 2 per cent, with a mortgage loan borrowing rate as a premium of 2 per cent.  
The model presented considers different interest rates to shape the CAL and the 
mortgage loan borrowing rate and household lending are relevant to the results.  
There are real constraints on other financial assets, as noted by Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002), when a household can hold a mortgage debt obligation up the 
maximum LTV permitted through mortgage credit granting to support homeownership in 
a principal residence.  It is valid to assume that 
0 ≤  Xi,t           i = 1 to n − 1 (42) 
which is the nonnegativity constraint on other financial assets where Xi,t is the ith 
element of Xt.  This means that a homeowner with a maximum LTV mortgage loan has a 
borrowing constraint limited to the mortgage loan and cannot borrow additional amounts 
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to purchase financial assets.  The model focuses   on the household decision as to asset 
allocation at t = 0 and does not consider how a household may choose to reallocate its 
portfolio over time.  This follows the economic reasoning of Hakansson (1970) who 
found that the optimal asset allocation depends in each case only on the probability 
distribution of the returns, the interest rate, and the individual's one-period utility function 
of consumption.   
The mortgage loan can be regarded as a household finance tool that allows a 
household to maintain maximum LTV levels over time, through home equity refinance, if 
this is required to dynamically span the household`s consumption needs.  The mortgage 
lending system supports this, and the notion is that in each period the household 
operates within a frictionless mortgage lending system and can adjust the amount of 
mortgage through refinancing, by way of a second mortgage or home equity loan, 
consistent with Yao and Zhang (2005). Since the mortgage loan is amortized, and even 
if house prices remain constant, there are equity gains stored as wealth in the home and 
the household may decide to re-balance its portfolio over time to invest in other financial 
assets.  A household may also wish to expand or reduce its consumption of housing 
services by shifting housing type from an apartment condominium to a single detached 
home, or vice versa.  As will be shown, the returns and variances between different 
housing types vary and shifting housing type will impose a transaction cost.   
The returns for assets are after capital gains tax, tc, nominal returns.  The 
expected return for financial asset i in year t will be defined as  
R�i,t =  µ�i(1 −  tc) +  εi,t (43) 
where 
i = (B, E, H) (44) 
and where the distribution of the noise is 
 ℰi ∼  𝒩(0,σi)  (45) 
The expected return for a bond will be defined as  
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R�B,T =  µ�b(1 −  tc) +  εB (46) 
The expected return for equity will be defined as  
R�E,T =  µ�E(1 −  tc) +  εE (47) 
The returns for homeownership in a principal residence are not subject to taxation, and 
therefore expected returns can be expressly simply as  
R�GH,T =  µ�gh,t +  εh,t (48) 
where µ represents the return in a specific geography or housing market, g, for a specific 
housing type, h, either single detached home or apartment condominium.  This leaves 
the ε term which represents a stochastic component, which is expected to realize a 
return of zero.   
Within the equilibrium approach the annual price appreciation, which can also be 
defined as the change in returns over time, from either renting or owning housing 
services, are in equilibrium.  The model defines a general housing market for a 
respective geography, and the change in price will depend on the computed equilibrium 
annual price appreciation for the market area, and only the volatility of returns vary by 
housing type.  The expression for equilibrium annual price appreciation is therefore, 
R�GH,t = µ�gh,t +  εs,t (49) 
The covariance matrix of returns is denoted by a (n + 1) matrix Ω as such 
Ω = E�ϵtϵtT� (50) 
The optimization problem to determine household preferences will maximize a 
function of the mean and variance of returns within a particular portfolio.  It does not 
factor household income into the model, and this allows for the straight forward 
calculation of initial net worth and income requirement to qualify for mortgage credit, 
assuming a 90 per cent LTV, as a new homeowner of either a single detached home or 
an apartment condominium.  If a household lacks income to qualify for a mortgage loan 
to purchase a single detached home or wishes to allocate less income to housing to 
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allow for a greater allocation to financial assets, then the household preference will be 
constrained to an apartment condominium.  Overall, the notion of households expressing 
preferences for portfolio selection based on different holding periods is consistent with 
household finance behaviour and life cycle theory.   
A mean variance optimization problem which considers housing follows the work 
of Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Waggle and Johnson (2009) and others.  As is typical 
under this optimization problem, household utility maximization is a function of means 
and variances of expected returns from a portfolio of assets, such that investors desire 
to hold the portfolio weights at T = 0 that solve the following investor problem: 
max Xt �(xtµ +  htµHi) −  12  A [xt, hit]Ω [xt, hit]T� (51) 
Within this expression x is a vector of various assets (stocks, bonds, and 
housing) with an expected return µ; and h is the physical quantity of housing held of a 
specific housing type i, either single detached home or an apartment condominium;  Ω is 
the variance, covariance matrix; and A is a parameter to measure the degree of relative 
risk aversion for the household as an investor.   
Since exogenous variation in the expenditure shares between housing and non-
housing services can result in a household acting as if they are more risk averse, it is 
necessary to assume a relatively large risk aversion coefficient.  For a reference, 
Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007) assume a degree of relative risk aversion 
coefficient of 5, and this will be used in the model.   
The utility function is subject to several constraints.  The first simply implies that 
the portfolio is complete in that the weights of the asset portfolio sum to 1 and the model 
represents this as  
∑ wini=1 = 1 (52) 
The second accounts for mortgage borrowing so that a mortgage holder follows 
mortgage credit granting rules related to LTV 
−ht ≤  xn,t ≤ 0 | LTV(Hi,t) (53) 
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The third requires that there is a non-negativity constraint on financial assets held in the 
portfolio given a household holds a mortgage obligation, so that  
0 ≤  xi,t                              i = 1 to n − 1  (54) 
The proposed model follows standard portfolio optimization whereby a household 
as an investor maximizes over its holding of financial assets and housing.  The 
household will express preferences between housing types for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, the choice between housing types may allow a household to better match 
housing services supplied by a housing unit with a household`s net wealth, income or 
consumption needs.  The expectations of housing returns also differ over different 
holding periods and vary depending on property maintenance considerations.   
The maximization problem for some models that include housing, Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002), Yao and Zhang (2005) and Waggle and Johnson (2009), is 
conditional on the current value of the state variable which represents the ratio of house 
value to net wealth which is defined as ht.  In this model, equation 51 is solved 
numerically and derives asset allocation shares that a household can simply relate to 
current net wealth, market house prices, and LTV ratios offered by mortgage lenders.  
The household operates within a housing and mortgage market structure that is 
dynamically complete, which means that the household can maintain homeownership 
and withdraw home equity at any point in time or sell the principal residence and take 
the house price being offered in the market and either change housing type or return to 
renting, but in so doing incur a transaction cost.  Rather than make this a random event 
or the horizon infinite or model and optimal stopping problem or even include an 
exogenous moving shock, the model assumes households consider different holding 
periods as part of the investment decision at t = 0.  For example, even though a 
household may have strong positive expectations about housing prices in the future, if 
the household has information that a move to another city is likely in one year this may 
influence preferences away from homeownership in favour of renting due to transaction 
costs.  The intuition is that holding periods influence household preferences and are 
accounted for strategically in the investment decision.  Of course many households 
choose to buy housing services not for investment purposes but rather to consume 
housing services not available in the rental market.   
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The model does account for transaction costs by adjusting returns to account for 
a sale of the property at the end of the holding period.  This is consistent with Cauley, 
Pavlov and Schwartz (2007) who conclude that after the home purchase event, frequent 
transactions in the future are impractical due to high cost imposed and thus the 
purchase decision effectively constrains the household`s ability to adjust asset allocation 
when housing is included in the portfolio selection.  If a household needs to increase or 
decrease housing services over time then this requires that the household re-optimize 
over the house, Ht, at the suitable time in the future.  This is a refinement to Grossman 
and Laroque (1990) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002) which allow households to 
frictionlessly make shifts in housing size.   
While financial assets can be constantly re-optimized, and typically portfolio 
selection models assume zero transaction costs, housing as an asset is purchased and 
held for more defined periods.  However, a significant and unexpected household event 
may force an unexpected transaction for the household, not accounted for at the 
purchase decision, but this obviates portfolio optimization.  For financial assets no 
transaction costs are assumed.  The short sale of financial assets is not allowed and 
mortgage borrowing is allowed, provided the LTV ratio is respected for the mortgage 
loan and the household is not over-leveraged.  As the household pays down the 
mortgage debt obligation, Xn,j, this is equivalent to increasing the holding of a bond by 
the same amount, satisfying the mortgage borrowing constraint. 
The model also considers property maintenance of the principal residence as a 
real estate asset as an extension and refinement to the research of Blazenko and Pavlov 
(2004).  This allows a homeowner of real property to express a choice to either maintain 
or defer property maintenance.  While property upgrades and renovations add to 
property value and there is market evidence that home sellers may upgrade properties 
just prior to listing a property for sale to maximize the sales price, or new homeowners 
invest in property upgrades as part of moving into the new residence to realize on 
housing attributes that have been neglected, there is less evidence on the appropriate 
level of basic property maintenance.  As such, property maintenance costs have 
strategic implications for households depending on the holding period being considered 
and influence preferences related to homeownership as an investment.   
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The housing constraint on the portfolio optimization is represented by the value 
of the state variable ht.  Following standard portfolio theory, the optimization problem for 
each value of ht is calculated by the economic model as the mean variance efficient 
frontier available to the household, which is simply the value of xt which achieves the 
minimum variance portfolio for a given expected return.  The value of ht determines the 
results of the constrained mean variance efficient frontier available to a household at a 
specific point in time given expectations of returns and variances.   
For the preferences expressed in the equation above a household`s indifference 
curve is 
∂µ�
∂σ
=  Aσ (55) 
where in vector notation 
µ� =  xtµ +  htµh (56) 
and  
σ2 =  [xtht]Ω[xtht]T. (57) 
The optimization problem is solved by numerical methods due to corner 
constraints.  The model results consider after tax returns for assets, consistent with 
Waggle and Johnson (2009) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002), although these authors 
adjust returns for inflation.  By using nominal returns for equilibrium and expected 
returns this assumes that inflation would equally affect all assets under consideration, 
and more importantly, that inflation poses a risk to renter households and therefore 
provides a benefit to a homeowner.  This allows for comparability among returns under 
different scenarios and assumes that a household`s inflation expectations are consistent 
among all economic variables.   
The challenge is how to measure risk and return of the capital appreciation of 
housing, which includes a measure of the price risk, or illiquidity, that characterizes 
markets for infrequently traded or heterogenous assets.  Supply and demand 
considerations and the cost of housing construction are not adequate to consider, 
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Rosenthal (1999).  A repeat sales measure of housing returns may address this 
concern, as noted by Goetzmann (1993); however this still represents a somewhat less 
than adequate approach to determine expectations of house price returns.  Therefore, 
while it is not possible to observe a household`s expectation of future appreciation of 
housing prices, in the U.S., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has provided a 
longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals and families and tracked 
items since 1968 through a formal survey with specific questions on the value of a 
principal residence; household mortgage lending; and the amount of monthly rent.  The 
PSID data has been used in portfolio choice studies by Flavin and Yamashita (2002), 
Cocco (2004), Yao and Zhang (2005), among others.  However, the PSID or an 
equivalent is not available for Canada. 
In this model, which considers a Canadian setting, a number of refinements and 
extensions to the existing research allow for variations to model capital appreciation of 
housing.  Guidance on the scenarios for house prices changes follows three scenarios: 
(1) future expectations based on historical returns; (2) an equilibrium approach; and (3) 
implied views.  These can be summarized as follows: 
A household has expectations of future housing price change and volatility and 
this is based on the observation of historic price changes, and there are different returns 
expected from homeownership price appreciation and the net rental dividend.  These 
expectations can be subject to constraints, and this methodology was established by 
Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2004).  As will be discussed, the study proposes to consider 
the rate of change of historic median house prices as a basis for households to express 
expectations of gains or losses.  This overcomes some of the challenges in measuring 
house prices changes, while the inclusion of net rental dividend offers a robust way to 
account for the true costs and benefits of homeownership.   
When the change in house prices moves in response to changes in rental rates, 
this establishes an equilibrium condition between the homeownership and rental housing 
markets.  This follows the research of Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) and 
equilibrium returns do not require that rental and homeownership housing services are 
perfect substitutes, since the house price-to-rent ratio may differ among cities.  However, 
it is the change in the rent level that influences house price changes.  In setting 
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equilibrium returns, the rental and ownership of new and resale housing are considered 
perfect substitutes in consumption, consistent with Hornstein (2009).  The equilibrium 
approach will assume that changes in house prices and imputed rents move together 
and evolve through a stochastic process to account for uncertainty and this provides a 
way to value the hedge of rental rate risk gained through homeownership. 
If households become homeowners based on investment principles, asset 
allocation that includes homeownership must reveal implied returns to housing in the 
optimal portfolio selection.  The economic reasoning of implied returns traces back to 
Sharpe (1974), and this was applied to housing by Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai 
(2005).  The intuition is that if a household has chosen homeownership through portfolio 
optimization then there are implied views as to asset returns and volatility of returns 
among mixed-asset portfolio allocations.  
To express housing returns the first step is to expand equation 48 to consider 
two variables, the capital gain or loss from homeownership and the value of the net 
rental dividend.  The total expected returns for housing can be represented as 
µgh,t = Gh,t +  Dh,t (58) 
where µgh,t is the expected average return on a specific housing unit over a specified 
time period, which represents both the expected capital gain, Gh,t, and the expected net 
rental dividend, Dh,t.  The capital gain and rental dividend will be after tax, and this is 
straight forward in Canada since the sale of a principal residence and the rental dividend 
are exempt from capital gains taxation. 
The right hand side of the equation captures the change in housing price levels 
over a specified time period.  The G�h,t variable is the simple expected price appreciation 
over a specified time period and this is consistent with other models such as Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) and Waggle and Johnson (2009).   
The capital gain for housing is from an observed time series of resale monthly 
data.  The data source for house prices, PtHi,t , will be median resale prices as tracked 
by the Multiple Listings Service (MLS) of the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA) 
between October 1993 and October 2011.  The base level for the median home price by 
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housing type and respective housing market is derived from the approximate value 
recorded in the market by CREA as of October 2011, adjusted and rounded as an 
annual approximate average over 2011.  The expected capital gain is based on the 
average of observed historic capital gains over each one month time period, which for 
any period of time is expressed as 
G�H,t =  PtHi,t − Pt−1Hi,t  Pt−1Hi,t  (59) 
The rationale for deriving the expected rate of change for house prices on the 
rate of change of historic median MLS house prices is based on the following economic 
reasoning and guidance: 
There is a key benefit with MLS median house prices from CREA to measure 
house price returns.  Median house prices track in a consistent trend, but at a lower level 
than average prices, and a consistent trend but slightly higher level than a Case-Shiller 
type index of benchmark prices, developed by CREA.  Moreover, MLS sales represent a 
consistent flow resale housing stock sales with higher priced new homes excluded, since 
the business practice among developers is to sell new housing by way of in-house 
marketing teams and not by MLS to avoid listing costs and high commissions, unless 
market conditions are in an extreme down cycle.   
MLS median price changes are a key factor considered by government agencies 
that are responsible for establishing property assessments.  These assessments are 
used by Canadian municipalities in setting property tax mill rates.  In a Canadian setting, 
the property assessment values can be challenged by a property owner and confirmed 
by a quasi-judicial review, which is not the case for a house price index.  Property 
assessment agencies do supplement MLS resale price changes with home improvement 
and building permit data, but general MLS price trends can be applied easily to larger 
markets, which is efficient given the large stock of housing.  While property assessment 
data could have been used, the time series is only annual.  Since assessments are 
directly related to MLS resale price data to support housing price levels, it was decided 
that monthly median resale housing price data would offer a more comparable and 
larger time series, consistent with monthly price data for financial assets.   
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Use of MLS resale data allows the model to be extended to all urban housing 
markets in Canada since CREA has a national scope of activity.  
For the equilibrium approach, the capital gain in house prices, G�H,t,  follows a 
stochastic process, similar to Sinai and Souleles (2005) where house prices are 
endogenous to the economic model, in which  
d G�H,t = µG�H,xdt + σG�H,xG�H,xdZG�H,x (60) 
on the right side of the equation, includes as the mean the equilibrium annual 
price appreciation by market area, noted in Table 5, that varies in a stochastic process 
based on the volatility of returns by housing type and market area.  Table 4 provides a 
summary of the standard deviations based on historic returns for each asset class. 
 
Table 4. Standard Deviation of Returns for Each Asset Class 
Bonds        3.90% 
Equities       29.8% 
Metropolitan Toronto Single Detached House   5.19% 
Metropolitan Toronto Apartment Condominium   5.83% 
Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House   6.74% 
Metropolitan Vancouver Apartment Condominium  6.10% 
 
 Except for times of economic recession or excessively high mortgage rates 
Canadian house prices generally exhibit increasing changes in price levels over time in 
urban markets such as Toronto and Vancouver and therefore house price changes are 
both stochastic and path dependent.  The simple definition of a path dependent 
stochastic system in the context of the economic model presented means that the 
evolution of house prices at time t + 1 is the probability of being in any state i  at time t + 
1 conditional on having been in any state j at time t.  The first order character of 
Canadian house prices signifies that it is only the current state of the house price and no 
anterior state in its history that affects the probability of where house prices will evolve to 
in the next time period.  The equilibrium approach considers the distribution of returns 
and therefore relies on the probability results from 1,000 separate simulations.  As noted 
earlier, if markets are complete and households behave as competitive price takers, 
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when following the reasoning of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), in a stochastic dynamic 
context this must be interpreted to mean that each market participant takes as given the 
stochastic process of the price and has rational expectations about it, then the 
equilibrium condition is efficient. 
The more complicated variable is the rental dividend, DH,t, and what is proposed 
is a refinement to the work of Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Yao and Zhang (2005), Sinai 
and Souleles (2005) and Waggle and Johnson (2009).  This will address some unique 
features of Canadian housing markets and taxation law related to a principal residence, 
since the taxation deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes needs to be 
excluded from the equation.  We can therefore express the rental dividend as 
DH,t =  CRH,t − Mig,t    � fd − Xt− Lt− Ct|StPt−1Hi,t  (61) CRH,t is the comparable or imputed rent that a household would have to pay if 
they did not own their own home.  The concept of imputed rent is consistent with 
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Sinai and Souleles (2005), and Waggle and 
Johnson (2009).  Conceptually, a household is considered to be renting to itself, but 
must incur all costs associated with homeownership.  The imputed rent is the average 
cost of rent in the market that any household would otherwise have to pay for housing 
services.  The objective for a renter household is to minimize rent paid, which is 
fundamentally different than a homeowner`s housing objective function.  Imputed rent is 
a known value at the time of home purchase and renter households will be considered to 
be earning current rent payments as an annual homeowner dividend and this amount 
will increase over time at a rate conditional on the change in rental rates in the market.  
A two-bedroom rental apartment unit will be used as the comparable housing unit to 
determine imputed rent.  This is consistent with the research of Himmelberg, Mayer, and 
Sinai (2005) who conclude that a two-bedroom rental apartment represents the most 
efficient and basic rental housing property to determine imputed rent, given that a renter 
household seeks to maximize utility by minimizing rent paid.  
 The CMHC October Rental Market Survey, which started to track rents in 
Canada since 1984, will be used as the data source to calculate both the base notional 
 109 
amount for the imputed rent as well as the expected nominal change over time.  This is 
based on the average historical change in rental rates between 1993 and 2011.  This 
annual time series recognizes that tenants and landlords typically sign a fixed one year 
rental lease and there is no rental price volatility for a 12 month period after the lease 
agreement has been signed between the renter and landlord.  The base rent level will be 
derived from CMHC`s October 2011 Rental Market Survey as an approximate rounded 
amount, and future rent levels will increase beyond this base amount using the historic 
average change in rent levels to determine the change over time. 
For the equilibrium approach, the imputed rent will have the same base dollar 
level at t = 0, as described above, but the change over time will follow a stochastic 
process such that 
dCRH,t = dµCRH,xdt + σG�H,xG�H,xdZG�H,x (62) 
which, on the right side of the equation, includes as the mean the equilibrium annual 
price appreciation by market area, noted in Table 4 as the annual imputed rent growth 
rate, that varies in a stochastic process based on the volatility of returns by housing type 
and market area, noted in Table 5.  The intuition to base future variance on past returns 
and past variance is based on the long-standing institutional framework which guides the 
Canadian rental market and keeps it stable with modest annual price increases that 
generally follow annual historic rates.  
Mig,t    � fd is the annual cost of property maintenance and utilities for a principal 
residence, where the household can choose between full maintenance, f, and deferred 
maintenance, d, and this amount differs by different housing type, i, and since it will be 
based on property value, it will differ by geography, g, as well.  Property maintenance 
primarily relates to the ongoing maintenance of the improvements on the property and 
not the land component.  To account for depreciation in Canada there is provision for a 
capital cost allowance under current tax law for residential structures used for 
commercial investment purposes and not as a principal residence, and this provides for 
a 25 year useful life, suggesting a 4 per cent depreciation rate for commercial taxation 
purposes, although capital gains on investment properties are taxable.  Research of the 
land title system for the City of Vancouver housing market confirms that the typical 
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useful life of a home before it is demolished and rebuilt is 70 years, which suggests that 
depreciation over the useful life where maintenance has been largely deferred is 
approximately 1.5 per cent of the improvements.  Condominium owners must pay a 
monthly strata fee for the building envelope, mechanical features, general maintenance 
of the building, and these are building features that are external to the apartment unit, 
and this sometimes includes utilities such as heat.  Single detached homeowners do not 
have a mandatory monthly property maintenance requirement, but utilities are a 
separate cost included in this parameter.  Deferred property maintenance becomes a 
strategic consideration for a homeowner, and is more likely to occur among single 
detached homes where building maintenance is not mandatory, whereas for 
condominiums Strata Councils must comply with legislation to set aside funds for 
property upgrade, supported by mandatory strata fees.   
For this analysis, a homeowner may apply strategic considerations to property 
maintenance, and can choose to fully maintain the residence allocating an annual 
percentage of property value equal to 2.5 per cent for a single detached home in 
Metropolitan Vancouver and 3.0 per cent for Metropolitan Toronto, and the difference 
adjusts for property values and climate.  The option to defer maintenance can reduce a 
single detached homeowner`s maintenance by 175 basis points for basic, operational 
upkeep and utilities since a single detached homeowner has a relatively high level of 
discretion over maintenance.  An apartment condominium homeowner can defer 
maintenance only partially due to mandatory monthly strata fees. For this analysis, a 
homeowner may apply strategic considerations to property maintenance, and can 
choose to fully maintain an apartment condominium with an annual cost based on 
property value of 3.0 per cent for Metropolitan Vancouver and 3.5 per cent for 
Metropolitan Toronto, and the difference adjusts for property values and climate.  The 
option to defer maintenance can reduce the apartment condominium maintenance by 
100 basis points for basic, operational upkeep and utilities since an apartment 
condominium homeowner has relatively less discretion due to mandatory strata fees. 
Xt is the cost of property taxes, which on an annual basis in Canada tend to fall 
within a range of 0.4 to 0.8 per cent of the property value and is generally considered to 
reflect property tax mill rates in the markets under consideration.  For this analysis the 
mid-point of 0.60 per cent will be used. 
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Lt is the cost of mortgage lending, which is discussed in detail by McDonald and 
Thornton (2008), and this takes in account the opportunity cost associated with the down 
payment investment.  The Canadian practice is for mortgage holders to use an 
amortized mortgage loan which includes payments both for principal repayment and 
interest.  Therefore, mortgage payments, MP, are expressed as 
MP = MB0(1 + rt)n r(1+rt)n −  1 (63) 
where MP is the monthly mortgage payment and MB0 is the initial mortgage balance, 
which is the total mortgage loan originated by the mortgage borrower and lender.  
Canadian mortgages, with the exception of variable rate mortgages, are compounded 
semi-annually. For example, this means that a household that is quoted a rate of 6 per 
cent, will actually have an effective annual rate of 6.09 per cent, based on a calculation 
of 3 per cent semi-annual.  As such, the mortgage lender needs to use a monthly rate 
based on an annual rate that is less than 6 per cent, since this rate will get compounded 
monthly. Therefore, the rate that compounded monthly, rM, results in an effective annual 
rate of 6.09 per cent can be solved mathematically as: 
rM = (0.0609)
12
= 0.493862%  
The annual equivalent mortgage rate is not 6 per cent but 5.926 per cent 
(0.493862 x 12 = 5.926 per cent), which is equivalent to the 6.09 per cent annual rate. 
The amount of interest owed over a period of time defined as months, Lt, is the sum of 
each monthly payment of mortgage interest, li, which is based on the month`s initial 
mortgage balance, MB0, multiplied by the effective monthly rate, rM.  As such a 
Canadian mortgage is constantly amortizing each payment period with the interest 
calculation declining in a commensurate fashion.  This can be expressed mathematically 
as 
Lt =  ∑ lini=m = (MB0 ∗ rM)m +  (MBn+1 ∗ rM)m+1 …  (64) 
It is possible that the initial mortgage balance, MB0, never changes and this 
would be an interest only mortgage or a mortgage such a home equity line of credit 
where the homeowner has the option to not make principal payments.  More likely, the 
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mortgage balance declines over time as the amortized principal payment, Ap, is made.  
Therefore, after the initial mortgage payment is made each consecutive mortgage 
payment will be based on a declining outstanding mortgage balance.  This means that  
MBn+1 = MBo −  Ap   (65) 
For the purposes of this analysis MBo equals the full purchase price of the home.  
This does not mean that 100 per cent LTV are available in the mortgage market, but 
assumes that households as investors should be compensated for the opportunity cost 
of a down payment for a principal residence.  
To determine an appropriate mortgage loan rate in a Canadian setting Allen, 
Clarke and Houde (2011) provide evidence of mortgage loan rate discounting, where 
lenders post one mortgage rate and mortgage borrowers negotiate a lower rate.  The 
average discount off the posted mortgage loan rate in the 1990s was about 50 basis 
points while in the 2000s the typical discount was approximately 100 basis points with 
higher income households paying higher mortgage rates than lower income and younger 
households.  Relating this to the Canadian bond market, Allen (2011) concludes that 
discounted mortgage rates have effectively traded at 200 basis points over the 
respective bond rate since 2000.  The total cost of mortgage lending interest payments 
are equal to the sum of the interest payments determined by the mortgage loan rate, rt, 
which will vary by term of the contract and the length of amortization period, n.  This also 
serves as the opportunity cost of capital related to the down payment.  Principal 
repayment is like an investment in a risk free bond, and the total cost of mortgage 
lending is a function of the total mortgage loan carried over a payment period minus the 
principal repaid as part of the amortization schedule.  The longer the amortization period 
the lower the mortgage payment a household must make to the mortgage lender, but the 
total payment of mortgage interest will be higher since the principal loan amount is being 
carried over a longer time horizon, and a 25 year amortization has been used.   
Canada`s housing finance system has benefitted from stable, low cost mortgage 
credit since 2000, King (2012a) and Allen (2011).  As such, the outlook for mortgage 
loan rates draws from historical data from the Bank of Canada (Chartered Bank – 
Conventional Mortgage Rate) between 2001 and 2011.  The expectation of mortgage 
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loan borrowing rates is based on an equivalent average of historic rates.  This means, 
for example, that the outlook for 5 year mortgage loan rate is based on the 5 year 
historic average of the 5 year mortgage loan rate with an adjustment made for 
negotiated mortgage discounting.   
Ct|St is the transaction cost conditional on the sale of the property and this allows 
for the household to express certain views as to finite, discrete holding periods and 
therefore spread out the transaction cost over an expected holding period which is 
determined at the time of purchase.  Transaction costs include both the sales transaction 
and a moving expense and are assumed to be between 5.0 and 7.0 per cent on the first 
$100,000 and between 2.0 and 3.0 per cent of the property value above this amount.  
For this analysis an estimate of 3.5 per cent of the total property value will be used as 
this will also include taxes, legal fees and an amount to cover moving expenses. 
Guidance to determine the total return to equity financial assets is based on the 
change in the Toronto Stock Exchange composite index and generally reflects a cross-
section of the large publically held corporations in Canada.  The data was examined on 
a monthly basis to determine the correlation with other financial and housing price data.  
The total return calculation includes stock dividends paid in kind, stock dividends paid 
with the securities of an issuer other than the issuer declaring such dividend, rights 
distributions, and cash distributions less than 4 per cent of the underlying stock price 
based on the last traded board lot. The expected equity returns used in the analysis are 
based on S&P TSX Composite Total Returns Index calculated by Morningstar (2011 
Andex Chart available at www.morningstar.com) and adjusted after tax.  Currently 50 
per cent of realized capital gains are taxed in Canada.  To determine the applicable tax 
payable there is a federal tax of 29 per cent that is added to the provincial capital gains 
tax that varies by jurisdiction with lower incomes paying about 10 cent of realized capital 
gain climbing to about 22 per cent for higher incomes, so a mid-point of 16 per cent has 
been chosen.  The individual's tax rate on the realized capital gain has been estimated 
to be 45 per cent and acknowledges the benefit of a dividend tax credit.  Morningstar 
has determined the 10 year, 20 year and 30 year S&P TSX total equity return to be 8.0 
per cent, 9.4 per cent and 8.9 per cent, respectively.  Based on an average of these 
historic total equity returns to provide a basis for expected returns, a historic return of 8.8 
per cent becomes an after tax expected total equity return of 6.75 per cent. 
 114 
Guidance to determine the total return to bonds is based on the change in the 
DEX Universe Bond Index, formerly the Scotia Capital Universe Bond Index, which 
tracks the total returns of investment-grade (BBB or better) government and corporate 
bonds in Canada.  The data was examined on a monthly basis for comparative purposes 
with the housing price data.  Over the last five years, the 1 year, 2 year, 3 year and 5 
year total bong return has been 6.32 per cent, 6.49 per cent, 6.58 per cent and 6.02 per 
cent, respectively (available at www.canadianbondindices.com).  The return used in the 
analysis will be after tax.  Similar to above, the individual's tax rate on the realized capital 
gain from an investment in bonds has been estimated to be 45 per cent.  Based on an 
average of these historic total bond returns to provide a basis for expected returns, the 
historic return of 6.5 per cent becomes an after tax expected total bond return of 5 per 
cent. 
4.3. The Empirical Research 
This section presents the results of household preferences for asset allocation, 
with guidance on how to evaluate housing returns based on: (1) future expectations of 
housing returns based on historical returns; (2) an equilibrium approach where house 
price appreciation and imputed rent evolve together as a stochastic process; and (3) 
implied annual rates of housing returns necessary for housing to be an asset in an 
optimal portfolio selection above the global minimum variance portfolio.  The study 
examines two primary housing markets in Canada, Metropolitan Toronto and 
Metropolitan Vancouver.  These markets were selected since they are major urban 
centres that exhibit the highest home prices in Canada with strong levels of home sale 
transactions and international appeal as destinations for new immigrants and investors.  
For the purposes of the analysis a representative household is considered, and defined 
to be a renter household that has met the mortgage credit granting guidelines and has 
also the necessary income requirements to become a homeowner of either a single 
detached home or an apartment condominium.  Table 5 summarizes the analytical 
structure to examine portfolio selection in which housing is an asset class in the 
presence of financial assets.  Each scenario will be re-calibrated by market area and by 
housing type. 
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Table 5. Analytical Structure to Examine Portfolio Selection with Housing as a 
Separate Asset Class  
Market Areas:  Metropolitan Toronto    Metropolitan Vancouver  
  
Housing Types: Single Detached House   Apartment Condominium 
 
Housing Returns: Future Expectations Follow Historic Returns and Constant  
   Imputed Rent Growth 
 
   Equilibrium Approach and Returns and Imputed Rent Follow    
   Stochastic Process 
 
   Implied Annual Rates of Housing Returns Necessary for Housing  
    to be an Asset in an Optimal Portfolio Selection Above the   
    Global Minimum Variance Portfolio 
 
Scenario #1 : One Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance  
Scenario #2 : Five Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance  
Scenario #3 : Ten Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance  
Scenario #4 : Fifteen Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance  
Scenario #5 : Twenty Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance  
Scenario #6 : Twenty Five Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance 
Scenario #7 : Thirty Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance 
Scenario #8 : Thirty Five Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance 
Scenario #9 : Forty Year Holding Period; Full Maintenance 
Scenario #10 : One Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance  
Scenario #11 : Five Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance  
Scenario #12 : Ten Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance  
Scenario #13 : Fifteen Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance  
Scenario #14 : Twenty Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance  
Scenario #15 : Twenty Five Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance 
Scenario #16 : Thirty Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance 
Scenario #17 : Thirty Five Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance 
Scenario #18 : Forty Year Holding Period; Deferred Maintenance 
 
The model requires a number of estimates for parameters and many of these 
have been previously discussed.  Table 6 provides a summary of the default values for 
the parameters.  Many of the variables are approximates that have been rounded and 
this simplification does not impact the outcome of the analysis to any significant degree.  
The price of the investment in assets (the numeraire) is fixed and normalized to one.  
The household investor derives utility from the different asset classes, and equation 51 
is the household problem that determines the optimal portfolio weights to hold. 
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Table 6. Parameters of the Economic Model 
Parameter Description         Default Value 
𝐿1  Discounted mortgage lending cost, 1 year, nominal   2.50%  
𝐿5  Discounted mortgage lending cost, 5 year, nominal   4.50%  
𝐿10 → 25  Discounted mortgage lending cost, 10 years and longer, nominal  5.00%  
n  Mortgage loan amortization period in years    25 
𝑃𝑡𝐻𝑆𝑀𝑇  Initial property value single detached home, Toronto         $500,000 
𝑃𝑡𝐻𝐴𝑀𝑇  Initial property value apartment condominium, Toronto         $300,000 
𝑃𝑡𝐻𝑆𝑀𝑉  Initial property value single detached home, Vancouver         $850,000 
𝑃𝑡𝐻𝐴𝑀𝑉  Initial property value apartment condominium, Vancouver        $375,000 
𝑅�𝐵  After tax expected total annual return on bonds    5.00%  
𝑅�𝐸𝐵  After tax expected total annual return on equity    6.75% 
𝐴  Degree of Relative Risk Aversion – Household as an Investor  5.00 
𝑀𝐹𝑆𝑀𝑇  Full annual maintenance cost, single detached home Toronto  3.00% 
𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑇  Deferred annual maintenance cost, single detached home Toronto 1.25% 
𝑀𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑇  Full annual maintenance cost, apartment condominium Toronto  3.50% 
𝑀𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑇  Deferred annual maintenance cost, apartment condominium Toronto 2.50% 
𝑀𝐹𝑆𝑀𝑉  Full annual maintenance cost, single detached home Vancouver  2.50% 
𝑀𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑉  Deferred annual maintenance cost, single detached home Vancouver 0.75% 
𝑀𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑉  Full annual maintenance cost, apartment condominium Vancouver 3.00% 
𝑀𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑉  Deferred annual maintenance cost, apartment condominium Vancouver 2.00% 
𝑋𝑡  Cost of annual property taxes      0.60% 
𝐶𝑡|𝑆𝑡  Transaction costs subject to sale of property    4.00% 
𝐶𝑅𝑀𝑇  Annual Imputed Rent Growth Rate , Toronto (Base Level : $13,500)          2.75%  
𝐶𝑅𝑀𝑉  Annual Imputed Rent Growth Rate, Metropolitan (Base Level $14,500)     3.00% 
𝐺�𝑆𝑀𝑇  Expected annual price appreciation single detached home, Toronto 5.00% 
𝐺�𝐴𝑀𝑇  Expected annual price appreciation apartment condominium, Toronto 5.50% 
𝐺�𝑆𝑀𝑉  Expected annual price appreciation single detached home, Vancouver 6.30% 
𝐺�𝐴𝑀𝑉  Expected annual price appreciation apartment condominium, Vancouver 5.25% 
𝐺�𝐻𝑀𝑇  Equilibrium annual price appreciation, Toronto    2.75% 
𝐺�𝐻𝑀𝑉  Equilibrium annual price appreciation, Vancouver   3.00% 
 
The next step in the portfolio optimization problem is to derive the variance 
covariance matrix which is based on the returns presented in Table 6 as well as the 
standard deviation of returns and correlation of returns among the assets.   
Table 7, Panels A – D, summarize the correlation matrix and the variance 
covariance matrix for each combination of asset classes.  It is assumed that the 
covariance and correlation matrices will apply equally to a home irrespective of strategic 
considerations related to property maintenance or holding period.  A number of points 
are worthwhile to highlight and are consistent with the general literature and survey of 
findings on the performance and relationship of financial assets as reported from 
financial analysts who actively manage portfolios.  First, the historical correlation 
between bond and equity returns in Canada is negative.  Second, the correlation 
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between bond returns and house price returns is much higher than the correlation 
between equity returns and house returns and this holds for both Metropolitan Toronto 
and Metropolitan Vancouver.  The correlation between bond returns and house price 
returns ranges between 39 and 46 per cent for both market areas.  The correlation 
between equity returns and house price returns ranges between 9 and 11 per cent for 
both market areas, and this suggests that house price returns are not closely related to 
returns for equities.  However, structural changes in the macro-economy may have a 
similar effect on asset price changes, and for example, a lowering of interest rates tends 
to have a positive effect on equities and house prices.  A covariance matrix was derived 
in Matlab using three parameters: (1) historic asset returns which is the change in price 
level from period to period, (2) the standard deviation of historic returns for each asset 
class over each period, and (3) the correlations of historic asset returns between the 
respective asset classes. 
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Table 7. Correlation and Covariance Matrices  
Panel A – Financial Assets and Metropolitan Toronto Single Detached Housing 
Correlation Matrix  Bonds   Equities Single Detached House 
Bonds    1.0 
Equities    0.109489 1.0 
Single Detached House  0.467712 0.094903 1.0 
 
Covariance Matrix  Bonds   Equities Single Detached House 
Bonds    0.0015  0.0013   0.0009 
Equities    0.0013  0.0888   0.0015 
Single Detached House  0.0009  0.0015   0.0027 
 
Panel B - Financial Assets and Metropolitan Toronto Apartment Condominium Housing 
Correlation Matrix  Bonds   Equities Apartment 
          Condominium 
Bonds    1.0 
Equities    0.109489 1.0 
Apartment Condominium  0.432218 0.105594 1.0 
 
Covariance Matrix  Bonds   Equities Apartment  
         Condominium 
Bonds    0.0015  0.0013  0.0010 
Equities    0.0013  0.0888  0.0018 
Single Detached House  0.0009  0.0018  0.0034 
 
Panel C – Financial Assets and Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached Housing 
Correlation Matrix  Bonds   Equities Single Detached House 
Bonds    1.0 
Equities    0.109489 1.0 
Single Detached House  0.413439 0.08952 1.0 
 
Covariance Matrix  Bonds   Equities Single Detached House 
Bonds    0.0015  0.0013  0.0011 
Equities    0.0013  0.0888  0.0018 
Single Detached House  0.0011  0.0018  0.0045 
 
Panel D – Financial Assets and Metropolitan Vancouver Apartment Condominium Housing 
Correlation Matrix  Bonds   Equities Apartment  
         Condominium 
Bonds    1.0 
Equities    0.109489 1.0 
Apartment Condominium  0.39126 0.09756 1.0 
 
Covariance Matrix  Bonds   Equities Apartment  
         Condominium 
Bonds    0.0015  0.0013  0.0010 
Equities    0.0013  0.0888  0.0020 
Single Detached House  0.0010  0.0020  0.0045 
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4.3.1. The Results 
This section summarizes the primary results of the analysis with the optimal 
portfolio weights for a household solved numerically using equation 51 under the 
different scenarios in Table 5 and the parameters outlined in Table 4.  The household 
investment strategies have the property that the optimal mix of risky assets in the 
portfolio depend on the distribution of returns, interest rate and the household`s utility 
consumption at t = 0.  The optimization results are reported as a percent of initial net 
wealth. 
The analysis starts with the assumption that a representative household will 
consider an unlevered investment in financial assets equally desirable to a levered 
investment in housing.  This follows the economic reasoning of Cauley, Pavlov and 
Schwartz (2007) which concludes that the effect of a homeownership constraint is 
largest at the beginning of a household`s life cycle for households with small net wealth 
relative to current income.  Therefore, as a household accumulates net wealth in a 
principal residence the homeownership constraint becomes less binding and the 
household can change asset allocations within an investment portfolio.  
The model output focuses on the preferences for households and assumes that a 
household has qualified through mortgage credit granting to become a homeowner.  The 
analysis avoids portfolio selection outcomes based on positive income growth or an 
income shock, following Hakansson (1970) and Cocco (2004), and the model is an 
extension and refinement of Waggle and Johnson (2009).  This allows the household to 
choose between housing types as the primary means to manage housing services 
consumption need and affordability due to initial net wealth and labour income 
constraints.  To provide a useful context, Statistics Canada, in its 2006 Census, reports 
that of the 517,720 private owned dwellings in Metropolitan Vancouver area there is an 
equal share of single detached homes to multi-family housing and of the 1,217,170 
private owned dwellings in Metropolitan Toronto there are about 60 per cent single 
detached homes.  The representation of housing options between higher-priced single 
detached housing and lower-priced apartment condominiums suggests that households 
in these markets are diverse.  Net wealth, labour income, house prices and household 
size are factors that likely influence the choice of housing type purchased.  The higher 
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price of single detached homes in Metropolitan Vancouver compared to Metropolitan 
Toronto would not be contradictory to the finding that there is a greater proportion of 
apartment condominiums in Metropolitan Vancouver than Metropolitan Toronto.  As a 
final assumption in the model, following Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007), the risk 
and rate of return to investments in residential real estate are independent of the price of 
a home.  The output clearly explains the interaction among asset returns, mortgage 
lending constraints and net wealth.  In terms of choice of housing type households with 
higher net wealth can more readily purchase a single detached home and this does 
relate to the research by Yao and Zhang (2005) which concludes that there is a 
correlation between the housing return and the labour-income growth rate.  Households 
will move up in the market over time, and the first shift is the result of a household 
changing tenure from renting to owning, and many households first purchase an 
apartment condominium which more readily offers housing services at a lower priced 
than single detached housing. 
As noted, the model allows households to consider discrete holding periods as 
illustrated in Table 4.  This has positive implications on estimating the true transaction 
costs related to homeownership since transaction costs are spread out over this holding 
period.  The mortgage loan is being amortized over a 25-year term and thus the 
mortgage balance is declining following a standard amortization schedule, but will not be 
paid off fully if the holding period is less than 25 years.  Even so, home equity is being 
accumulated by repayment of principal as well as from any capital appreciation in house 
prices over time. 
Households can express strategic considerations related to property 
maintenance and there are two options available that require different levels of cash 
outflow.  Under the first option the household keeps the property under a state of full 
maintenance and upkeep.  Under a second option the household defers property 
maintenance as noted earlier, and the ongoing property upkeep is equal to the 
mandatory payment of strata fees in the case of an apartment condominium, or a 
monthly payment for basic operational upkeep, utilities and repairs in the case of a 
single detached home.  
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Table 8 reports future expectations of the annual rate of return for house prices 
and imputed rent which is based on historical annual rates of return, as derived from 
equations 58, 59, 60 and 61 for each market area by housing type, holding period and 
property maintenance options.   
Table 8. Expected Annual Rates of Return for Housing Based on 
Historic Returns 
      Metropolitan Toronto    Metropolitan Vancouver 
     Single  Apartment   Single  Apartment 
     Detached  Condominium    Detached  Condominium     
Full Maintenance 
One Year           -2.0       0.0      -1.2     -0.5 
Five Years           0.6       1.2       0.3      0.8 
Ten Years           0.1       1.8       1.2      1.5 
Fifteen Years           0.7       2.5       2.2      2.3 
Twenty Years           1.5       3.1       3.1      2.9 
Twenty Five Years      2.2       3.6       3.6      3.5 
Thirty Years           2.7       3.9       4.3      3.8 
Thirty Five Years        3.1       4.0       4.5      4.0 
Forty Years           3.3       4.1       4.8      4.1 
 
Deferred Maintenance 
One Year            0.0       0.8       0.5      0.4 
Five Years            1.2       2.2       2.2      1.9 
Ten Years            1.9       2.9       3.1      2.5 
Fifteen Years            2.7       3.3       4.0      3.2 
Twenty Years            3.4       3.8       4.7      3.9 
Twenty Five Years      3.9       4.3       5.1      4.4 
Thirty Years            4.2       4.5       5.4      4.7 
Thirty Five Years        4.4       4.7       5.6      4.9 
Forty Years           4.6       4.9       5.8        5.1 
 
Using Table 8 expected housing returns as an input, and drawing from other data 
from Tables, 5, 6 and 7, equation 51 is solved numerically in Matlab.  All possible 
combinations of the risky assets, without including any holdings of the risk-free asset are 
plotted in risk-expected return space, and the collection of 1,000 possible different 
portfolios defines a region in this space.  Figure 8 presents a series of graphs to highlight 
the left boundary of this region which is a hyperbola and the bottom part of the frontier is 
discarded because it is inefficient.  When the mean variance efficient frontier does not 
change among the different scenarios, since the expected housing return falls below the 
expected return for bonds and equities, only one graphic is presented and this applies to 
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Metropolitan Toronto for both housing types.  For Metropolitan Vancouver, there are five 
graphs presented for the relevant scenarios for single detached housing and two graphs 
presented for the apartment condominium. 
The tangency point for the optimal portfolio selection of risky assets, given a 
household`s risk aversion, is determined by the separation property in that the interest 
rate defines the CAL.  The current household risk free lending rate is about one per cent, 
similar to the Bank of Canada Overnight Lending Rate and one year Government of 
Canada bonds.  When the lending rate or the one year mortgage loan borrowing rate of 
2.5 per cent is used to draw the CAL the portfolio selection is defined as the global 
minimum variance portfolio.  In Figure 8, Graph A, the mean variance efficient frontier is 
presented for a Metropolitan Toronto single detached house.  The global minimum 
variance portfolio allocates 78 per cent to bonds; 2 per cent to equities and 20 per cent 
to housing.  If the CAL is defined by the long term for the mortgage borrowing loan rate 
which is 5 per cent, the portfolio selection is a mix of bonds and equities along the 
efficient frontier and the optimal risky portfolio is 100 per cent equities.  The instructive 
point is that housing may form part of the optimal risky portfolio even when expected 
returns fall short of expected returns for financial assets.  This is due to the separation 
property, since the portfolio selection outcome is dependent on the interest rate which 
determines the CAL.  The findings differ from research such as Yao and Zhang (2005) 
which highlight the important buffering role of home equity for negative shocks to stock 
returns but do not discuss the interest rate to plot the CAL.  Given an initial house value 
of $500,000 and a 90 per cent LTV, the initial net wealth required to become a 
homeowner would be $2,500,000 under the global minimum variance portfolio.  This is in 
stark contrast to the maximum permissible mortgage credit granting guidelines, when 
100 per cent of initial wealth is allocated to housing under 90 per cent mortgage LTV, 
which only requires an initial wealth of $50,000, but this portfolio selection is not optimal.  
The minimum income requirements under maximum LTV, 5 per cent mortgage loan rate 
and 25 year amortization to be approved for a $450,000 mortgage loan obligation is 
approximately $106,000.  If a 35 year amortization and 2.5 per cent mortgage loan rate 
is used the minimum income requirements drops to about $65,000.  The instructive point 
is that if asset allocation is based on the global minimum variance portfolio a household 
is shifting asset allocation away from equities.  Therefore, a high initial net wealth is 
 123 
needed for homeownership, but this is not the case if the household decision is to simply 
maximize existing mortgage credit granting, specifically high ratio LTV ratios.  Yao and 
Zhang (2002) conclude that the shift in obtaining housing services from rent to 
homeownership is more likely to occur among those households with a high net wealth, 
and homeownership investment risk is a consideration. 
Figure 8. Mean Variance Efficient Frontier - Expected House Prices as Outlined 
in Table 8 With Different Scenarios as Outlined in Table 4 
Graph A: Metropolitan Toronto Single Detached House 
For Scenarios 1 - 18 
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In Figure 8 Graph B the mean variance efficient frontier is presented for a 
Metropolitan Toronto apartment condominium.  Housing is included as part of the asset 
allocation only at the global minimum variance portfolio when the CAL is drawn from a 
risk free lending rate of one per cent.  When the CAL is based on the short term 
mortgage loan borrowing rate there is a 18 per cent allocation of the portfolio to housing.  
This portfolio selection would result in an under-representation of equities shifting the 
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allocation towards bonds and housing as compared to a CAL drawn from a long term 
mortgage loan borrow rate of 5 per cent.  With the global minimum variance portfolio, 
and an initial house value of $300,000, a 90 per cent LTV would require a homeowner to 
have a net wealth of $1,670,000.  Under maximum permissible mortgage credit granting 
a household could become an apartment condominium homeowner with only $30,000 
initial net wealth, with 100 per cent asset allocation to housing.  The minimum income 
requirements under maximum LTV, 5 per cent mortgage loan rate and 25 year 
amortization to be approved for a $270,000 mortgage loan obligation is approximately 
$64,000.  If a 35 year amortization and 2.5 per cent mortgage loan rate is used the 
minimum income requirements drops to about $39,000.  When a household allocates its 
entire initial wealth to housing obviously the holding of equities and bonds is zero per 
cent and the resulting portfolio is suboptimal and subject to homeownership investment 
risk.   
Graph B: Metropolitan Toronto Apartment Condominium for Scenarios 1 – 18 
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For Metropolitan Toronto, when the interest rate is tied to the risk free lending 
rate or the short term mortgage loan rate, the global minimum variance portfolio is 
determined to be the optimal risky portfolio.  Under this portfolio selection housing forms 
part of the asset allocation, even though expected housing returns fall short of expected 
returns for financial assets.  A household that bases a portfolio selection on holding the 
global minimum variance portfolio requires an initial net wealth that is much higher than 
that required under permissible mortgage credit granting guidelines, due to high ratio 
LTV ratios.  Portfolio selection when a long term mortgage loan borrowing rate 
determines the CAL, suggests asset allocations geared to bond holdings rather than 
equities at low levels of risk tolerance, while higher risk tolerance favours more equities 
over bonds and housing is never part of the asset allocation.  The optimal portfolio 
selection is 100 per cent asset allocation to equities when the CAL is based on the long 
term mortgage loan borrowing rate and the risk aversion parameter remains at 5. 
For Metropolitan Vancouver, the single detached house scenarios 1 – 14 result in 
similar asset allocations as Metropolitan Toronto because of the interest rate which 
determines the CAL due to the separation property.  The optimal risky portfolio becomes 
the global minimum variance portfolio, when the CAL is based on a risk free lending rate 
of 1 per cent or the 2.5 per cent mortgage loan borrowing rate, and the asset allocation 
is 10 per cent to housing which is less than in Metropolitan Toronto, 88 per cent to bonds 
and only 2 per cent to equities.  Given an initial house value of $850,000 and a 90 per 
cent LTV the initial net wealth required to become a homeowner and hold the global 
minimum variance portfolio would be $8,500,000.  The optimal portfolio selection when 
the CAL is based on the long-term mortgage loan borrowing rate is 100 per cent asset 
allocation to equities.  Maximum permissible mortgage credit granting does allow a 
household to purchase a single detached home with only $85,000 net wealth, with 100 
per cent asset allocation of initial wealth to housing.  The minimum income requirements 
under maximum LTV, 5 per cent mortgage loan rate and 25 year amortization to be 
approved for a $765,000 mortgage loan obligation is approximately $182,000, and this 
decreases to about $110,000 at a one year mortgage loan rate of 2.5 per cent over a 35 
year amortization.  This would result in a zero per cent holding of bonds and equities, 
and as the mortgage principal was repaid the household could re-allocate its asset 
allocation.   
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Generally, research on homeownership investment focuses on the U.S. where 
households with relatively low net wealth but high income often make a 100 per cent 
initial wealth allocation decision in favour of homeownership.  This is due to the taxation 
deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes.  U.S. households typically become 
homeowners as soon as they can meet minimum mortgage credit guidelines, since the 
present value of the tax benefits from mortgage loan interest deductibility are decreasing 
in time, which provides an incentive to become a homeowner in the U.S., often as soon 
as a household meets minimum credit granting rules, Cetin and Zapatero (2010).  The 
result is that the portfolio selection is over-weighted in housing.  The conclusion of 
research from Yao and Zhang (2002) and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) is that 
mortgage loan interest and property tax deductibility may result in households choosing 
homeownership over renting, and this portfolio selection crowds out a more balanced 
portfolio asset allocation of bonds and equities.  The empirical results from a Canadian 
market setting without the presence of this tax policy is that housing will always form part 
of the global minimum variance portfolio. 
Graph C : Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House for Scenario 1 – 14 
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For Metropolitan Vancouver scenarios 15 – 18, where property maintenance is 
deferred, the optimal portfolio selection includes housing irrespective of what interest 
rate determines the CAL, although the asset allocations differ.  What becomes relevant 
is the level of household initial net wealth to hold the optimal portfolio selection. 
For scenario 15, as depicted in Graph D, when the CAL is based on a risk free 
lending rate or a short term mortgage loan borrowing rate, there is a 10 per cent 
allocation to housing under the global minimum variance portfolio.  The initial net wealth 
requirement for homeownership is $8,500,000, given a single detached house price of 
$850,000, since the asset allocation to housing is 10 per cent and the LTV requires a 10 
per cent down payment.  When the CAL is based on a long term mortgage loan 
borrowing rate, the optimal portfolio risk is 18 per cent.  The portfolio selection allocates 
44 per cent to housing and given a single detached house price of $850,000 and 90 per 
cent LTV, the initial net wealth requirement for homeownership is approximately 
$1,930,200, much lower than that required under the global minimum variance portfolio.  
Under maximum mortgage credit granting rules a household could become an 
apartment condominium homeowner with only $85,000 initial net wealth, with 100 per 
cent asset allocation to housing.   
Graph D : Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House for Scenario 15 
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Graph E: Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House for Scenario 16 
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Graph F : Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House for Scenario 17 
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Graph G : Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House for Scenario 18 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Asset Mix at  3.79% Risk
88% Bonds : 2% Equities : 10% Housing
Portfolio Return (%)
Capital Allocation Line = Optimal Risky Portfolio
Portfolio Risk (%)
Asset Mix at 8% Risk
12% Equities : 88% Housing
 
 
Under a long term mortgage loan borrowing rate the CAL allocates the remaining 
asset position in favour of equities at 56 per cent, which illustrates that a portfolio 
selection which uses a higher interest rate to determine the CAL, compared to the global 
minimum variance portfolio, replaces the bond holding with an asset allocation to both 
equities and housing.  This more balanced asset allocation suggests that a single 
detached housing investment in Metropolitan Vancouver over a long holding period 
when the property maintenance is deferred almost replaces a bond investment for 
households with generally high levels of risk aversion which is an interesting and 
important result. 
Scenarios 16 – 18, where the holding period is extended but where the 
household decides to defer property maintenance allows the expected return to housing 
to increase beyond that of bonds but still fall below that of a 100 per cent allocation to 
equities.  This highlights an important shift in the optimal risky portfolio selection, as 
depicted in Graphs E, F and G.  The results for the asset allocation for the global 
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minimum variance portfolio remain unchanged, the optimal risky portfolio when a long 
term mortgage loan borrowing rate is used to determine the CAL results in a decrease of 
the risk for the optimal portfolio to 8 per cent.  There is a higher asset allocation to 
housing, at 88 per cent, and the remaining 12 per cent allocation to equities without an 
allocation to bonds.  Given a single detached house price of $850,000 and 90 per cent 
LTV, the initial net wealth requirement for homeownership under the optimal portfolio 
selection is approximately $960,500, much lower than that required under the global 
minimum variance portfolio and Scenario 15.  As in the previous scenarios, this finding is 
consistent with Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz (2007) who conclude that homeownership 
crowds out asset allocation although a household`s tolerance for portfolio risk will 
influence housing asset allocation.  These research findings do include the benefits of 
mortgage interest tax deductibility which is a significant parameter of the model.   
It is worthwhile to mention that Flavin and Yamashita (2002) suggest that 
households hold quite different portfolios of financial assets because each household is 
optimizing their portfolio subject to a constraint on housing.  This constraint relates to 
household net wealth and income and the binding non-negativity constraint on financial 
assets require a household to reach a specific level of net wealth and income as part of 
optimal portfolio selection.  Cocco (2004) also concludes that among households with 
low net wealth the decision in favour of homeownership does crowd out a balanced 
portfolio selection that includes equities but this is a function of mortgage credit granting 
rules, specifically permissible LTV ratios and the household choice to maximize 
mortgage credit granting  
Since the price of a single detached home in Metropolitan Vancouver is 60 per 
cent higher than Metropolitan Toronto, homeownership in Metropolitan Vancouver will 
undoubtedly constrain portfolio selection due to affordability and higher initial wealth and 
income requirements to obtain a mortgage approval.  Cauley, Pavlov and Schwartz 
(2007) conclude that the larger the investment in a house, relative to wealth, the greater 
the effect of the homeownership constraint and the more extreme the household`s initial 
asset allocation.   
For Metropolitan Vancouver, households who select an apartment condominium 
the results for scenarios 1 – 17 are similar to the Metropolitan Vancouver single 
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detached house scenarios 1 – 14 and the results for all scenarios for Metropolitan 
Toronto.  Housing is included as part of the asset allocation only when the interest rate is 
based on the risk free lending rate or the short term mortgage loan borrowing rate and 
the global minimum variance portfolio determines the asset allocation for housing at 10 
per cent.  Given an initial house value of $375,000 and a 90 per cent LTV, the initial net 
wealth required to become a homeowner and hold the portfolio is $3,750,000.  Maximum 
permissible mortgage credit granting allows a household to become an apartment 
condominium homeowner with only $37,500 net wealth, with 100 per cent asset 
allocation to housing   The minimum income requirements under maximum LTV, 5 per 
cent mortgage loan rate and 25 year amortization to be approved for a $337,500 
mortgage loan obligation is approximately $80,000.  The required household income 
would decrease to about $68,000 using a long term mortgage rate of 5 per cent over an 
amortization period of 35 years, and this decreases to about $48,600 when a borrower is 
qualified at a one year loan rate of 2.5 per cent over a 35 year amortization.   
The work of Yao and Zhang (2005) is important to highlight in the case of 
housing in Metropolitan Vancouver since affordability is a concern among most local 
households.  These authors conclude that the decision to purchase a home is based on 
obtaining housing services and not as an investment decision and therefore 
homeownership provides an alternative to renting housing service with an embedded 
hedging benefit.  As housing is a heterogeneous good, there may be a difference in the 
level of quality of housing services provided in the purpose built rental market and the 
apartment condominium market.  Moreover, as Sinai and Souleles (2005) conclude, the 
focus on the asset price risk of home owning neglects the fact that all households are 
born “short” housing services since they have to live somewhere.  This is consistent with 
the research of Flavin and Yamashita (2002) who conclude that housing plays a dual 
role in both the consumption bundle and the asset portfolio of the household, and for this 
reason equilibrium returns where house price change is uncertain focuses the analysis 
on homeownership investment risk.   
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Graph H : Metropolitan Vancouver Apartment Condominium for Scenarios 1 – 17 
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Graph I illustrates the results for an apartment condominium in Metropolitan 
Vancouver over a 40 year holding period and under deferred property maintenance.  
This allows the expected return to housing to increase, as in scenarios 16 – 18 for 
Metropolitan Vancouver single detached housing, beyond that of bonds but still falls 
below that of equities.  A number of important findings can be highlighted.   
First, when the interest rate is based on the risk free lending rate or the short 
term mortgage loan borrowing rate the asset allocation for the global minimum variance 
portfolio.  This is only slightly changed from previous market areas, housing types and 
scenarios, with an increase in the asset allocation to housing.  The asset allocation is 87 
per cent to bonds, 1 per cent to equities and 12 per cent to housing.  This suggests a 
initial net wealth of $3,120,500 to hold the global minimum variance portfolio which is 
lower than the $3,750,000 initial net wealth requirement for scenarios 1 – 17. 
Second, when the interest rate is based on the long term mortgage loan 
borrowing rate the optimal asset allocation is 58 per cent to equities and 42 per cent to 
housing, without an allocation for bonds.  The initial net wealth requirement to hold the 
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optimal risky portfolio is $890,285 which is much lower than the global minimum 
variance portfolio.  However, under the maximum LTV ratio a household only needs an 
initial wealth of $37,500 to meet maximum permissible mortgage credit granting 
guidelines. 
Third, under either lower or higher portfolio risk than that determined as the 
optimal risky portfolio, the holding of housing as an asset class remains unchanged at 33 
per cent.  At 10 per cent portfolio risk the remaining asset allocation is 37 per cent bonds 
and 30 per cent equities.  At 20 per cent portfolio risk, equities assume the remaining 
asset allocation at a 67 per cent allocation.  This finding aligns with Yao and Zhang 
(2005), as noted before, which highlight the important buffering role of home equity for 
negative shocks to stock returns. 
The minimum income requirements to support the mortgage loan obligation 
based on the maximum LTV remains unchanged from scenarios 1 to 17. 
Graph I : Metropolitan Vancouver Apartment Condominium for Scenario 18 
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The preceding empirical findings which evaluate asset allocation for Metropolitan 
Toronto and Vancouver by housing type where expected housing returns are based on 
historic returns.  They uncover a number of instructive points, including:   
1.  Expected housing returns fall short of that for bonds and equities in 
Metropolitan Toronto under all scenarios and in Metropolitan 
Vancouver under most scenarios, this suggests that homeownership 
may be an inferior investment choice compared to financial assets. 
2.  When the CAL is based on a long term mortgage loan borrowing rate 
housing only forms part of an optimal portfolio selection in 
Metropolitan Vancouver when property maintenance is deferred, over 
long holding periods of at least 25 years for single detached housing 
and 40 years for an apartment condominium.   
3.  When the CAL is based on the risk free lending rate or short term 
mortgage loan borrowing rate the global minimum variance portfolio 
represents the optimal risky portfolio.  Housing does form part of the 
asset allocation, ranging between 10 and 12 per cent for Metropolitan 
Vancouver and 18 to 20 per cent for Metropolitan Toronto depending 
on housing type, while equities only account for 1 or 2 per cent of the 
asset allocation and bonds dominate the portfolio selection.   
4.  Since reported homeownership rates in Metropolitan Toronto and 
Metropolitan Vancouver are relatively high, and given the high initial 
wealth requirements to hold the global minimum variance portfolio it is 
likely the case that households base the homeownership decision on 
maximum permissible mortgage credit granting rules and potential 
appreciation in house values and not optimal portfolio selection.   
5.  When portfolio selection is based on the global minimum variance 
portfolio this follows the research of Cocco (2005) that 
homeownership may result in low levels of equity participation, 
although as the mortgage principal is repaid or home prices 
appreciate a household has the option to re-calibrate its asset 
allocation.   
6.  Under high ratio LTV mortgage lending, a household can allocate all 
its initial net wealth to housing and provided that minimum income 
requirements can be met this supports homeownership.  However, 
this decision poses households with a high degree of homeownership 
investment risk, especially over short holding periods.   
7.  The results of the portfolio selections indicate that the negative shocks 
to equity returns, largely a result of high levels of return volatility, can 
be offset equally by a portfolio selection that includes bonds or 
housing when examining portfolio risk ranges between 10 and 20 per 
cent.  
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4.3.2. An Equilibrium Approach 
Under the equilibrium approach, homeownership and renting are not required to 
be substitutes, but the evolution of housing returns to homeownership and those for 
rental housing are in equilibrium, as noted before.  To focus on homeownership 
investment risk the equilibrium approach allows the evolution in house prices and 
imputed rent to be uncertain and this is achieved when price and rent change follow a 
stochastic process.  The historical movement in house prices are only relevant to 
determine the volatility of returns which provide the range of possible returns over each 
unit of time with the evolution in house price and imputed rent determined by a Brownian 
motion.  Equilibrium housing returns are solved numerically derived from equations 58, 
59, 60 and 61.  Table 9 provides a summary of the observed equilibrium housing 
returns, which is the average return from 1,000 simulations for each scenario.  The 
findings profile the impact of homeownership investment risk over short holding periods.  
Of course, if homeownership were infinite or if a household remained living, for example, 
with family or friends at no cost then homeownership would not be risky at all since there 
would be no risk associated with the evolution of house price and rental rate changes 
over time, as noted by Cocco (2004).   
Sinai and Souleles (2005) found that a household which does not own housing 
must rent housing services on the spot rental market, and this will subject a household to 
rent risk, which is the uncertain annual fluctuation in rent.  Homeownership therefore 
offers a household a guaranteed stream of housing services for a known up-front price.  
The rent risk is likely to dominate over long horizons increasing the demand for 
homeownership since a household needs life-long housing services.  Finally, the rent 
risk increases in magnitude with the interaction of rent volatility and horizon, so the 
demand for owning increases faster with rent volatility for a household with a long 
horizon. 
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Table 9 . Equilibrium Housing Returns from Equations 58, 59, 60 and 61  
Panel A : Metropolitan Toronto Single Detached House 
     Full Maintenance Deferred Maintenance 
One Year Holding Period    -4.26   -2.38 
Five Year Holding Period   -2.84   -1.15 
Ten Year Holding Period   -3.19   -0.71 
Fifteen Year Holding Period   -3.09   -0.52 
Twenty Year Holding Period   -2.32    0.38 
Twenty Five Year Holding Period  -1.01    1.25 
Thirty Year Holding Period   -0.38    1.99 
Thirty Five Year Holding Period    0.55    2.20 
Forty Year Holding Period    1.00    2.25 
 
Panel B : Metropolitan Toronto Apartment Condominium 
     Full Maintenance Deferred Maintenance 
One Year Holding Period    -2.71   -1.87 
Five Year Holding Period   -1.85   -0.82 
Ten Year Holding Period   -1.21   -0.10 
Fifteen Year Holding Period   -0.89    0.17 
Twenty Year Holding Period   -0.10    1.20 
Twenty Five Year Holding Period   0.88    1.97 
Thirty Year Holding Period    1.55    1.33 
Thirty Five Year Holding Period    1.97    2.76 
Forty Year Holding Period    2.29    2.94 
 
Panel C : Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House  
     Full Maintenance Deferred Maintenance 
One Year Holding Period    -4.24   -3.42 
Five Year Holding Period   -4.05   -1.55 
Ten Year Holding Period   -4.23   -1.48 
Fifteen Year Holding Period   -4.53   -1.21 
Twenty Year Holding Period   -3.56   -0.25 
Twenty Five Year Holding Period  -2.39    0.69 
Thirty Year Holding Period   -1.26    1.58 
Thirty Five Year Holding Period   -0.50    1.75 
Forty Year Holding Period   -0.10    2.40 
 
Panel D : Metropolitan Vancouver Apartment Condominium 
        Full Maintenance  Deferred Maintenance 
One Year Holding Period    -5.83   -3.98 
Five Year Holding Period   -1.49   -0.01 
Ten Year Holding Period   -1.32    0.68 
Fifteen Year Holding Period   -1.03    0.97 
Twenty Year Holding Period   -0.02    1.63 
Twenty Five Year Holding Period   0.99    2.40 
Thirty Year Holding Period    1.05    2.73 
Thirty Five Year Holding Period    2.07    3.15 
Forty Year Holding Period    2.30    3.34 
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The key insight gained from analyzing the distribution of returns from the 
equilibrium housing approach for Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver by 
different housing type and over different holding periods, subject to different household 
considerations related to property maintenance, confirms that an investment in housing 
demands long holding periods to move from a negative return to a positive one.  This 
finding supports the research of Sinai and Souleles (2005) and highlights the economic 
value of long holding periods and strategic management of property maintenance to 
minimize the probability of negative returns associated with homeownership investment.  
Therefore, without explicitly examining the rental housing market or the benefits of 
renting compared to homeownership, there is strong evidence to suggest that when a 
household requires consumption of housing services over the short or medium term the 
rental housing market should be regarded as the primary source of housing supply. 
For Metropolitan Toronto, both the single detached house and the apartment 
condominium can realize a positive return under both full and deferred property 
maintenance but only after holding the property for at least 25 years.  If property 
maintenance is deferred the optimal holding period is reduced substantially to about 15 
or 20 years.  This result complements the earlier findings of portfolio selection when 
future expectations of returns are based on historic returns.  Homeownership in 
Metropolitan Toronto offers a household both housing services and a positive investment 
return thus offering economic value in terms of hedging uncertain changes in housing 
costs and this occurs over long holding periods. 
For Metropolitan Vancouver the results also complement the findings of the 
preceding section.  A single detached house under full property maintenance is unlikely 
to achieve a positive economic return and has a high probability of economic loss over 
all holding periods.  An apartment condominium can achieve a positive economic return 
under full property maintenance when the holding period is at least 25 years and this is 
reduced to 10 years when property maintenance is deferred.  Overall, due to the high 
cost of a single detached house, deferred property maintenance is a likely consequence 
for a household that is constrained by income or net wealth to pay for full property 
maintenance.  Moreover, in high house price neighbourhoods an apartment 
condominium reduces the potential for an economic loss and will also realize higher 
returns than a single detached house. 
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To further emphasize the findings above, the results of the equilibrium approach 
were graphed to highlight the probability distribution of a loss from a homeownership 
investment in respective housing markets under different scenarios as presented in 
Table 4.  Figure 9 illustrates the output as a series of graphs. 
For Metropolitan Toronto, a single detached house under full property 
maintenance has a 85 per cent or greater probability of a loss with a holding period of 25 
years or shorter.  Under deferred property maintenance the probability of a loss is no 
more than 7 per cent at holding periods of 25 years or longer.  For an apartment 
condominium the probability of a loss is lower than for single detached housing, and is 
close to zero for holding periods of 25 years or more under either full or deferred 
property maintenance.  If property maintenance is deferred the probability of a loss is 50 
per cent or lower for holding periods of 10 years or more. 
For Metropolitan Vancouver, a single detached house under full property 
maintenance has a probability of loss no more than 82 per cent when the holding period 
is 25 years or less, and a loss of at least 94 per cent for holding periods between 5 and 
20 years.  Under deferred property maintenance the probability of a loss is less than 5 
per cent for holding periods of 30 years or longer.  For an apartment condominium the 
probability of a loss is 10 per cent or less for holding periods of at least 20 years under 
deferred property maintenance.  If full property maintenance is carried out the probability 
of a loss increases to over 80 per cent for holding periods of 10 years or shorter. 
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Figure 9. Probability of a Loss from a Homeownership Investment Based on 
Equilibrium House Price Returns from Table 9 
The Equilibrium Approach Where Annual Home Price Appreciation and Annual Change   
in Imputed Rent  Follow the Same Stochastic Process Over Time Based on  Returns   
for  Each Market in Table 2 and Volatility of  Returns  for Each Asset in Table 3. 
Graph A : Metropolitan Toronto Single Detached House 
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Graph B : Metropolitan Toronto Apartment Condominium 
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Graph C : Metropolitan Vancouver Single Detached House  
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Graph D : Metropolitan Vancouver Apartment Condominium 
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The equilibrium approach offers findings in support of Yao and Zhang (2002) who 
conclude that always renting is suboptimal for those households that have a long term 
desire to live within a specific community as households fail to realize on the 
consumption benefits associated with homeownership over renting.  Moreover, since the 
economic return increases with time and the probability of loss decreases with time, a 
household with a long term housing horizon should become a homeowner sooner rather 
than later in life. 
4.3.3. Implied Annual Housing Returns: 
Housing as an Optimal Asset Allocation  
This section considers the implied annual housing returns a household is expecting to 
achieve so that housing is an asset in an optimal portfolio selection above the global minimum 
variance portfolio.  For the purposes of analysis, the interest rate to determine the CAL will be 
based on a long-term mortgage loan borrowing rate of 5 per cent.  It will be assumed that the 
expected returns from equities and bonds as presented in Table 5 are valid and will provide 
guidance on the general market outlook, given that the holding periods for housing can extend up 
to forty years.  This analysis of implied views assumes that the asset returns for bonds and 
equities can remain fixed and exogenous.  It could equally be possible that the expected housing 
returns in Table 9 hold and investors express different expectations on the returns for equities 
and bonds and this may be logical given the performance of financial markets following the 2007 
financial crisis.  However, in keeping with the housing focus, Table 10 summarizes the implied 
annual housing returns for housing to be included as an asset with a 33 per cent allocation. The 
optimal portfolio selection is above the global minimum variance portfolio and the CAL is 
determined by the 5 year mortgage loan borrowing rate, by numerically solving equation 51.   
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Table 10. Implied Annual Rates of Return When Housing is an Asset in an Optimal 
Portfolio Selection Above that Defined as the Global Minimum Variance 
Portfolio  
   Metropolitan Toronto       Metropolitan Vancouver 
   Single  Apartment       Single Apartment  
   Detached  Condominium      Detached  Condominium  
Full Maintenance 
One Year       12.0       10.8     12.9     10.9 
Five Years      10.1        9.2     10.5       9.0 
Ten Years       9.2        8.5       9.4       8.4 
Fifteen Years       8.4        7.8       8.4       7.7 
Twenty Years       7.8        7.3       7.8       7.2 
Twenty Five Years      7.3        6.9       7.3       6.8 
Thirty Years       7.0        6.7       7.0       6.5 
Thirty Five Years      6.8        6.5       6.8       6.4 
Forty Years       6.6        6.3       6.6       6.3 
 
Deferred Maintenance 
One Year       10.4        9.8      11.1      9.9 
Five Years         8.6        8.4        9.0      7.9 
Ten Years         7.8        7.6        8.0      7.5 
Fifteen Years         7.0        7.0        7.2      6.9 
Twenty Years         6.5        6.6        6.6      6.4 
Twenty Five Years        6.2        6.3        6.2      6.1 
Thirty Years         5.9        6.0        5.9      5.8 
Thirty Five Years       5.8        5.9        5.7      5.6 
Forty Years        5.6        5.8        5.6       5.4 
 
Figure 9 clearly shows that the implied annual housing always exceed that of 
bonds, and this holds also for equities except at long holding periods, even though 
deferred maintenance is important to the results.  At first glance the high level of implied 
returns to housing suggests a large risk to homeownership over short holding periods or 
unrealistic expectations of housing returns.  Some households may also express short 
term expectations that housing price appreciation will exceed that of financial assets.  
This may be possible where constraints in land development and housing supply, 
combined with higher than anticipated levels of household demand for housing, leads to 
short-term dis-equilibrium and put upward pressure on house prices, but housing assets 
likely exhibit mean reversion to historic averages similar to financial assets.  So the 
implied housing returns must be considered more closely.  
The results in Table 10 suggest that if an investor of speculator purposefully 
enters the Metropolitan Toronto or Metropolitan Vancouver housing market for a short 
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holding period the implied returns are high over short holding periods and higher for a 
single detached house than an apartment condominium and obviously higher under full 
property maintenance.  The implied return declines over the holding period with an 
apartment condominium under deferred property maintenance recording the lowest 
implied housing return.  But this begs the question as to why investors and speculators 
buy housing over short term holding periods?  Policy makers identify the negative 
consequence of this activity as fuelling house price appreciation, making housing less 
affordable for local residents.  For example, the Mayor of the City of Vancouver in his 
December 5, 2011 inaugural speech proposed a blue-ribbon panel to investigate 
affordable housing in the City with one idea being profit-taking measures on housing 
speculators.  Similar concerns have been raised with speculation in Metropolitan Toronto 
where the estimate is that 40 per cent of new housing is bought by investors hoping to 
realize high, short term returns from housing investments.  Canadian Business explored 
this in the September 13, 2010 issue.  Given that there are relatively high implied returns 
to housing compared to expected housing returns (Table 8) and equilibrium housing 
returns (Table 9), this suggests that housing is an asset that investors can gain unique 
value from through enhancements and usage by direct ownership control that does not 
exist for financial assets.   
There are a number of possible reasons to hold housing as a short term 
investment.  First, to realize on a high short term return properties can be upgraded 
through high return renovation activity or a full tear down and re-build.  Investors may 
have experience in construction, and therefore are in the market seeking specific 
properties to purchase, likely those properties in need of significant repair and 
renovation.  The Appraisal Institute of Canada has developed RENOVA, an interactive 
web-based guide designed to give consumers and real estate professionals an estimate 
of the return on investment for a variety of home improvements.  Table 11 lists the top 
home renovation items by return on investment, and a combination of these renovations, 
given the high level of deferred property maintenance on any specific property, could 
offer the returns necessary to support the implied returns from a short holding period and 
these apply to Metropolitan Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver.   
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Table 11. Returns on Investment from Various Renovation Activities  
Renovation Type    Expected Return on Investment 
Add New Bathroom     80 – 100 % 
Bathroom Renovation     75 – 100 % 
Kitchen Renovation     75 – 100 % 
Replace Door Handles, Hardware and Fixtures  75 – 100% 
New Interior Painting     50 – 100 % 
New or Add Light Fixtures    60 – 70 % 
New Flooring      50 – 75 % 
New House Entryway     50 – 75 % 
New or Add Fence and Patio Deck   50 – 75% 
Upgrade and Replace Landscaping   25 – 50% 
 
 
Source: Appraisal Institute of Canada Renova, 2011 http://www.aicanada.ca 
 
 
Second, a homeowner owns 100 per cent of the housing unit, and this differs 
from owning a fractional interest in a financial asset.  While housing renovations offer 
positive returns on investment, a homeowner can also gain utility from a housing unit 
when part of the home can be used for economic gain.  This can be achieved by 
establishing, for example, a home office or even storing the household`s means of 
production or even renting out an accessory rental suite.  Finance theory supports a 
premium for a shareholder to gain “control” over a corporation through acquisition of a 
majority shareholder position and this may not be dissimilar from homeownership where 
the household must, in the open market, outbid other multiple control seekers for a 
housing unit.  The share price premium for corporate control after the announcement 
can be as high as 40 per cent before the takeover, Jensen and Ruback (1983) and 
Kraizberg and Teall (2009). 
Third, what Table 10 does not highlight is the consistent upward movement in 
rental rates over time, and the research of Sinai and Souleles (2005) suggests that 
homeownership represents a hedge against the cost of renting.  The risk is essentially 
stabilized at the decision to shift from renting to owning housing, since a household no 
longer obtains housing services in the spot rental market.  The imputed rent yield begins 
at t = 0, when homeownership commences, and reflects rental rate increases.  The 
computation of imputed rent yield assumes that the initial property value remains fixed 
and that rental rate levels rise steadily over time.  Figure 10 illustrates the imputed rent 
yield by housing market and property type over time.  At 40 years, the imputed rent yield 
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gained through homeownership makes the return to housing significant exceeding that 
of financial assets in all cases except for Metropolitan Vancouver single detached 
housing.  Moreover, in the case of deferred property maintenance the imputed rent yield 
offsets the cost of property maintenance and property taxes providing a positive net cash 
flow to the homeowner. 
Figure 10. Imputed Rent Yield Based on Initial Property Value  
Over Different Holding Periods by Market Area and Housing Type 
𝑃0𝐻𝑖,𝑡 / 𝐶𝑅𝐻,𝑡 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 10 20 30 40
Holding Period
Per Cent
Metro Toronto
Apartment 
Condominium
Metro  Vancouver
Single Detached
Metro  Toronto
Single Detached
Metro  Vancouver 
Apartment 
Condominium
 
Note.  The calculation takes the initial property value from Table 5 in the numerator and divides 
this by the annual imputed rent which begins at the stated base level and increases over 
the respective holding period at the annual imputed rent growth rate from Table 5.  
The imputed rent yield is a very simple financial metric that a household can 
measure to gauge the economic value of homeownership by housing type.  It is 
particularly relevant if the household decides not to sell but remain in the house 
“infinitely” or until a significant life event.  It raises an important investment reality for 
households that retire as homeowners, and offers a growing annuity equal to the cost of 
an alternative, but comparable rental housing unit.  Using homeownership as a strategic 
household finance tool to hedge the inflation of renting housing services is a valid 
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consideration for households no longer earning labour income and whose income 
source is not indexed to inflation. Through homeownership the cost of housing services 
is fully hedged and all that remains are effective means to manage property 
maintenance and pay for property taxes.  For households no longer earning labour 
income and not holding an indexed pension, selling a principal residence may be 
deleterious to financial well-being as the household enters retirement years, and this is 
in contrast to the findings of Yao and Zhang (2005).   
The empirical results support the household decision in favour of 
homeownership, particularly when the choice is for a long term hold of an apartment 
condominium as a way to obtain housing services and to hedge uncertain house price 
changes.  This suggests that if a household, particularly one and two person 
households, can gain adequate housing services from an apartment condominium, and 
not over-consume housing services by owning a single detached home, the imputed rent 
yield will exceed returns from financial assets and imputed rent yields will increase over 
time at a rate equal to the rise in rental rates.  For Metropolitan Vancouver and Toronto, 
the imputed rent yield increases with time and apartment condominiums offer a higher 
yield than single detached housing due to the lower initial house price and the basis of 
calculating imputed rent which uses a two bedroom apartment.  In Metropolitan Toronto 
the imputed rent yield for an apartment condominium exceeds 14 per cent by year 40, 
while in Metropolitan Vancouver the yield exceeds 12 per cent.  These findings are 
consistent with Sinai and Souleles (2005) who conclude that unlike standard financial 
assets, a homeownership interest in housing pays out an annual dividend equal to the 
ex post spot rent, and so provides a hedge against rent risk.  The imputed rent yield 
benefit also is evident for single detached housing in Metropolitan Vancouver and 
Toronto, although more muted.  However, a household that owns a single detached 
home has the option to gain efficiencies through ownership of a property that may be too 
large for personal consumption requirements.  This can be done by renting out an 
accessory rental unit such as a basement suite, or using part of the property for a home 
office or to store items related to the household`s means of production such as 
equipment and supplies.   
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Chapter 5.  
 
Concluding Comments: 
Today Homeownership is an 
Investment Decision for Canadians 
During each of the four regimes in Canadian housing finance the institutional 
framework for housing development and mortgage lending evolved at varying levels but 
generally in ways to support homeownership.  For example, while MLI came into effect 
in Canada in 1954 for new housing, it was not until the late 1960s that resale homes and 
multi-family apartment and townhouse units were eligible for NHA MLI.  By the 2000s, 
multi-family condominium developments became the dominant housing form in 
Canada`s main urban markets, offering affordable, smaller housing options (in contrast 
to the standard single-detached subdivisions) for a wide range of households.  Various 
incentives such as the Canadian Home Buyer Plan have been expanded and continue to 
allow households to access wealth in a tax sheltered RRSP for home purchase 
downpayment, confirming that the government and financial services sector recognize 
the importance of homeownership in a principal residence.  
The retail platform for mortgage loans has also changed with the increasing 
presence of dedicated mortgage lending specialists and mortgage brokers.  Through 
sophisticated direct marketing, mortgage lenders and brokers widely promote the 
benefits of homeownership in a principal residence as an investment decision and home 
equity as a household finance tool.  But if homeownership is to be considered as part of 
a critical asset allocation consistent with portfolio theory, it is the integration of housing 
finance with the capital market that is integral to the current market based system.  Two 
securities, the principal residence and the mortgage loan, can be managed by a 
household to smooth inter-temporal household consumption if adequate home equity is 
available.   
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The expansion of mortgage securitization which began in 1987 with NHA MBS 
gained international respect among investors with the CMB program in 2001.  This 
stabilized and lowered mortgage lending costs while providing the funding source that 
allows many financial institutions to meet minimum capital reserve requirements.  The 
CMB program, secured by NHA MLI, sets the foundation for a market based mortgage 
system addressing many of the risks that constrained mortgage funding historically.  The 
system was fully tested during the 2007 to 2011 financial credit crisis.  During this time, 
in contrast to commercial lending, households with prime credit ratings that could adhere 
to NHA mortgage credit granting rules, obtained mortgage funding at low mortgage loan 
rates, and with the most flexible mortgage terms in Canadian housing finance history. 
This research focuses on the role of the domestic mortgage lending system in 
support of households that have the option to become homeowners.  The research 
proposes two indices based on a comprehensive set of features and indicators present 
in the domestic nation.  The first index considers the degree to which a domestic 
mortgage market is liberal and a second index considers the degree to which a domestic 
mortgage market is flexible.  The liberal index relates to the domestic homeownership 
rate, while the flexible index relates to the domestic level of mortgage debt per capita.  
When the indices are combined on a matrix they serve to plot the relative position of a 
domestic mortgage market system to confirm whether it is dynamically complete, 
supporting homeownership as an investment.   
The indices proposed in this research are applied to a cross-country comparison, 
and represent a refinement and extension to the “synthetic index of mortgage market 
development” and “index of government participation in housing finance markets”, both 
set forth by the IMF (2008, 2011) as well as other research.  The conclusion is that the 
mortgage markets of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and 
Australia are sufficiently liberal and flexible so that a representative household can 
evaluate homeownership as an investment decision.  The findings support the analysis 
of an investment in homeownership as an optimal portfolio selection in the presence of 
bonds and equities.  This occurs when a household can choose among different housing 
types over different holding periods and expresses strategic considerations related to 
property maintenance. 
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Household preferences in favour of homeownership are complex and ultimately 
the rent versus buy decision is shaped by the need to obtain housing services over time 
as well as the investment qualities of different housing types over various holding 
periods and strategic considerations related to property maintenance.  The mortgage 
lending system is also relevant.  This includes the available mortgage loan borrowing 
rates, as well.   
The empirical results highlight a number of instructive points.  First, the mortgage 
loan borrowing rate and the available household lending rate shape household asset 
allocation when a stylized Markowitz optimal portfolio selection model includes equities, 
bonds and housing among the asset mix.  If the CAL is defined by the long term 
mortgage borrowing loan rate, housing only forms part of an optimal portfolio in 
Metropolitan Vancouver for a single detached house under deferred maintenance at a 
holding period of 25 years or more and an apartment condominium under deferred 
maintenance at a holding period of 40 years.  In Metropolitan Toronto housing is never 
part of the optimal portfolio selection.  This would suggest that households would tend to 
avoid homeownership, yet homeownership rates are high in both markets.  An important 
insight is that due to the separation property, when the CAL is defined by the risk free 
rate to represent the available lending rate of one per cent, or a short term year 
mortgage loan borrowing rate of 2.5 per cent, then the global minimum variance portfolio 
is the optimal portfolio selection.  While largely dominated by a holding of bonds and a 
modest holding of equities the global minimum variance portfolio includes housing for 
both market areas even though the expected returns to housing is inferior to the returns 
from financial assets.  However, initial net wealth requirements for housing within this 
portfolio selection are substantial than that required under maximum permissible 
mortgage lending credit granting if a household allocates all of its initial net wealth to 
qualify for a mortgage loan and assumes the maximum LTV ratio.  As such, the 
homeownership decision for most households is based on mortgage credit granting rules 
and not optimal portfolio selection and homeowners bear unique investment risk.   
Second, the equilibrium approach highlights the potential homeownership 
investment risks and verifies that when house prices and imputed rent evolve together in 
a random fashion there is a high probability of economic loss in both Metropolitan 
Toronto and Metropolitan Vancouver.  In Metropolitan Toronto a single detached house 
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under full property maintenance has a probability of loss of at least 82 per cent when the 
holding period is 25 years or shorter.  Under deferred property maintenance there is a 
zero per cent probability of an economic loss at 30 years or longer.  In Metropolitan 
Vancouver a single detached house under full property maintenance has a probability of 
loss greater than 82 per cent when the holding period is 25 years or shorter.  Under 
deferred property maintenance there is a 4 per cent probability of an economic loss at 30 
years or longer.  In both market areas, for an apartment condominium, the probability of 
a loss is 10 per cent for holding periods of 25 years or more under either full or deferred 
maintenance.  If property maintenance is deferred the probability of a loss is no greater 
than 50 per cent for holding periods of 10 years or more.  Therefore, without explicitly 
examining the rental housing market or the benefits of renting compared to 
homeownership, there is strong evidence to suggest that when a household requires 
consumption of housing services over the short or medium term the rental housing 
market should be regarded as the primary source of housing supply. 
Third, the implied annual rate of returns for housing to represent the dominant 
asset allocation in an optimal portfolio selection always exceeds that of bonds and 
equities, except at long holding periods even though deferred property maintenance is 
important to the results.  The instructive point is that the high level of implied returns to 
housing suggests a risk to holding housing over short holding periods unless the 
expectation of households is that housing price appreciation will exceed that of financial 
assets.  In this regard, the findings also suggest that implied housing returns, especially 
if the market has consistent demand among short term investors, may fuel house price 
appreciation in some markets.  There are possible reasons why implied housing returns 
are high.  First, to realize on a high short term return, there is an immediate intention for 
the new property owner to upgrade the property through high return renovation activity 
or a full tear down and re-build.  Second, in keeping with finance theory on corporate 
control, utility from homeownership is increased when a homeowner can use part of the 
home for economic gain by establishing, for example, a home office, renting out an 
accessory suite or even storing the household`s means of production.  Third, 
homeownership represents a hedge against the cost of renting.  Rental risk is essentially 
stabilized at the decision to shift from renting to owning, since a household no longer 
obtains housing services in the spot rental market.  The empirical results support the 
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household decision in favour of homeownership, particularly when the choice is for a 
long term decision in favour of homeownership as a way to obtain housing services and 
to hedge random house price changes.  This suggests that if a household does not over-
consume housing services, the imputed rent yield will not only exceed returns from 
financial assets but also increase over time at a rate equal to the rise in rental rates, and 
as a secondary benefit a homeowner will gain from capital appreciation of housing.   
In summary, households do not likely make the choice to become homeowners 
as part of an optimal portfolio selection due to initial wealth requirements.  There is 
evidence to suggest that permissible mortgage credit granting rules impact the 
homeownership decision, and over a long-term horizon homeownership allows rent risk 
to be hedged and offers gains from imputed rent yield.  The high implied return from 
holding housing over the short term suggests that there are positive economic gains to 
be made from specific renovation activities.  Not only are there economic risks to over-
consuming housing services as a homeowner, but when a household requires housing 
services over the short term the rental housing market should be regarded as the 
primary source of housing supply.  For policy makers, future research may investigate 
the use of tax credits to support property maintenance so that households can live in 
adequate housing over the long term, rather than mortgage loan interest deductibility 
(similar to the U.S.) which may simply encourage households to carry a large mortgage 
loan obligation.  The tax deductibility is in effect a public subsidy to minimize personal 
taxation.  Other future research may focus on the impact of homeownership and high 
house prices on household participation in equity markets. 
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Appendix A.  
 
Timeline of Some Key Events in 
Canadian Housing Finance  
1900 – 1935 
• Mortgage credit constraints often resulted in homeownership being achieved by 
way of cash purchases, sweat equity, vendor mortgages, and equitable 
mortgages provided by non-institutional lenders through private, nonregistered 
contracts. 
• Residential mortgages typically offered by financial institutions such as Life 
Insurance Companies and Trust and Mortgage Loan institutions. 
• 1918 federal mortgage loan plan introduced with a set 5% mortgage loan interest 
rate. 
• Desjardins in Québec established to serve retail and commercial lending needs in 
Québec. 
• Direct government lending and set interest rates. 
1934 
• U.S. Federal Housing Administration introduces mortgage loan insurance. 
1935 
• Dominion  Housing Act allowed financial institutions to participate in a joint system 
with the federal government to offer amortized  residential mortgage loans to 
qualifying households. 
1938 – 1944 
• Creation of National Housing Act (NHA) in Canada.  Revised in 1944 setting NHA 
mortgage loan rates at 4.5% permitting up to 30 year amortizations. 
1946 
• Central (later Canada) Mortgage Housing Corporation established. 
• Mortgage borrowers offered loan-to-value ratios of 93.33% of the property value. 
• Joint loans between government and banks. 
1954 
• Mortgage loan insurance introduced in Canada for mortgage borrowers without a 
33.33% down payment. 
• Insured mortgage loans and interest rate ceilings outlined by legislation. 
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1966 
• BC and Alberta introduce strata title condominium legislation allowing for 
homeownership in parts of multi-family buildings, and then introduced in Ontario in 
1970. 
1967 
• Canada’s Bank Act amended to allow banks to fully participate in mortgage 
lending and abolishing interest rate ceiling. 
• Caisse de dépôt placement du Québec established. 
• Market interest rates took over from interest rate ceilings. 
1971 
• AHOP provides subsidy to low-income households to become homeowners 
1980 
• Bank Act Amendment to allow international banks to establish Canadian 
subsidiaries. 
1987 
• NHA MBS introduced. 
1992 
• Canada`s Home Buyer Plan and First Home Loan Insurance Program offered 
95% LTVs. 
2001 
• CMB Program introduced. 
2007 
• Covered Bonds first used in Canada following the financial credit crisis. 
2008 to 2013 
• Canada’s Department of Finance prescribes limits on mortgage credit granting 
rules for NHA Insured Mortgage Loan Insurance Products. 
1998, 2004 and 2013 
• Basel I (1988) and II (2004) and III (2013) Accords set capital reserve 
requirements. 
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Appendix B.  
 
Statistical Analysis of the Index of 
Mortgage Market Development 
Figure B1 summarizes the applications of the use of the indices of mortgage market 
development.  It identifies the expected household behaviour related to both a liberal 
and a flexible mortgage market.  This includes the relationship of a liberal mortgage 
market with homeownership and the relationship of a flexible mortgage market with 
household mortgage debt levels. 
Figure B1: 
Statistical Analysis of the Index of Mortgage Market Development 
Panel A : Index of Liberal Mortgage Features and Indicators and Homeownership Rate 
Homeownership Rate (percent)
Sources: most recent available data based on report publication date from European Mortgage Federation; Australian Bureau of Statistics; Japan, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau; Statistics Canada; U.S. Census Bureau; and Internal Monetary Fund.
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Sources for the data include the European Mortgage Federation for the European nations; Bond 
Market Association and Federal Reserve for the U.S.; Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics; Bank of Japan and the Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Statistics Canada and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Monetary Fund to 
obtain other data and for general data verification. 
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Panel B : Index of Flexible Mortgage Features and Indicators and  Homeownership Rate 
Homeownership Rate (percent)
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Sources: most recent available data based on report publication date from European Mortgage Federation; Australian Bureau of Statistics; Japan, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau; Statistics Canada; U.S. Census Bureau; and Internal Monetary Fund.  
Sources for the data include the European Mortgage Federation for the European nations; Bond 
Market Association and Federal Reserve for the U.S.; Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics; Bank of Japan and the Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Statistics Canada and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Monetary Fund to 
obtain other data and for general data verification. 
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Panel C : Index of Combined Mortgage Features and Indicators and Homeownership Rate 
Homeownership Rate (percent)
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Sources: most recent available data based on report publication date from European Mortgage Federation; Australian Bureau of Statistics; Japan, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau; Statistics Canada; U.S. Census Bureau; and Internal Monetary Fund.  
Sources for the data include the European Mortgage Federation for the European nations; Bond 
Market Association and Federal Reserve for the U.S.; Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics; Bank of Japan and the Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Statistics Canada and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Monetary Fund to 
obtain other data and for general data verification. 
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Panel D : Index of Flexible Mortgage Features and Indicators and Mortgage Debt Per Capita 
Mortgage Debt Per Capita (2009 ($) current prices)
Sources: Internal Monetary Fund and estimates prepared by author.
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Sources for the data include the European Mortgage Federation for the European nations; Bond 
Market Association and Federal Reserve for the U.S.; Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics; Bank of Japan and the Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Statistics Canada and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Monetary Fund to 
obtain other data and for general data verification. 
As Figure B1 illustrates in Panel A, the Index of Liberal Mortgage Features in a nation is 
positively correlated with its domestic homeownership rate, with a R2 of 0.31.  If Italy is 
removed from the analysis the correlation increases sharply, with a R2 of 0.59, and this 
may be appropriate since the homeownership rate is already one of the highest among 
OECD nations even without a liberal system.  The other outlier is the U.S. and research 
by Green (2008) and Shiller (2008) among others, has concluded that the U.S. mortgage 
system with nonrecourse mortgage borrower may be too liberal in granting mortgage 
loan approvals or mortgage loan insurance, and the U.S. homeownership rate has not 
likely been enhanced by such a liberal system.  The only exception may be among 
subprime borrower classes which may be dis-proportionately represented in the U.S., 
although this has not been confirmed.  Therefore, by excluding Italy and the U.S. the 
correlation increases, with a R2 of 0.75, which is a level attained by the IMF 2011 study.  
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Germany could also be considered an outlier with a much higher homeownership rate 
than would be expected given its liberal index. 
In Panel B it is important to note that the Index of Flexible Mortgage Features in a nation 
does not correlate in any significant way with the domestic homeownership rate.  
Moreover, in Panel C, even when an Index of Combined Mortgage Features and 
Indicators is created by equally blending the liberal and flexible features and indicators in 
a nation, there is no significant correlation with the domestic homeownership rate. 
Panel D considers whether a representative household in any nation draws upon levels 
of mortgage debt which are commensurate with the Index of Flexible Mortgage 
Features.  The variable used is mortgage debt per capita in 2009 dollars, and this 
variable is derived from statistics published by the IMF.  The reasoning is that 
households who borrow within a flexible mortgage market and need to use mortgage 
funds as a household finance tool to manage household consumption will have 
mortgage debt levels based on the flexibility of the system and the size of the household, 
and therefore per capita levels are appropriate to use.  The statistical result is significant 
and the outcome is similar to the results expressed in Panel A, with a R2 of 0.74.  The 
nations which exhibit mortgage debt per capita in line with the flexible index are the 
Netherlands, Canada, Italy, France and Germany.  Surprisingly, given the Flexible Index 
derived, the U.S. and the U.K. should report much higher levels of mortgage debt per 
capita, while Denmark, Australia, Ireland and Spain should report lower levels.  For the 
U.S. this may be related to a high concentration of mortgage debt in particular regions 
and among certain borrower classes, while the general market could obtain more 
mortgage debt but decided not to, and this may also hold for the U.K. 
 
